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ABSTRACT 
 
The dearth of empirical evidence across developing countries on whether trade 
liberalization would lead a country to specialize in dirty industries to exploit its 
comparative advantages in trade, motivates this thesis. The thesis uses the case of Kenya, 
―a lower-middle income country with the largest economy in Eastern Africa― to 
investigate two fundamental questions: (i) will Kenya’s realization of its comparative 
advantages in trade, relative to those of its neighbors, heighten the risk of specialization 
in dirty production? and (ii) will Kenya’s trade competitiveness be adversely impacted by 
its implementation of an environmental tax that directly targets polluting energy inputs? 
Compared to a 2009 base-run, the impact of three alternative ex-ante policies were 
quantitatively evaluated: further trade liberalization, alone; pollution abatement, alone; 
and joint implementation of these policies. A static computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model for Kenya, that is theoretically founded on the tradition of CGE models for 
open developing economies by the World Bank (Dervis, et al., 1982), was developed to 
investigate these fundamental issues. Deepening Kenya’s trade liberalization, alone, was 
found to have beneficial effects on output, with the risk that the country could intensify 
its specialization in dirty industries. In comparison, an environmental policy in the form 
of a tax on energy inputs, alone, reduced pollution in energy-intensive industries, but was 
costly in terms of falling output. Potential worsening of Kenya’s environmental situation 
might, nevertheless, be mitigated without adversely affecting output through a mix of 
policy interventions. In conclusion, even if political commitments for a cleaner 
environment were in place in Kenya, which is far from certain, further trade liberalization 
without concrete policy interventions to abate industrial pollution, might create or 
exacerbate environmental degradation. 
 
Keywords: Kenya; trade liberalization; environmental tax; dirty industries; CGE. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Overview 
 
A controversy over the linkages between trade opening and environment quality emerged 
in the early 1970s leading to the incorporation of environmental concerns in the 
agreement of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) (Beghin, et al., 1994)
1
. The discussion pits environmentalists, who argue 
that intensification of economic activities inevitably contribute to environmental 
degradation and likely ecological demise, against trade economists, who contend that the 
process of achieving economic progress itself will eventually resolve environmental 
problems (Shafik, 1994). Developing countries with outward-oriented economic policies 
are said to reap a relatively higher dividend from globalization (Beghin, et al., 2002b:3-
14). On the contrary, however, critics of globalization contend that it quickly manifests 
itself in depletion of finite natural resources, degradation of biodiversity, and 
intensification of pollution (Kirkpatrick and Scrieciu, 2008:497). Above all, 
globalization, and trade, if not the main cause of, are key contributors to, environmental 
damage (Nordström and Vaughan, 1999; Beghin, et al., 2002b:3). 
 
The discourse on free trade-environmental quality nexus is relevant in the case of Kenya. 
Graduated only recently to the lower-middle income status by the World Bank, the 
country has the largest economy in Eastern Africa, and in 2015 was ranked 8th in Africa 
in terms of nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP). A founder member of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), Kenya is a major player in free trade initiatives in the East 
African Community (EAC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA). Kenya’s trade openness ratio fluctuated between 52.2% and 64.6% over the 
1961-2009 period (Musila, et al., 2015)
2
 and, according to the World Bank (2016), 
averaged 52.5%, as a percentage of GDP, during the 2009-2015 period. To deepen its 
                                                          
1
 Also see: “The environment: a specific concern” and “Trade and environment in the WTO”. World Trade 
Organization (WTO, 2016).  Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/. 
2
 Musila, et al. (2015) define trade openness ratio as a quotient between the sum of exports and imports and 
GDP. 
 2 
 
trade opening agenda, in September 2016, Kenya signed a free trade pack with the 
European Union (EU), under the auspices of the EAC. Hence, Kenya’s trade openness 
ratio is bound to rise further because of these trade-opening initiatives. On the whole, the 
Kenyan economy is highly sensitive to trade liberalization reforms.  
 
Kenya’s real GDP growth accelerated to 5.6% in 2015, up from 3.3% in 2009 
(International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2016), thanks to its outward-oriented economic 
policies. In 2014, the agriculture sector ―that provide essential raw materials for 
industrialization―, and the manufacturing sector, contributed 30%, and 11%, 
respectively, to Kenya’s real GDP (World Bank, 2016). Regarding the contribution to 
value-added in production, the leading sector is services, followed by agriculture, and 
then industry. Kenya’s outward-oriented economy is ubiquitously market driven, across 
products, factors, capital, and foreign exchange markets. There are structural bottlenecks, 
however. Unfavorable terms of trade shocks have caused Kenya’s current account deficit, 
as a percentage of GDP, to widen from 4.6% in 2009 to 8.2% in 2015 (IMF, 2016) and, 
furthermore, the country’s overall unemployment rate stands at about 9% (World Bank, 
2016), and is even higher among the youth. 
 
Kenya’s economic development is driven, mainly by its comparative advantages in trade, 
factors, and natural resources. With regard to the latter, the country stands ready to 
exploit its recently discovered coal and oil reserves
3
 to further drive its economy to a 
solid middle income status by 2030.  Clearly, this will have major environmental 
consequences. Nevertheless, there is heightened civil society activism, that builds on the 
Wangari Maathai (1940-2011) ―the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate―, who called on 
her fellow Kenyans, and Africans in general, “to take charge of their environment” 
(Green Belt Movement, 2015).  
 
                                                          
3
 Kenya has recently discovered recoverable oil deposits and is building a 960 MW coal-fired power plant 
in its coastal city of Lamu (Kant, et al., 2014). Exports of oil is planned to commence in mid-2017 (see 
article by Bloomberg, “Kenya From Nowhere Plans East Africa’s First Oil Exports: Energy” at:  
http://www.bloomberg.com/). 
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At present, Kenya is a low emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs). However, the risks of 
environmental degradation are rising because of a growing population at 2.7% per 
annum, a demographic shift towards urban that is estimated at an annual rate of 4.15% 
over the 2015-2020 period (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(UN ESA), 2014), and a rapid pace of economic and infrastructure developments. Data 
by the World Bank (2016) show that the proportion of Kenyan population exposed to 
particulate matter, PM2.5 air pollution
4 
that exceed the World Health Organization 
(WHO)’s guidelines, increased significantly, from 43.9% in 1990 to 59.8% in 2013. This 
is as PM2.5 air pollution rose by 8.9% between 2000 and 2011 (World Bank, 2016). Over 
the same period, emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) increased by 30.2%, those of nitrous 
oxide (NO2) by 24.1%, and methane (CH4) by 24.5% (World Bank, 2016). The growth 
of emissions from the energy and transportation sectors is projected to add 43 MtCO2eq 
(million tons CO2 equivalent) of GHGs by 2030, compared to the situation in 2013 
(Kant, et al., 2014). A major contradiction is that while the country’s National Climate 
Change Action Plan (NCCAP) envisages a low-carbon economy by 2030, Kenya’s 
Vision 2030 aims to drive industrialization through higher utilization of fossil fuels for 
electricity generation (Kant, et al., 2014).  
 
With freer trade, and given the classical theory of trade, a country might specialize and 
expand economic activities in the area where it has a comparative advantage in trade (see 
Kirkpatrick and Scrieciu, 2008:498). Cross-country empirical evidence concerning 
whether a country might specialize in dirty production to exploit its comparative 
advantages in trade is, however, lacking in many developing countries. In Mexico, 
unilateral trade liberalization under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
was associated with a 3.2% rise in real GDP, and a 2.5% to 4.8% rise in all major 
pollutants (Beghin, et al., 1995). Results that are more drastic were found for Costa Rica, 
where comparative advantages in polluting sectors increased emissions by 15%-20% as 
trade flows rose significantly, compared to a 2010 benchmark scenario (Dessus and 
Bussolo, 1998).  
                                                          
4
 Particulate matter (PM) ―also known as particle pollution―, comprise of tiny pieces of solids or liquids 
that are found in the air, and if less than 2.5 micrometers, are harmful to human health when inhaled.  
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These outcomes suggest that trade opening damages the environment. If this were the 
case, major concerns could emerge in Kenya, given the country’s economic 
transformative agenda that is shifting the economy towards agroindustry manufacturing. 
As discussed further in Chapter III, already, 17% of Kenya’s exports are in energy-
intensive activities with significant industrial emissions. As Kenya pursues the benefits of 
globalization in the context of the planned oil production and exports starting 2017, its 
primary energy sector, and energy-intensive manufacturing, are bound to expand 
significantly in the short-term. This poses the risk that the country’s production 
techniques might turn dirtier. Besides, given a growing population, and urbanization, 
harmful emissions from the consumption of fossil fuels would rise. If so, this is bound to 
pose rising and substantial public health risks, in the backdrop of an already highly 
polluted urban transportation system.  
 
Kenya, compared to its neighbors, has relatively higher factor endowments, including 
capital. This, combined with weak environmental regulations is fertile ground for 
“pollution havens” (see Copeland and Taylor, 2004; Cole, 2004; Cole and Elliott, 2005; 
Kuik and Gerlagh, 2003)
5
. Consequently, expanding productive activities could turn 
inefficient, dirtier, or worse, make Kenya a “pollution haven”. But, if Kenya implements 
tough pollution abatement policies, the marginal costs of production are likely to rise 
significantly. This in turn could adversely undermine the country’s current export 
competitiveness. An environmental tax on polluting consumer goods could be imposed 
but such a policy might significantly raise the prices of the targeted goods; this is a 
politically sensitive issue.  Does this suggest that Kenya has the incentive to specialize in 
dirty industries?  If this were the case, Kenya’s policy makers could be faced with trade-
offs between further trade liberalization and environmental quality; economic growth 
being inimical to the environment, and environmental policy being detrimental to 
economic growth objectives (Beghin, et al., 2002b:12). 
 
                                                          
5
 The ‘pollution haven’ hypothesis hold the view that polluting industries in industrialized economies 
where environmental standards are high will relocate to lax regulatory jurisdictions. 
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Presently, academic literature offers very little guidance to Kenya’s policy makers on 
these fundamental questions. The problem, with the current state of knowledge, is that 
each developing country is faced with its own unique context on environment-trade 
nexus. Beghin, et al., (2002b13) argue that the agenda for research in this area is huge, 
and policy designers need to be informed by “case-by-case” empirical scrutiny. To close 
the gap in the academic literature, this thesis employs a quantitative approach to 
investigate whether the hypothesis of a trade-off between trade liberalization and 
environmental quality might be supported in the case of Kenya. If this were the case, then 
a higher level of environmental quality might imply a trade-off in terms lower real GDP 
growth rates. Conversely, economic growth itself might partly be driven by deepening 
international trade, but at higher environmental costs to Kenya. Empirical support for 
such a finding might incentivize Kenya’s policy makers to take concrete steps to mitigate 
probable environmental damage that may arise from further trade opening. Finally, 
Kenya presents a good case for testing these trade-environment linkages, as reliable, 
relevant, and recent data is available.  
 
1.2. Problem Statement and Objectives 
 
1.2.1. Specific problem 
 
This study is motivated by the dearth of robust empirical evidence on whether there exists 
a trade-off between further trade openness and environmental quality in developing 
countries, and specifically, Kenya. Using a static computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model, it aims to bridge this gap in knowledge by quantitatively evaluating the 
interdependencies between Kenya’s trade liberalization and emission abatement policies. 
The study’s goal is to provide evidence on whether the hypothesis that developing 
economies tend to specialize in dirty industries to exploit their comparative advantages, is 
supported in the case of Kenya. 
 
 6 
 
1.2.2. Objectives of the study 
 
This research employs a theoretically founded CGE model, that is founded on a reliable 
database, to quantitatively investigate whether a trade-off exists between trade openness 
and environmental quality in the case of Kenya. Kenya’s push to deepen trade 
liberalization over time, and its willingness to exploit its relatively significant 
comparative advantages in factors of production and natural resources to drive its 
industrialization agenda as defined in its Vision 2030, is viewed as an incentive for the 
country to specialize in dirty production.  
 
To respond to these issues, a 2009 baseline scenario is defined. The objective is to 
evaluate the quantitative ex-ante impacts of three alternative policy goals ―further trade 
liberalization, alone; an environmental tax, alone; and free trade and an environmental 
tax, jointly― over the short-term compared to the 2009 base-run.  
 
The question of whether the assumed trade-off between trade liberalization and pollution 
abatement does incentivize developing countries, like Kenya, to specialize in dirty 
technologies leads to further questions. Will Kenya’s realization of its comparative 
advantages increase the risks of the country specializing in dirty production?  Will the 
implementation of a policy of taxes on energy inputs adversely affect Kenya’s 
international trade competitiveness?  Specific questions that this thesis will aim to 
address, are:  
 What is the impact of further trade liberalization policy, alone, on the pattern of 
specialization? 
 What is the impact of implementing an environmental tax policy, alone, on 
competitiveness? 
 What is the impact of joint implementing of further trade liberalization policy, 
and an environmental tax policy, on competitiveness and pattern of 
specialization? 
 
 7 
 
1.3. Organization of this Thesis 
 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Next is Chapter II that reviews the 
theoretical and empirical literature concerning the linkages between trade, economic 
growth, and the environment.  The Chapter also outlines the outcomes of select 
econometric and modeling techniques used by researchers to assess the trade-off between 
trade liberalization and environmental quality, and importantly, the methodological 
choices that are available for conducting such quantitative analysis.  
 
Thereafter, Chapter III contextualizes this thesis by presenting Kenya’s economic, trade, 
foreign direct investments flows, and environmental indicators, and analyzing how these 
have evolved in the recent decades. Kenya’s quest to capture the dividends of 
globalization through exploitation of its comparative advantages in trade is analyzed in 
the backdrop of intensification of industrial emissions that such global driven growth may 
cause.  
 
This is followed by Chapter IV that presents the static computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model for Kenya in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) software ―the 
KenCGE Model― that is used to conduct the quantitative analysis.   
 
Chapter V introduces the different experimental scenarios that are employed in the 
analysis to address the objectives of this study. The Chapter also presents the outcomes of 
this thesis. These include the patterns of Kenya’s trade specialization with deeper trade 
opening, and the environmental implications of such changes.  
 
Finally, Chapter VI concludes this thesis with a discussion on key take away messages, 
limitations of the study, and suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Chapter two presents a review of the theoretical and empirical literature underpinning the 
relationships between economic growth, international trade, and the environment. An 
introductory review is provided in Section 2.1 regarding the relationships between trade 
and growth, on the one hand, and higher economic growth and environmental quality, on 
the other.  Section 2.1, also outlines the theoretical perspectives relating to the main 
channels through which freer trade impacts the environment. Thereafter, Section 2.2 
summarizes the key outcomes of econometric and modeling techniques that researchers 
have employed to assess the trade-off between trade liberalization and environmental 
quality. Next is Section 2.3 that covers the methodological choices that are available for 
use in this thesis. Finally, Section 2.4 makes concluding remarks. 
 
2.1. Theoretical Literature 
 
2.1.1. Trade, growth, and the environment  
 
Literature contends that increased international trade foster growth, but also intensifies 
pressures on the environment. In this regard, the links between trade and growth have 
fascinated scholars since David Ricardo, in his 1817 publication "On the Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation" proposed his classical theory of comparative 
advantage
6
.  Building on the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage, Eli Heckscher 
and Bertil Ohlin, proposed their influential general equilibrium, Heckscher–Ohlin (H–O) 
Model of international trade (see Feenstra, Robert C., 2004; Leamer, Edward E., 1995), 
asserting that a nation’s factor endowments drive international trade. If countries have 
access to similar production technologies, the H–O Model predict that a country's 
production and exports will be driven by its abundant and cheap factors, and imports by 
its scarce factors.  
                                                          
6
 The Ricardian theory on comparative advantage was in stark contrast to doctrine of absolute advantages 
that Adam Smith had earlier proposed in his 1776 publication, “The Wealth of Nations”, as the basis for 
international trade. 
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A major phenomenon that shaped international trade is the wave towards regionalization 
of trade, which commenced with the launch of the European Economic Community in 
1957.  The decade and a half ending 2000 marked a reinvigorated interest by countries to 
negotiate and sign agreements on regional economic blocs to draw benefits of 
membership, including gains from trade (World Bank, 2000).  The collapse, in 2008, of 
the Doha round of trade negotiations that had commenced in 2001, created a new impetus 
for countries to strengthen their regional trade agendas. In this regard, Africa signed 
several trade agreements to further deepen regional trade and investments
7
. The pursuit of 
trade specialization to exploit country comparative advantages fueled the growth of 
globalization. Consequently, the heated discussions regarding the linkages between 
economic growth and the environment that had emerged in mid-1960s (Kågeson, 1998) 
intensified. The discussions were redirected to the linkages between trade opening and 
environment quality, in the early 1970s, leading to the incorporation of environmental 
concerns in the agreement of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Beghin, et al., 1994). It was, however, not until the 1990s 
when the World Trade Organization (WTO)
8
 took over the leadership on trade-
environment linkages that more focused discussions emerged relating to the effects of 
trade on the environment (see Beghin, et al., 2002b:3; Kirkpatrick and Scrieciu, 
2008:497). 
 
Daly (1973) in “Toward Steady-state Economics” publication, favor the minimum 
feasible physical production and consumption levels to contain the ever-rising demand 
for finite natural resources. The alternative, that is supported by other scholars, including 
Beckerman, W. (1974), view economic growth as an accelerator for efficiency in the 
production processes. As a result, growth is said to foster substitution possibilities, away 
                                                          
7 Africa’s regional economic blocs are: Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA); Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); East African Community (EAC); Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
8
  The predecessor to the World Trade Organization (WTO) was the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) that was a multilateral agreement regulating international trade. WTO was launched at the 
end of the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) of trade negotiations (WTO, 2016). 
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from outdated and environmentally unfriendly technologies, to eco-friendly technologies. 
The trade liberalization-environmental quality controversy, overall, pits 
environmentalists who argue that the intensification of economic activities, inevitably 
contribute to environmental degradation, and likely economic and ecological demise, 
against trade economists, who contend that the process of achieving economic progress 
itself will eventually, resolve environmental problems (Shafik, 1994).  
 
In brief, although developing countries with outward-oriented economic policies are said 
to reap relatively higher dividend from globalization (Beghin, et al., 2002b:3-14), 
opponents argue that globalization quickly manifests itself in depletion of finite natural 
resources, degradation of biodiversity, and intensification of pollution (Kirkpatrick and 
Scrieciu, 2008:497). If not the main cause of environmental damage, then globalization 
and trade, are major causes of environmental degradation (Nordström and Vaughan, 
1999; Beghin, et al., 2002b:3). 
 
2.1.2. Transmission mechanisms   
 
The channels through which freer trade impacts the environment, are both indirect, and 
direct. A trade liberalization policy might indirectly impact the environment through the 
direct effects of freer trade on economic growth (see Kirkpatrick and Scrieciu, 2008:499). 
Trade opening directly influences a country’s economic growth performance, by 
subjecting domestic firms to international competition. In this case, globalization, over 
time, enhances productivity of labor, through access to recent technologies. In turn, 
higher labor productivity improves efficiency of firms, and enables countries to exploit 
their comparative advantages, and intensify exports. This way, economic growth, itself 
directly impacts environmental quality, and consequently, through economic growth, 
trade has indirect effects on environmental performance. This indirect channel through 
which trade affects the environment is founded on the theory of the environmental 
Kuznets curve (EKC). Inspired by the work of Kuznets (1955), the ECK theory is 
credited to the independent works by Panayotou (1993), Grossman and Krueger (1993), 
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and Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, (1992)
9
.  The ECK hypothesis suggests that the 
relationship between different types of pollutants and per capita incomes, is shaped as an 
inverted-U (Kågeson, P., 1998). 
 
In theory, the EKC hypothesis suggests that as income rises, pollution increase at low per 
capita income, reaches a turning point, and thereafter declines at higher per capita 
income. Lower degrees of environmental awareness characterize the initial stages of 
industrialization, as the public is more preoccupied with having jobs and incomes to meet 
their basic needs (Dasgupta et al., 2002). This, coupled with weak environmental 
regulatory capacity, causes intensification of industrial pollution, and consequently, the 
EKC rises rapidly. Nevertheless, industrial pollution diminishes when income levels 
surpass a certain threshold, the citizenry concerns for cleaner environments mounts, and 
there is capacity to enforce environmental standards (Dasgupta et al., 2002). Grossman 
and Krueger (1995), using urban air pollution, and three river basins contaminants 
―dissolved oxygen, fecal, and heavy metals―, found support for the EKC, and observed 
that the turning point took place before a country attained a per capita income of 
US$8,000 – US$10,000 (in 1985 dollars).  Although the EKC hypothesis may be a useful 
tool for explaining how growth, and consequently, trade, could impact emissions over 
time, it is important to underscore that the nexus between growth, trade and pollution is 
multifaceted.  Trade and growth are intertwined through complex policy and institutional 
arrangements. Adding environmental issues to create linkages from trade to growth and 
then growth to environmental quality adds further complexities, and introduces a high 
degree of uncertainty regarding to how trade could impact the EKC relationship (see 
Kågeson, 1998 for further discussion on EKC). 
 
As for the direct channels through which trade liberalization affects the environment, the 
traditional approach is to conceptualize three mechanisms, namely, a scale effect, a 
                                                          
9
 Kuznets (1955) postulated that the relationship between income inequality and economic development is 
inverted U-shaped. EKC term was coined by Panayotou (1993) who developed a study for the International 
Labor Organization. Grossman and Krueger (1993) assessed the environmental impacts of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) prepared a background 
paper for the World Bank (1993)’s World Development Report, 1992. 
 12 
 
composition effect, and a technique effect (WTO, 2016)
10
. These trade-induced emissions 
impacts were proposed through the pioneering work of Grossman and Krueger (1991)
11
, 
and was later expounded by Grossman and Krueger (1993), and Copeland and Taylor 
(1994, 1995).  According to Antweiler et al. (2001) a scale effect occurs when an increase 
in the scale of economic activity intensifies pollution, holding both the pollution 
abatement techniques, and the production mix, constant. Alternatively, a technique effect 
arises when pollution abatement is intensified leading to declining levels of emissions, 
holding constant both the scale, and the composition, of economic activity. Finally, if 
both pollution abatement techniques, and the scale of economic activity, are held 
constant, but emissions rise as the composition of production shifts towards more 
pollution-intensive production, then a composition effect is said to arise (Antweiler et al., 
2001).  
 
Antweiler et al. (2001) theorizes the scale, composition, and technique effects by 
proposing a simple model that decomposition the overall effect of a change in pollution, 
after trade is liberalized. In their model, differences in factor endowment and income, 
jointly determine the trade patterns. The model builds on the idea that industries that 
pollute heavily are also highly capital intensive, and assume a small open economy that 
comprises two industries each producing one final goods, under constant returns to scale. 
The polluter is industry X, that is capital intensive and employs primary factor capital, K, 
and generates pollution per unit of production, as a by-product. Abatement technology is 
available for industry X, under the assumption of diminishing returns to abatement 
activity. Firms in industry X, aiming to maximize profits will jointly choose gross output 
of the dirty good X, and their respective abatement functions. The other industry (Y), 
produces a clean good, Y, by employing the primary factor labor, L. Finally, the 
economy has a government that decides on the level of the pollution tax, that is an 
increasing function of the economy wide optimal tax (Antweiler et al., 2001). 
                                                          
10
 Conceptualization of the three independent effects (scale, composition and technique) of freer trade on 
the environment was first applied to analyze the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) on the environment (see: “The impact of trade opening on climate change” (WTO, 2016). 
11
 The terms trade-induced scale, and technique, effects were introduced by Managi, et al., (2009) to refer 
to the impact on emissions from trade opening through the scale and technique effects. 
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It is conjectured that because a country’s comparative advantage due to its resource 
abundance could either be on pollution-intensive industries, or relatively cleaner 
production, the sign of the composition effect might be ambiguous (Kuik and 
Verbruggen, 2002; Managi, et al., 2009). Also, the strength of a country’s environmental 
policy determines whether the composition effect is positive or negative.  The impact on 
a country’s level of pollution that is associated with resource abundance is called a 
capital–labor effect, and the one relating to the strength of environmental policy, is called 
an environmental regulation effect (Managi, et al., 2009).   
 
In addition to the three direct traditional channels through which freer trade impacts 
environmental quality, Kreickemeier and Richter (2014) adds a fourth one, which is, a 
reallocation effect. On the margin, as competition intensify, efficient firms with lower 
emission intensities edges out of the industry those that are relatively less efficient, and 
have higher pollution intensities. For this reason, resources get reallocated towards 
efficient producers. Accordingly, the reallocation effect is the marginal decrease in 
overall emission intensity as productivity gains, from trade, increase. Holding the scale 
effect constant, the impact of trade opening on the total emissions is negative, if and only 
if, the level of industry-wide emission intensity falls strongly with rising productivity. 
Kreickemeier and Richter (2014)’s model assume that firms are heterogeneous, and they 
compete in monopolistically competitive goods market. 
 
2.1.3. National borders and the environment 
 
McAusland and Millimet (2013) modified Krugman (1980)’s model on scale economies, 
product differentiation, and the pattern of trade to introduce new theoretical perspectives 
on the linkages between trade ―both intranational (i.e., between regions in a country) 
and international― and the environment. As in Krugman (1980), they assume that firms 
operate under monopolistic competition, and employ a constant elasticity of substitution 
function for product differentiation. Consumers, on their part, have Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz 
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preferences for variety in goods. Unlike Krugman (1980), however, McAusland and 
Millimet (2013) have environment quality variables in their model. The model predicts 
that environmental quality improves, as trade intensities rise and, therefore, international 
trade, rather than intranational trade, is more beneficial to the environment. Consumers 
have access to a wider variety of goods and prices, thanks to international trade. This 
leads to welfare gains for domestic consumers. Domestic environmental regulators, 
however, are not concerned about pollution abroad, because of the independence that 
exist between environmental jurisdictions. In this regard, theorists argue that authorities 
in open economies have reason to ignore regulatory costs incurred abroad (see Lockwood 
2001; Pflüger 2001; Haufler and Pflüger, 2004). Domestically, regulators can, therefore, 
set tougher environmental regulations, because pollution costs are incurred by exporting 
countries. In other words, as trade intensity increase, much of the consumer surplus is 
transferred, through exports, to importing countries, and accordingly, regulators in 
importing countries are less willing to sacrifice local environmental standards. This way, 
growth is said to have a decoupling effect (Pflüger, 2001) that predicts that regulators set 
inefficient emission taxes because of inducement by consumer price spillovers.  The 
decoupling effect is one of McAusland and Millimet (2013)’s channels through which 
growth in a foreign economy impacts domestic environmental regulations. Other two 
channels that are related to access by domestic consumers of a wider variety of goods, are 
income and substitution effects, and which are opposing forces.  On the one hand, 
variety-induced income effects increase the demand for stricter environmental regulation; 
that is, as incomes rise because of access by consumers to a wider variety of goods at 
competitive prices after trade, so will the demand for cleaner environments increase, 
ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, the demand for stricter environmental regulations might fall 
because of variety-induced substitution effects, with incomes held constant (McAusland 
and Millimet, 2013).    
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2.1.4. “Pollution haven” hypothesis 
 
The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) theory was concerned with the effects of trade-
induced growth on the environment. Another theoretical issue that preoccupied 
economists was the real and perceived costs that environmental regulations themselves 
impose, and that could adversely undermine a country’s comparative advantage. In this 
case, the debate focused on the fear that free trade might “induce a race to the bottom” 
through easing of environmental standards, as regions compete for industry and jobs 
(Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004). From this reasoning, there emerged the "pollution 
haven” hypothesis, that hold the view that polluting industries in industrialized 
economies, where environmental standards are high, might relocate to developing 
countries, where environmental regulations are weaker, since the latter are perceived to 
have comparative advantages in dirty production12. As a result, differences in emissions 
across countries are attributed to varying environmental regulation and trade flows. A 
related, but dissimilar concept to the “pollution haven” hypothesis, is the “pollution 
haven” effect, that is discussed later in this thesis, and that as Taylor (2004) assert, 
focuses on tightening of environmental regulations to deter exports (or to stimulate 
imports) of dirty goods.  
 
Copeland and Taylor (1994) formalized the "pollution haven” hypothesis in a static two 
countries (North, developed, and South, less developed) general equilibrium model.  In 
this model, the North differs from South only in that the North’s per capita endowment of 
human capital is relatively larger than that of the South. They consider the equilibrium 
position where country North selects a relatively higher pollution tax than country South. 
North, endowed in relatively higher income than the South, imposes a higher pollution 
tax. Given that the North-South divide is only in respect of human capital endowments, 
pollution becomes a relatively scarce, and consequently costly, input in the North in the 
autarky, no trade scenario. Consequently, country North loses comparative advantage in 
                                                          
12
 T h e  simple factor endowment hypothesis, that posit that trade liberalization attracts dirty capital 
intensive activities to developed countries as they are relatively capital abundant, is the natural 
alternative to the “pollution haven” hypothesis (Antweiler, et al., 2001). 
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producing dirty goods and only clean industries set up production facilities there. 
Pollution-intensive industries prefer to migrate to the South. This is the model’s basis for 
trade. The North and South are willing to exchange, in equivalent goods, effective labor 
services that are abundant in the North, with pollution services that are relatively far in 
excess in the South. Eventually, the gap between factor prices will close, because of 
excess demand for pollution services in the South. The model is highly stylized, however. 
It excludes many determinants of trade, other than human capital that is the only factor of 
production, and income differentials between North and South. However, the authors 
argue that their model forms a good basis of interpreting earlier empirical work. Given 
the human capital factor that determines demand for environmental goods and the level 
of environmental controls, Copeland and Taylor (1994)’s model predict that international 
trade serves as a conduit for dirty industries’ migrations from developed, to developing 
countries.  
 
Several authors, including Bommer (1999), Levinson and Taylor (2008), Benarroch and 
Gaisford (2014), propose theoretical explanations for or against, the “pollution havens” 
hypothesis, and effect.  In support for the "pollution haven” hypothesis, Bommer (1999)’s 
simple signaling model demonstrate that trade liberalization in a domestic market where 
environmental standards are stringent, cause dirty goods to be relatively more import 
competitive.  Consequently, a firm’s decision to relocate production to a “pollution 
haven”, became a strategically cheaper option. Thus, global environmental quality 
deteriorates, as firms in the potentially cleaner environment deter governments from 
imposing harsher environmental standards (Bommer, 1999). In contrast, Benarroch and 
Gaisford (2014) propose a multi-country model covering intra- and inter-industry trade 
under monopolistic competition, and that demonstrates how “pollution havens” would 
not arise. All countries in the model produce two goods, a differentiated product that is 
skill-intensive, and a homogenous one that is labor-intensive. Pollution, which is a by-
product of the production process, may be abated. The model predicts a fall in pollution 
in all countries if the differentiated-good sector is amply cleaner, and conversely, 
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pollution increases in all countries when the differentiated-good sector is sufficiently 
dirtier (Benarroch and Gaisford, 2014). 
 
2.1.5. Choice of policy instruments   
 
The final theoretical piece of literature that we will discuss deal with the compatibility of 
policy instruments that aim to tackle trade-induced pollution. An environmentalist 
response to the trade liberalization and environmental quality trade-offs is the 
implementation of effective regulatory controls that maintains the status quo on the net 
overall environmental impact, as economic activities expand. In this regard, the 
environmentalists prefer tougher standards for pollution abatement, arguing that 
“polluters” should pay the maximum amount for the damage they cause to the 
environment. Accordingly, the polluter pays principle is used to justify the use of specific 
instruments to abate pollution (Lloyd 1992).  
 
The ideal pollution abatement policy, is one that directly targets emissions (see Corden & 
Falvey, 1985; Bragga, 1992; Kennedy, 1994; and Carraro, 1999). Economists contend 
that a uniform per unit of emissions tax, that is targeted to discourage emissions, is an 
optimal policy (Lloyd, 1992, Markusen, 1975a, and Markusen, 1975b). However, where 
environmental instruments are lacking or are difficult to implement because of weak 
institutional capacity (Bohm and Russell, 1985) ―that is, in a second-best world―, then 
“trade policy interventions, alone or combined with environmental taxes, can be welfare 
improving.” (Beghin, et al., 1994).  In this regard, Copeland (1994) and Krutilla (1991) 
explain the related issues for a polluted small, and a large trading country, respectively.  
 
WTO rules concerning product regulations, food safety, and animal and plant health, 
allows members to apply country specific trade-related actions to protect the 
environment, but such actions should not be disguised barriers to free trade. Although the 
WTO has no agreement on the environment, its rules relating to technical barriers to trade 
and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (WTO, 2016) are used by countries to justify 
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restriction of entry of agricultural goods into domestic markets. Kirkpatrick and Scrieciu, 
(2008:506) refers to the European Union (EU)'s protectionist subsidies on production and 
exports of agricultural products as an example of the use of trade policy as an instrument 
for environmental control
13
. This approach was, however, discredited as inefficient by 
Anderson and Blackhurst (1992), in their publication titled “The Greening of World 
Trade Issues”.  Despite this contention, trade policy continues to be applied for 
environmental controls (see Blackhurst and Subramanian, 1992; and Subramanian 1992), 
and this, Beghin, et al., (1994:172) contend, is puzzling. From these discussions, there 
emerged a consensus that more research efforts were needed on coordinated trade and 
environment policies for abating pollution (see Copeland, 1994; Beghin, et al., 1994). 
 
2.2. Empirical Literature 
 
2.2.1. Econometric results   
 
Stringency of environmental policy  
 
In a pioneering study covering the late 1960s and early 1970s, Tobey (1990) used a cross-
sectional model of international trade by Hechscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV), to test the 
hypothesis that stringency of regulations in industrialized countries had significant effect 
on international trade patterns in highly polluting industries. The author, however, did not 
find overwhelming evidence in support of his hypothesis. The conclusion that stringency 
of differing national environmental rules, had no effect on the world distribution of 'dirty' 
industries, was in stark contrast to the unsupported argument by environmental skeptics 
that stricter pollution abatement could have a small, but discernible adverse effect on the 
‘balance-of-trade’ (Tobey, 1990). 
 
Despite Tobey (1990)’s work, the debate on the causal impact of trade on the 
environment, which is one of the most important debates in trade policy (Taylor, 2004), 
                                                          
13
 Kirkpatrick and Scrieciu, (2008:506) argue that the challenge is how to decouple measures that protect 
the environment from those that are protectionist in nature. 
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has taken long to resolve partly because of inconsistent findings (McAusland and 
Millimet, 2013).  Using cross-country data covering the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and developing countries over 1973-2000 period, 
Managi, et al., (2009) employed a dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) 
panel data approach to evaluate the effects of trade openness on the environment.  For 
their indicators of pollution, they found that freer trade was associated with lower 
emissions in OECD countries. In developing countries, however, trade opening was 
found to increase substantially the emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2), and carbon dioxide 
(CO2), but was associated with lower levels of biochemical oxygen demand (BOD). 
These results support Tobey (1990)’s conclusion, and the findings by OECD (1993) and 
Jaffe et al., (1995), that tougher environmental controls in developed economies do not 
undermine trade competitiveness. 
 
Grossman and Krueger (1993), who also empirically examined the pioneering work by 
Tobey (1990), predicted that trade openness could have both positive and negative effects 
on the environment. On the one hand, Antweiler et al., (2001) find that freer trade is good 
for the environment ―a finding that is supported by Dean (2002)―, and at the worst, its 
effects are environment-neutral. Frankel and Rose (2005), and McAusland and Millimet 
(2013) also support the finding that trade is associated with lower emissions. Ederington 
et al. (2005), and Levinson and Taylor (2008), however, find that pollution abatement 
costs have adverse effects on net exports, which indicate that net exports increase as 
pollution intensify. These inconsistent outcomes of empirical evidence have led to a huge 
amount of academic literature on the trade-environmental linkages, a few of which are 
explored next.  
 
Environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) 
 
Managi, et al. (2009) used econometric techniques to estimate an equation with terms for 
per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and its quadratic to capture both scale, and 
technique effects, respectively. For BOD, they found that average incomes remained 
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negative for both the OECD and non-OECD countries (i.e., no change in sign as income 
levels rises). This was a rejection of the predictions of the EKC hypothesis. However, for 
both SO2 and CO2 emissions, average incomes were positive for non-OECD countries, 
and negative for OECD countries, an indication of support for the EKC hypothesis. They 
estimate that the average income turning point associated with this change in sign, for 
SO2 and CO2 emissions, was US$14,045 and US$24,732 for non-OECD countries, and 
US$24,616, and US$29,678, for OECD countries, respectively. The OECD countries 
have a relatively higher capital-labor ratio because of their comparative advantage in 
capital-intensive goods, and therefore, require a relatively larger average income turning 
point, compared to non-OECD countries, for the technique effect to offset the scale effect 
(Managi, et al., 2009). 
 
A study by Torras and Boyce (1998) assessed the EKC hypothesis and found that factors 
such as literacy, civil liberties, and political rights were influential in addressing 
environmental quality in low-income countries in respect of air and water pollution. This 
suggests that a generalization of the prediction of the EKC hypothesis across countries is 
problematic because other complementary factors to income growth might play an 
important role in influencing environmental outcomes.  The general predictions of the 
EKC hypothesis have also been qualified by De Bruyn, et. al., (1998) who found that 
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrogen oxide (NOx), and sulfur dioxide (SO2) in 
selected developed economies declined because of the positive effects of growth, 
technological progress, and structural reforms. Shafik (1994) used a panel data of 149 
countries over the 1960-1990 period to investigate the relationships between per capita 
incomes and environmental quality while controlling for climate, technology, and 
policies that influence environmental performance. The author concludes that where 
environmental costs are localized, and private and social benefits of abatement are 
substantial, countries are more likely to implement policies to stop environmental 
degradation that accompany growth (Shafik, 1994). Grossman and Krueger (1995) make 
a similar argument suggesting that the strongest link between income and the 
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environment is induced by policies that respond to citizenry demand for measures that 
protect the environment.  
 
The “pollution haven” hypothesis 
 
The “pollution haven” hypothesis was given credence by an early study by Low and 
Yeats (1992), that used the United States (US) data over the 1965-1986 period, to 
investigate how changes in trade had impacted emissions intensities in the rest of the 
world. The authors concluded that developing countries have revealed comparative 
advantages for producing pollution-intensive commodities (Low and Yeats, 1992). 
Akbostanci and Türüt-Asik (2007), evaluated using a panel data approach, the role of 
dirty industries in Turkey's exports of manufactured goods over the period 1994–1997. 
They found that higher exports were associated with an increase in dirty manufacturing 
industries, an evidence in support of the “pollution haven” hypothesis. Feridun et al. 
(2006) also supported the “pollution haven” hypothesis in the case of Nigeria where 
trade-induced technique effect was small but negative. Cole and Elliott (2003a) used two 
methodologies on US inter-industry trade data, and arrived at contradicting results. From 
one point of view, they differed with Tobey (1990), and found support for the “pollution 
haven” hypothesis when they employed the ‘new’ trade model with monopolistic 
competition and differentiated goods. In this case, they concluded that environmental 
regulations had a statistically significant influence on the share of inter-industry trade. 
From another point of view, however, using the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model 
of trade they agreed with Tobey (1990)’s finding that the relationship between 
environmental regulations and ‘dirty’ net exports was insignificant. This appears to 
contradict the predictions of the “pollution haven” hypothesis (Cole and Elliott, 2003a).  
 
Birdsall and Wheeler (1993)’s case studies and econometric evidence on Latin American 
countries soundly rejected the "pollution haven" hypothesis, supporting the view that 
there was no association between trade liberalization and higher foreign investment, on 
the one hand, and freer trade and pollution-intensive industrialization, on the other. 
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Surprisingly, the authors find that trade openness increased demand for developed 
countries’ cleaner technologies, and this was beneficial for the environment (Birdsall and 
Wheeler, 1993). Jaffe et al., (1995)’s review of available evidence on the linkages 
between environmental regulations and trade competitiveness in manufacturing in the 
United States (US) found little evidence that stringent environmental regulations had a 
large adverse effect on competitiveness, or relocation of "pollution-intensive" industries. 
Their evidence, therefore, also discounted the “pollution haven” hypothesis, thus 
supporting the findings of earlier studies, including the one by Tobey (1990) (Jaffe et al., 
1995). 
 
Grether and De Melo (2003) who used a gravity panel model of bilateral trade flows and 
production for 52 countries during the 1981-1998 period in five heavily polluting 
industries, did not find much evidence in support of the “pollution haven” hypothesis. 
They found that heavy polluting industries exhibited a North-South migration pattern 
except for non-ferrous metals industries that migrated to the North. They argue that the 
delocalization movements were a response to factor-abundances, and surprisingly, not 
because of North-South environmental regulatory gaps (Grether and De Melo, 2003). 
Ederington et al. (2004), who employed the Grossman and Krueger (1993) regression 
approach to analyze shifts in US manufacturing toward cleaner industries over the 1972-
1994 period, against industry-level data on US imports, found no evidence supporting the 
“pollution havens" hypothesis. They concluded that tariff changes in the US after trade 
liberalization did not disproportionately affect pollution-intensive industries, as there 
were also shifts towards cleaner production and imports (Ederington et al., 2004). 
 
The validity of the “pollution havens" hypothesis has also been empirically investigated 
using foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. Broadly, there is mixed evidence in support 
of the assertion that weaker environmental regulations attract relatively higher FDI flows. 
This is what McGuire (1982) observed in the case where factors of production are freely 
mobile across frontiers. This conclusion is supported by Eskeland and Harrison (2003) 
who found weak evidence that multinationals relocate in sectors with high levels of air 
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pollution. The authors also observed that, at best, results were ambiguous regarding the 
pattern of FDI in the US towards industries with high pollution abatement costs. Javorcik 
and Wei (2004), who used firm-level data of FDI inflows to 25 transitional economies in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union economies found no systematic evidence to 
support the assertion that dirty industries are relatively more attracted to jurisdictions 
with weak environmental standards.  More recently, Manderson and Kneller (2012), 
using outward FDI by United Kingdom (UK) firms, did not find robust evidence to 
support the assertion that dirtier, compared to, cleaner multinationals are more likely to 
migrate to host countries with weak environmental policy. Rather, they found evidence 
that countries that offer easier access to intermediate production inputs, and that are open 
to international trade, are more likely to attract relatively dirtier FDI from the UK.  
 
The weak evidence on the “pollution haven” hypothesis indicate that there are other 
factors, other than differences in the costs of abating emissions, that influence industry 
relocation decisions. These include factor endowments (Grossman and Krueger, 1993; 
Tobey, 1990), and political economy factors. Furthermore, trade liberalization causes 
trade openness to increase and induces technological change that could work against the 
predictions of the “pollution haven” hypothesis (Taylor, 2004). Finally, econometric 
methodological shortcomings that fail to control for unobserved heterogeneity, and 
endogeneity, could lead to the likelihood of not observing important “pollution haven” 
phenomena (Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004). 
 
The “pollution haven” effect 
 
The failure to find support for the “pollution haven” hypothesis led to the strand of 
literature relating to the “pollution haven” effect. The concept of “pollution haven” effect 
refers to tightening of environmental standards to deter exports (or stimulate imports) of 
dirty goods (Taylor, 2004)
14
. Levinson and Taylor (2008) developed a theoretical model 
                                                          
14
 The “pollution haven” effect and the "pollution haven” hypothesis are two different, but related concepts. 
Recall that the "pollution haven” hypothesis relate to the concern of possible relocation of dirty industries 
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that they used to estimate a reduced-form equation that linked industry net imports to 
local and foreign markets’ measures of environmental regulations, factor costs, and trade 
tariffs. Their panel data included indicators of United States (US) environmental 
regulations, and data on US trade flows with Canada and Mexico for 130 manufacturing 
industries from 1977 to 1986. They argue that their findings support the presence of a 
"pollution haven" effect, as pollution abatement (environmental regulatory) costs were 
associated with a negative effect on net exports. They estimated that a 1% increase in 
pollution abatement costs caused a 0.4%, and 0.6% increase in net imports by the US 
from Mexico, and Canada, respectively. These results were statistically significant 
(Levinson and Taylor, 2008). Ederington et al. (2005), like, Levinson and Taylor (2008) 
also found that pollution abatement costs have adverse effects on exports, a support for 
the “pollution haven” effect.  Cole and Elliott (2005) who included in their study the 
differentials in both factor endowments and environmental regulations found that US’ 
pollution-intensive FDI flows could be attracted to Brazil and Mexico, an evidence in 
support for the “pollution haven” effect. This was because Brazil and Mexico were found 
to have higher levels of capital endowments relative to the stringency of their 
environmental regulations. Similarly, Mulatu, et al., (2010)’s investigation, using data on 
16 manufacturing industries from 13 European countries, found evidence in support of 
the “pollution haven” effect that was relatively similar in magnitude to other determinants 
of industry location, such as supply of skilled labor. A recent study by Sawhney and 
Rastogi (2015) investigated the India-US trade flows during the 1989–2006 period, and 
concluded that there was no evidence in support of the “pollution haven” effect in the 
overall manufactured trade flows, but there was some evidence in specific highly 
polluting industries. Reasons have been advanced as to why the support for “pollution 
haven” effect has been weak (Levinson and Taylor, 2008) or how, from a theoretical 
perspective, such an effect might not arise (Benarroch and Gaisford, 2014).  
                                                                                                                                                                             
from developed economies, where environmental standards are stricter, to developing economies that have 
comparative advantages in dirty production because of weak environmental standards. 
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Decomposition of environmental impacts 
 
The failure to find support for the “pollution haven” hypothesis led researchers to explain 
the impact of free trade on pollution by estimating the magnitude of scale, technique, and 
composition effects. By estimating these effects, Antweiler et al. (2001) finds that trade 
liberalization is good for the environment. Employing their theoretical model, and data on 
sulfur dioxide (SO2) concentrations by the Global Environment Monitoring Project for 
43 countries during the 1971-1996 period, they estimate that when the scale of 
production, and accompanying income, increase by 1%, pollution rise by about 0.3% (a 
positive scale effect), fall by about 1.4% (negative technique effect), and lead to 
relatively smaller, but negative, change in pollution concentrations (negative composition 
effect). Consequentially, if free trade increases GDP per person by 1%, the combined net 
effect reduces concentrations of sulfur dioxide by about 1% (Antweiler et al., 2001). 
Frankel and Rose (2005)’s findings support those of Antweiler et al. (2001). Using cross-
sectional data on 41 countries in 1990, and after accounting for endogeneity of trade 
through instrumental variables, they found that freer trade lowers air pollution in the case 
of concentrations of SO2, and to a lesser extent, nitrogen dioxide (NO2). They conclude 
that despite their mixed results, freer trade was harmless to the environment (Frankel and 
Rose, 2005).  
 
Cole and Elliott (2003b), aimed to validate Antweiler et al. (2001)’s findings by 
decomposing pollution into an overall effect combining scale and technique effects. They 
also distinguish direct composition effect (the effect that emanate from shifts in the 
capital–labor ratio), from the trade-induced composition effect (change in gross domestic 
product that is related to shifts in the production of dirty goods in response to price 
changes). They observe a relatively smaller trade-induced composition effect, compared 
to the combined scale and technique effect and the direct composition effect. In the case 
of SO2 emissions, as in Antweiler et al. (2001), their results suggest that both 
environmental regulations, and shifts in the capital–labor ratio influences pollution, and 
that these effects tend to cancel out each other. Specifically, on sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
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emissions, they confirm Antweiler et al. (2001)’s finding that trade liberalization was 
beneficial to the environment (Cole and Elliott, 2003b). However, regarding other 
pollutants, Cole and Elliott (2003b)’s findings are more complex, as the magnitude and 
signs of the combined scale and technique effect, and the trade-induced composition 
effect, varied across pollutants. They find weak evidence regarding the impact of freer 
trade on the environment in the case of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, and no effect at 
all, in the cases of nitrogen oxide (NOx), and biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) 
pollutants. Furthermore, results varied depending on base of measurement —per capita 
emissions or pollution intensities. On the latter, the authors find good news as pollution 
intensities fall with trade for all four pollutants (CO2, SO2, NOx, and BOD). On the 
former, a 1% increase in trade-induced income reduced per capita emissions by 1.7% in 
the case of SO2 emissions. They find that per capita emissions were likely to fall for 
BOD pollutants, but rise, for both NOx and CO2 pollutants as free trade intensified. The 
likely offsetting effects of environmental regulations, on the one hand, and capital–labor, 
on the other, might explain why many studies fail to find evidence in support of the 
“pollution haven” hypothesis (Cole and Elliott, 2003b). 
 
Managi, et al. (2009), unlike, Cole and Elliott (2003b), aimed to derive an overall impact 
(negative or positive) of trade openness on emissions, using indicators for SO2, CO2, and 
BOD.  The authors used both the fixed effects and a dynamic generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimation techniques on a panel of a large annual dataset for OECD 
and developing countries over the period from 1973 to 2000. They find that trade 
openness intensities cause a decrease in BOD in all countries. However, in the case of 
SO2 and CO2 emissions the intensity of trade openness causes a decrease in CO2, and 
SO2 emissions in OECD countries, and an increase in non-OECD countries. Specifically, 
in the long-term, on average, a 1% increase in trade openness was associated with a 
favorable impact of −0.155% in the case of BOD in non-OECD economies. The 
corresponding effect on SO2 and CO2 emissions was an unfavorable impact of 0.920% 
and 0.883%, respectively. Regarding the OECD economies, the long-term impact for 
SO2, CO2, and BOD, were favorable at −2.228%, −0186%, and −0.224%, respectively. 
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They explain that BOD decline in non-OECD countries because of availability of low 
cost technologies for abating BOD that are sourced from OECD countries. Regarding the 
decomposition of emissions, the authors find that a negative scale-technique effect 
dominate a positive composition effect in OECD countries, and therefore, the short- and 
long-term overall effects of trade openness on emissions was negative for all pollutants. 
The overall results were mixed, however, in other countries. In developing countries, 
SO2 and CO2 emissions were associated with positive scale-technique and composition 
effects. In this case, the short- and long-term overall effects of trade openness were 
positive. However, for BOD, a negative scale-technique effect dominated a positive 
composition effect causing the overall effect of trade openness to turn negative. The 
authors find that long-term elasticities were distinctly larger than the short-term 
elasticities. They also suggest two changes through which trade impacts emissions, which 
are, environmental regulation effect, and capital–labor effect. They argue that the 
environmental regulation effect was likely to dominate the capital–labor effect (Managi, 
et al., 2009).  
 
Li, Xu, and Yuan (2015) arrive at different outcomes by finding that trade openness was 
associated with significant negative effects on the environment in both OECD and non-
OECD economies. Using the instrumental variables (IV) methodology of Frankel and 
Rose (2005), and data from 134 economies over the period 1961 to 2004, the authors 
claim that they are the first to use air visibility data to measure environmental quality.  
They estimate that a 1% increase in trade openness could reduce air visibility in OECD 
economies, and non-OECD economies, by about 0.09%, and 0.081%, respectively. The 
fact that this finding holds for both developed and developing countries, unlike in Managi 
et al. (2009)’s case where trade openness was found to reduce pollution only in OECD 
countries, is a new finding in the literature (Li, Xu, and Yuan, 2015).  
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Do national borders matter? 
 
McAusland and Millimet (2013) use the ordinary least squares (OLS) and limited 
information maximum likelihood (LIML) approaches to estimate a gravity model of 
trade. Their aim is to investigate the impact of trade on the environment. Using 
international and intranational trade data for the US and Canada they find evidence that 
international trade has beneficial effects on the environment, but intranational trade does 
not. A one percent increase in international trade intensity was associated with a decrease 
in total pollution by 1.2% for the average US state, and by 10.1% in the average 
Canadian province. Conversely, intranational trade was found to be harmful to the 
environment. A one percent increase in intranational trade intensity caused total toxic 
emissions to increase by over 5.3% and 3.3% for the average US state, and Canadian 
province, respectively. This indicates that trade openness has positive effects on 
environmental quality in the case of Canada and the US. The authors inform us that it 
may not be possible to replicate their work in other country settings because of data 
constraints (McAusland and Millimet, 2013). This is a major shortcoming of adopting 
econometric approaches to evaluate trade-environmental relationships, especially in a 
developing country setting. 
 
2.2.2. Modeling results   
 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models 
 
Country studies:  Beghin, et al., (1995) employ a CGE model
15
 to analyze the tradeoffs 
between growth and environmental policies in Mexico in the context of trade 
liberalization under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The effects of 
three policies on Mexican growth, sectoral allocation, and trade are considered: pollution 
abatement alone; trade liberalization alone; and coordinated environmental and trade 
                                                          
15
 The CGE model used was the Trade and Environment Equilibrium Analysis (TEQUILA2) Model that 
was an adaptation from the OECD Development Centre's prototype CGE model (see Beghin, et al., 1996 
for a recent version of this model). 
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policies. Mexico’s unilateral trade liberalization policy under the NAFTA was associated 
with a 3.2% rise in gross domestic product (GDP) and a 2.5%-4.8% rise in all major 
pollutants. The authors assert that coordinated policies mitigated the undesirable effects 
of stand-alone policies. They show that trade opening could coexist with the tightening of 
environmental standards. Further, they inform us that the assumed trade-offs between 
growth and the environment was unlikely to attenuate Mexico’s economic performance 
significantly. High contractionary impacts were associated with the abatement of only 
one pollutant —the bio-accumulative toxic substances in water. The authors conclude 
that, under freer trade, evidence rejected the hypothesis that Mexico could specialize in 
dirty industries (Beghin, et al., 1995).  
 
Dessus and Bussolo (1998) use a recursive dynamic prototype CGE model developed by 
the OECD
16
 to analyze, quantitatively, the association between trade liberalization and 
emission abatement policies in Costa Rica. The authors find that full trade liberalization 
by the year 2010, could worsen Costa Rica’s pollution levels by between 15% and 20%. 
This is because Costa Rica’s trade-induced scale effect (due to higher output) was found 
to outweigh both the trade-induced composition (shift in output), and technological (use 
of dirtier technology) effects. Joint implementation of free trade and effluent taxes 
minimized this growth-environment trade-off (Dessus and Bussolo, 1998). 
 
Beghin, et al., (2002b)’s publication presents the outcomes of a collection of empirical 
investigations of the interactions between growth, international trade, and the 
environment in seven developing economies —Chile, China, Costa Rica, Indonesia, 
Mexico, Morocco, and Vietnam—, using a dynamic CGE methodology by the OECD17. 
Beghin, et al., (2002b)’s presentation on Mexico and Costa Rica draw from the work by 
Beghin, et al., (1995), and Dessus and Bussolo, (1998), respectively, as presented above. 
A comparative analysis of outcomes of the Mexican case, with those for Indonesia and 
Costa Rica, give interesting results (see Beghin, et al., 2002b: 233-250). In the case of 
Mexico, no evidence was found that major environmental degradation could emanate 
                                                          
16
 For a recent version of this model, see: Beghin, et al., (1996). 
17
 Ibid. 
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from trade liberalization. Simulations for Mexico revealed that with free trade, 
production would get less pollution-intensive because of resource allocation, and output 
composition changes. There was a dominant scale effect, however, that potentially could 
intensify emissions in many sectors, if an appropriate environmental policy to mitigate 
the risks of environmental damage was not implemented.  It was observed that some 
pollutants were strongly complementary, for example, nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and sulfur 
dioxide (SO2). Therefore, a pollution abatement tax that targets one such pollutant 
reduced emissions by far more than a tax on any one of complementary effluents. This is 
beneficial in reducing administrative costs of pollution control.  
 
The cases for Costa Rica and Indonesia were, however, not promising. There was a 
likelihood of increasing the risk of specialization in dirty industries because of significant 
rise in pollution intensities after trade opening. Therefore, efforts to coordinate trade 
liberalization and pollution abatement policies could bear higher dividends; a trade 
opening policy alone was associated with substantial increases in trade-induced pollution, 
while on the other hand, a pollution abatement policy alone, was associated with major 
reduction in real output. For the cases of Costa Rica and Indonesia, trade was viewed as a 
pathway for pollution abatement; abating pollution in domestic production could be 
achieved by substituting dirty inputs produced domestically, with imports of pollution-
intensive commodities in production (Beghin, et al., 2002b:233-247). 
 
Regarding the seven cases, Beghin, et al., (2002b) argue that, with the exception of 
China, where trade reforms were found to have a potentially damaging impact on the 
environment, all the other cases support a “cautionary but favorable” impression of the 
links between outward-oriented growth and the environment (Beghin, et al., 2002b:4). 
The authors observe that their findings are consistent with those by Jha, et al., (1999), 
Nordström and Vaughan (1999), Wheeler and Martin (1992), and Dasgupta and Wheeler 
(1997), who used other methodologies.  The case of China aimed to assess the country’s 
trade liberalization and environment policies in the context of its accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), using a 1992-2010 base trend. China’s trade opening was 
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viewed as potentially harmful to the environment for all pollutants. To start with, China’s 
economy was assessed as pollution-intensive because of pervasive use of fossil fuel (soft 
coal) energy and construction materials, which translate into a strong scale effect when a 
pollution abatement policy is imposed. Because of this, trade opening heightened the risk 
of specialization in dirty industries. Coordinating free trade and pollution abatement 
policies might only minimize, but not eliminate, the growth-environment trade-offs in the 
Chinese case (Beghin, et al., 2002b:7/8; 183/4).   
 
Beghin, et al., (2002a) have analyzed trade liberalization reforms in Chile in the context 
of the country’s accession to both the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
and the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) trade bloc
18. Chile’s membership in 
NAFTA was found to be environmentally friendly as it diverted trade that in turn reduced 
the use of cheap energy inputs. The results under the MERCOSUR scenario, however, 
are different as pollution was found to increase because of higher use of dirtier energy 
inputs. Similarly, unilateral trade liberalization intensified pollution as cheaper and dirtier 
energy inputs became more accessible. This had an adverse impact on urban mortality 
and morbidity because of a substantial increase in pollutants related to SO2, and NO2, 
and small particulates matter, PM10. Conversely, combined implementation of unilateral 
trade integration and a tax on PM10 pollutants was found to be 16% more welfare 
enhancing than isolated unilateral trade reforms. Freer trade was associated with an 
intensification of pollution in the City of Santiago, but interestingly, because of a wide 
scope for use of economic instruments, the environmental damage concerns were 
manageable. Targeting a few pollutants was found to reduce emissions of pollutants with 
complementary relationships. Consider the case of air pollutants comprising carbon 
monoxide (CO), lead, nitrogen dioxide (NO2), particulate matter, PM10, sulphur dioxide 
(SO2), and volatile organic compounds (VOC). Environmental taxes on NO2, PM10, 
SO2, and VOC were found to significantly cause reductions in concentrations of lead of 
6%-7%. Further, pollution taxes on either NO2, PM10, or SO2 contributed to substantial 
reduction in concentrations of the other two, and in addition, some reduction in CO.  
                                                          
18
 MERCOSUR (Spanish: Mercado Común del Sur; English: Southern Common Market) is a sub-regional 
bloc whose full members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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Despite these positive developments in Chilean case, there were increases in emissions of 
untaxed pollutants caused by substitutability among some pollutants that are associated 
with the composition effects (Beghin, et al., 2002a). In this regard, an increase in bio-
accumulative toxic metals in water (BIOWAT), and in soil (BIOSOIL), were found to 
induce decreases in levels of SO2, NO2, and PM10 pollution. These results arose because 
of sectoral specialization in goods that are cheap to produce and that sharply intensify 
pollution from untaxed emissions. The authors argue that the implementation of 
coordinated free trade and environmental tax policies, is of outmost priority where 
substitutability relationships among pollutants exist. Compared to a unilateral trade 
liberalization policy alone, the pace of growth in total trade slackened under combined 
policies. Further, at the sectoral level, certain imports (e.g. fish products) that increased 
under a unilateral trade liberalization policy alone, increased even more under joint 
policies. The authors argue that, in this situation, imports became a pathway for abating 
emissions. In the case of Morocco, Beghin, et al., (2002b) inform us that the objective of 
the study was to analyze the trade, environment, and economy linkages of a proposed free 
trade agreement with the European union (EU). Trade liberalization was found to be 
pollution-intensive in both production and consumption, if no mitigating measures are 
taken to protect the environment. Finally, Vietnam’s trade liberalization reforms were 
found to increase environmental damage, but the resultant trade-offs were judged as not 
excessive (Beghin, et al., 2002b). 
 
Lee and Roland-Holst (1997) use a calibrated general equilibrium model to analyze trade 
with Japan. One of Lee and Roland-Holst (1997)’s experiments show that a combination 
of an effective pollution abatement instrument and trade liberalization, achieves the twin 
objectives of higher welfare (e.g. higher real GDP) and lower emissions. Using the SO2 
emissions, the authors demonstrate that both higher welfare and lower pollution is 
achieved by a combined policy of full trade tariff removal, and introduction of a uniform 
tax that is designed to achieve a 3.2%-7.4% ex-ante pollution abatement target (Lee and 
Roland-Holst (1997).  
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O’Ryan et al. (2005) conducted simulation on Chile, using a static CGE model ―the 
ECOGEM-Chile model. The authors simulate the direct and indirect effects on the 
Chilean economy, of raising fuel taxes ―an environmental tax reform― by 100%, 
accompanied by trade tariff reductions. A simulation of 100% increase in fuel taxes, 
leads to negative outcomes on consumption, output, trade, and real GDP. At the sectoral 
level, major changes occur, whereby oil extraction and production, and the transport 
sector contract sharply, while the electricity sector that provide untaxed energy expand. 
Households are also adversely affected by falling wages and falling employment as firms 
reduce use of labor factors due to scaling down of productive activities. On the 
environmental front, however, the results were positive as pollution was reduced for all 
pollutants ―by 17% for SO2 and NO2 emissions, and by 15% for PM10 emissions. The 
authors then emphasize the importance of coordinating the implementation of trade and 
environmental policy reforms. In the joint scenario two policies are simultaneously 
simulated: a fuel tax, and tariff reduction. The authors demonstrate that the adverse 
impact of environmental reforms, such as a reduction in consumption and production, 
could be mitigated by compensatory reduction in trade tariffs. However, the net results 
will depend on the relationship between trade and energy use across sectors (O’Ryan et 
al., 2005). 
 
Li, J. C. (2005) uses a standard CGE model developed by the Trade and Macroeconomics 
Division of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) to investigates 
whether a trade-off existed between trade liberalization and environmental quality. Using 
Thailand’s 1998 social accounting matrix (SAM), the author evaluates the impacts of 
three policy scenarios: an emissions tax on energy intermediate inputs and final consumer 
goods with an aim of cutting emissions by 20% in reference to the base scenario; a 25% 
trade tariff reduction; and combined trade and emissions tax. Li, J. C. (2005) conclude 
that there was a modest risk for Thailand to specialize in producing dirty goods unless 
pollution abatement measures accompany freer trade reforms. If pollution abatement and 
free trade policies are jointly implemented, the author finds that economic growth is not 
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significantly weakened. Li, J. C. (2005) results confirm findings by Dessus and Bussolo 
(1998) and Beghin, et al., (1995).  
 
Although some of the studies outlined above indicate that trade openness could lead to 
significant rise in harmful emissions, other studies suggest otherwise. Kang and Kim 
(2004) conducted a study on the relationship between trade policy reforms and the 
environment using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) CGE model
19
. The authors 
found that the full removal of trade barriers between South Korea and Japan had 
favorable effects of reducing the overall air pollution emission by 0.36% (Kang and Kim, 
2004). A more recent study by Gumilang, et al. (2011) applied the GTAP’s static CGE 
model to analyze the environmental impacts of Indonesian’s tariff reforms towards year 
2022 under agreements with Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). The results were mixed; while CO2 emissions increased by 0.47% compared 
to the base scenario, the impact on water pollution was negative. The authors conclude 
that the impact of deepening Indonesia’s trade liberalization on the environment was 
insignificant.  
 
Global and regional studies:  A comprehensive study on developing countries was 
undertaken by Eickhout et al., (2004), using both GTAP CGE model and the Integrated 
Model to Assess the Global Environment (IMAGE, 2001; Alcamo et al., 1998). The main 
goal of the study was to quantify the effect of trade liberalization on the environment. 
Across the regions covered, the authors found mixed evidence of the impact of trade 
liberalization on the environment, in the context of the Doha Round of trade negotiations. 
The authors argue that trade liberalization and environmental actions need to be 
coordinated to minimize risk of environmental damage (Eickhout et al., 2004). These 
findings are in line with those by Strutt and Anderson (2000) who employed the GTAP 
CGE model to evaluate the effects of tariff reductions on Indonesia in the context of the 
Uruguay Round (towards the year 2010) and the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation’s 
trade agreement (towards the year 2020).  The authors found that trade policy reforms 
                                                          
19
 See Hertel (1997). Global Trade Analysis: Modeling and Applications, T.W. Hertel (ed.), published in 
1997 by Cambridge University Press (https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/products/gtap_book.asp) 
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were beneficial to the environment in respect of air and water emissions and that the 
reforms mitigated the depletion of natural resources that are abundant in Indonesia. They 
concluded that at the worst, trade reforms might only cause minimal environmental 
degradation (Strutt and Anderson, 2000).   
 
Using the GTAP model, Mukhopadhyay and Thomassin (2010) comprehensively 
assesses the environmental effects to year 2020 of the ASEAN region + 3 (China, Japan 
and Korea) free trade agreement.  Air pollution effects (particularly, CO2) of trade 
liberalization were judged to be fairly large in the case of Vietnam, Indonesia and 
Thailand, but relatively smaller in the cases of China, Japan and South Korea.  Vietnam, 
for example, was judged to the main beneficiary of higher growth in output in a free trade 
ASEAN region, and at the same time, the related impact on its environment was likely to 
be unfavorable. Broadly, the impact of the ASEAN + 3 free trade agreement on the 
environment was mixed. The authors observe that evidence, for or against, the “pollution 
haven” hypothesis was also mixed. This is because both developing and developed East 
and South Asian countries were equally likely to experience a negative or positive CO2 
trade-induced composition effect depending on the selected trade liberalization scenario. 
The analysis of total pollution change highlighted that activity changes played a major 
role in driving pollution. Regarding greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, while the effect of 
technology on pollution was negative in Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, they varied 
in the other countries included in the study (Mukhopadhyay and Thomassin, 2010). 
 
Other equilibrium models 
 
Multisector models:  Using a multisector, multiregion applied general equilibrium model 
(GTAP-E), Kuik and Verbruggen (2002) analyzed the impact of unilateral 
implementation by the North of the Kyoto Protocol on carbon leakage in the context of 
full implementation of import tariffs reductions proposed under the Uruguay Round. 
Regarding the South, they found a positive scale effect (+11.7 Mt C02 emissions), a 
positive technique effect (+90.6 Mt C02 emissions), and a negative composition effect (-
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22.17 Mt C02 emissions).  The Uruguay Round of tariff reductions enhanced the 
competitive advantage of the North’s CO2-intensive industries, in comparison to a 
scenario base of CO2 reductions without free trade. Evidence did not support that tariff 
reduction would induce relocation of industries to the South (Kuik and Verbruggen, 
2002).  
 
Input-output analysis:  In reference to the Heckscher–Ohlin (HO) theory, and using an 
input-output analysis, Dietzenbacher, and Mukhopadhyay (2007) examined whether India 
(a developing economy), could be regarded as a pollution haven. The authors compared 
India’s extra emissions of CO2, SO2 and NOx that correspond to 1 billion rupees of 
additional exports with a reduction in emissions arising from an increase of the same 
value of extra imports. The authors found that between 1996/1997 and 1991/1992, India 
moved away from being a pollution haven, and at the same time benefited highly from 
trade (Dietzenbacher, and Mukhopadhyay, 2007).  
 
Partial equilibrium models:  Saunders and Wreford (2005) use a partial equilibrium 
model to assess the impact of trade liberalization on agricultural production and 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The authors find that New Zealand’s dairy sector 
returns increase with full trade liberalization with the OECD economies. A GHG 
emission abatement strategy without accompanying trade liberalization had adverse 
effects on producer returns, while trade liberalization without an accompanying emission 
mitigation strategy was likely to increase returns at the expense of higher GHG emissions 
(Saunders and Wreford, 2005).  Saunders and Cagatay (2004) use a partial equilibrium 
model to investigate cross country linkages between trade liberalization policies, dairy 
production systems, and groundwater nitrate levels in developed economies. Trade 
liberalization was found to have an adverse effect on the European Union (EU) dairy 
production, but it reduced EU nitrate emissions marginally. Dairy production rose in 
other developed countries, accompanied by a marginal rise in emissions (Saunders and 
Cagatay, 2004). Gallagher and Ackerman (2000), developed a simple, partial equilibrium 
framework for analyzing the effect of trade policy changes on the relative concentrations 
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of “clean” and “dirty” industries in two countries or regions in the context of the 
“pollution haven” hypothesis. An application of this model by Gallagher (1999) suggest 
that NAFTA did not significantly affect the location of “clean” or “dirty” industry in the 
US versus Mexico (Gallagher and Ackerman, 2000). 
 
Table 2-1, while not exhaustive, outlines the models examined during this literature 
review. Empirical literature on the linkages between trade and environment quality have 
followed two strands of methodologies. Studies have used econometric techniques to fit 
regressions to estimate the impact of trade liberalization on the environment. However, 
there are only a few of such studies on developing countries because of lack of quality 
environmental indicators to support cross-country empirical analysis. 
 
Conversely, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models that emerged in the early 
1970’s (Shoven, et al., 1972), have become important tools for analyzing economic effect 
of policy changes in developed countries. CGE models were popularized for developing 
countries’ contexts by the World Bank through its pioneering project that developed the 
theoretical foundations of CGE models for open developing economies (Dervis, et al., 
1982).  CGE models are very popular in analyzing the impact of policy changes in a wide 
range of economic contexts (see Dixon and Jorgenson, 2013). The book edited by 
Batabyal and Nijkamp (2010) on research tools in natural resources and environmental 
economics informs us that CGE models have several advantages. These include their 
utility for measuring the impacts of policy shocks in a theoretically consistent manner, 
and for quantifying changes in the economy. The CGE models’ ability to capture indirect 
effects of policy shocks that are at times difficult to quantify otherwise, make the models 
popular with researchers who aim to assess economy wide inter-linkages between 
markets (factor and goods) and institutions (households, public and private sectors, and 
the rest of the world). As Table 2-1 illustrate, far more studies relating to developing 
countries have employed the CGE modeling approach, to investigate the policy trade-offs 
in the trade liberalization and environment nexus.   
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2.3. Methodological Choices 
 
Table 2-1: Methodological Approaches - Trade Liberalization-Environmental Linkages 
Author(s) Key aim of study Country/region 
   (time-frame) 
Methodology Impact on environment 
Econometric Techniques 
Sawhney et al., 
(2015) 
Test of "pollution haven" effect US-India  
(1989–2006) 
Regression analysis Mixed evidence on "pollution haven" 
effect 
Li, Xu, et. al., 
(2015) 
Effects of free trade on 
environment 
134 countries (1961–
2004)  
Instrumental Variables (IV) Reduction of air visibility with trade 
openness 
McAusland et. al., 
(2013) 
Impact of national borders on 
environment 
US and Canada (1997 
and 2002) 
Gravity model estimate  Unlike intranational trade, international 
trade is associated with lower emissions 
Chang (2012) Examine openness-environment 
linkages 
China (1981–2008) Vector autoregression Mixed results for both exports and imports  
Managi, et al. 
(2009) 
Impact of trade openness on 
environmental quality  
OECD & other countries  
(1973-2000) 
Generalized method of 
moments/panel 
Non-OECD (SO2 & CO2 increase; BOD 
decrease); OECD economies (all 
decrease). EKC hypothesis supported in 
cases of SO2 & CO2, but not BOD 
Levinson et al., 
(2008)  
Effect of environmental 
regulations on trade 
US trade with Canada, 
Mexico (1977/86) 
Panel data and two stage least 
squares (2SLS) 
Increase in US abatement costs caused 
increase in net imports 
Feridun et al. 
(2006) 
Freer trade and pollution 
linkages 
Nigeria (1980/1992-
1999/2000) 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and generalized least squares 
(GLS) 
"Pollution haven" hypothesis supported 
Frankel et. al., 
(2005)  
Trade-environment effects for 
given levels of GDP 
Cross-section of 41 
countries (1990)  
Gravity model estimation 
with IVs 
Trade lowers pollution concentrations 
Ederington et al. 
(2004) 
Free trade & dirty industries’ 
migration 
US (1972 -1994) Grossman and Krueger 
(1993) regression approach 
"Pollution haven" hypothesis not 
supported 
Cole et al., (2003b) Decompose pollution into an 
overall (scale & technique) 
effect. Introduces capital–labor 
endowments 
Cross-country (1975–
1990/1995)  
Fixed effects and random 
effects panel, with two 
models: ‘new’ trade, and 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek 
(HOV) 
Supported "pollution haven" hypothesis 
under ‘new’ trade model, but not under 
HOV model. Technique effects dominate 
in some cases, and scale effects in others  
Antweiler, et al, 
(2001) 
Estimate of scale, technique, 
and composition effects 
44 countries  
(1971-1996) 
Regressions analysis SO2 concentrations fall as freer trade raise 
GDP per person 
Tobey (1990) Impact of environmental policy 
on 'dirty' industries 
World-wide (late 
1960s/early 1970s) 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions with HOV model 
Stringency of environmental policy has no 
significant effect on patterns of trade 
  
 39 
 
 
     (Table 2-1: Methodological Approaches - Trade Liberalization-Environmental Linkages) (continued) 
Author(s) Key aim of study Country/region  
   (time-frame)  
Methodology  Impact on environment 
Applied General Equilibrium Techniques 
Gumilang, et al. 
(2011) 
Trade liberalization-
environment linkages 
Indonesia  
(2001-2022) 
Static global CGE model 
(GTAP) 
Mixed results 
Mukhopadhyay et 
al., (2010) 
Economy wide analysis of 
freer trade and environment 
ASEAN + China, Japan 
& Korea (2001-2010-
2020) 
Static global CGE model 
(GTAP) 
Large impact in Vietnam, Indonesia, and 
Thailand. 
Zhu et al., (2006)  Free trade, factor mobility, 
and the environment 
EU, Central & Eastern 
European Countries 
(1998) 
Static CGE model Positive economic welfare effects 
without increases in GHG emissions 
Li, J. C. (2005) Trade liberalization and 
environment trade-offs 
Thailand (1998 base 
year) 
Standard CGE model 
(IFPRI) 
Modest risk of specialization in dirty 
production  
O’Ryan et al. 
(2005) 
Impact of raising fuel taxes 
and tariff cuts 
Chile (1996 base year) Static CGE model Positive results with environmental-trade 
policy coordination 
Beghin et al. 
(2002b)  
Trade liberalization through 
regional trade blocs and 
environment 
Chile (1992-2010 base 
trend) 
CGE model of trade and 
environment 
Freer trade intensify pollution; double-
dividend conjecture on joint 
environment and efficiency gains 
Beghin et al. 
(2002b)  
Free trade and environment 
given entry into WTO 
China (1992-2010 base 
trend) 
CGE model of trade and 
environment 
For all pollutants, trade reforms harm the 
environment 
Beghin et al. 
(2002b)  
Analysis of growth, trade, and 
environment linkages 
Vietnam (1995-2010 
base trend) 
CGE model of trade and 
environment 
Trade reforms increases environmental 
damage but trade-offs are not excessive 
Beghin et al. 
(2002b)  
Trade-environment, linkages 
given free trade with EU 
Morocco (1995-2005 
base trend) 
CGE model of trade and 
environment 
Freer trade, without mitigating 
environmental policies is production   & 
consumption pollution-intensive  
Dessus, et al. 
(1998)  
Trade liberalization and 
emission abatement 
Costa Rica (1992-2010 
base trend) 
Recursive dynamic CGE 
model 
Free trade might increase pollution 
because of comparative advantages for 
manufacturing 
Lee et. al., (1997) Trade, environment, and 
welfare impacts 
Indonesia (1985 base 
year)   
CGE model – free trade 
with Japan  
Coordinated policies enhance welfare 
and lower emissions 
Beghin et al. 
(1995) 
Growth, openness, and 
environment links 
Mexico (1990-2010 
base trend) 
TEQUILA2 (CGE) model Unilateral trade liberalization increases 
GDP and pollution 
Source: Author  
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2.4. Summary  
 
Overwhelming evidence suggest that pollution intensity is higher in low-income 
countries compared to developed countries (Hettige, et al., 1992; Lucas, et al., 1992). 
However, empirical evidence on the nexus between the environment policies and 
competitiveness is not conclusive. Further, to paraphrase (Beghin, et al., 1994:176) 
“studies do not find strong evidence that environmental regulations per se have 
influenced competitiveness”.   
 
Furthermore, studies have failed to support the “pollution haven” hypothesis that predicts 
that weak environmental regulations foster higher foreign direct investment inflows 
(Beghin, et al., 1994). In fact, Birdsall and Wheeler (1993)’s empirical study on Latin 
American countries reject the "pollution haven" hypothesis, supporting the view that 
there is no association between trade liberalization and higher foreign investment, on the 
one hand, and freer trade and pollution-intensive industrialization, on the other.  
 
Surprisingly, the authors find that trade openness increased demand for developed 
countries’ cleaner technologies with beneficial effects on the environment.  
Dietzenbacher, and Mukhopadhyay (2007) make similar observations in the case of 
India, which was found to have moved away from being a pollution haven while at the 
same time benefiting from trade openness. 
 
Quantitative empirical studies that have analyzed the theorized linkages between trade 
liberalization and environment have applied either econometric techniques, or economic 
modeling approaches, mainly computable general equilibrium (CGE) models.  The wide 
variations of empirical outcomes of CGE studies on trade liberalization and 
environmental quality presents an opportunity to expand such studies to the African 
region, and Kenya, specifically.  
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Many subjects have been covered in studies on Kenya that use the CGE models. These 
include: liberalization of services (Balistreri, et al. 2015); consequences of avian flu 
(Thurlow, 2011); Doha Round of trade negotiations (Zepeda, et al. 2009); agriculture and 
income of adjustment to terms of trade shocks (Karingi and Siriwardana, 2003); impact 
of second oil price shock and resultant energy tax policies on the economy (Semboja, 
1994); and technical efficiency changes in Agriculture (Akinboade, 1993). However, 
Kenya appears to have been overlooked in the literature relating to the hypothesized 
trade-off between trade liberalization and pollution abatement. 
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CHAPTER III: THE KENYAN ECONOMY 
 
Chapter three presents Kenya’s key economic, trade, and environmental indicators, and 
examines how these have evolved in the recent decades. It shows that the real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate has picked up over the past 5 years, a trajectory that 
is expected to continue in the medium term. It illustrates the trade liberalization initiatives 
that the country is undertaking to drive faster economic growth and industrialization. As 
Kenya intensifies its globalization agenda by exploiting its comparative advantages in 
trade, so will industrial emissions rise. These are some of the main issues that are covered 
in this Chapter that starts by presenting Kenya’s recent economic developments, covering 
both the macroeconomic performance, and the structure of the economy. Next is Section 
3.2 that outlines the recent developments on the international trade arena. Here issues 
related to Kenya’s trade openness, imports, and exports transactions, and import tariffs 
are discussed. Thereafter, Section 3.3 provides a brief overview of the foreign direct 
investments flows to Kenya. Finally, before concluding in Section 3.5, Section 3.4 
outlines the country’s environmental policy and performance in recent years.  
 
3.1. Recent Economic Developments 
 
3.1.1. Macroeconomic performance 
 
Kenya, a lower-middle income country, has the largest economy in Eastern Africa, and 
the 8th largest in Africa, as measured in nominal GDP
20. The country’s population was 
estimated at 44.23 million in 2015 (Table 3-1) which, according to the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU) (2016) is expanding at an annual rate of 2.7%. Over the decades 
prior to 2009, Kenya’s economy was adversely affected by political shocks that emanated 
from ethnic conflicts in 1992, 1997, and over the 2007-2008 period (Odero, et al., 2015), 
                                                          
20
 Kenya rebased its GDP in 2014 raising its per capita GDP from USD 994 to USD 1 246.  The 2014 
rebasing changed the base year to 2009 from 2001, updated the production, relative prices, and 
consumption patterns, and introduced innovations related product changes. Further, the rebasing exercise 
changed the utilization and acquisition of capital goods, and adopted an economic activity classification 
that follows international practices (Government of Kenya, 2014b).  
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and that caused the economy to contract significantly.  Thanks to the enactment of the 
2010 Constitution that introduced a more equitable economic and social order in a 
devolved system of 47 county governments, Kenya appears to be enjoying a period of 
renewed good fortune.  
 
Table 3-1: Kenya's Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2009-2015 
Indicator  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Real GDP (%)/1 3.31 8.40 6.11 4.56 5.69 5.33 5.59 
GDP, current prices  
     (KSh, trillions)/1 
 
2.86 
 
3.17 
 
3.73 
 
4.26 
 
4.73 
 
5.36 
 
6.05 
GDP per capita (US$, Units)/1 982 1,039 1,062 1,239 1,314 1,417 1,388 
Inflation, annual,  
     consumer prices (%)/1 
 
8.02 
 
5.77 
 
18.93 
 
3.20 
 
7.15 
 
6.02 
 
8.01 
Exchange rate, period average  
     (KSh per US$)/2  
 
77.35 
 
79.23 
 
88.81 
 
84.53 
 
86.12 
 
87.92 
 
98.18 
General government revenue  
     (% of GDP)/1 
 
18.79 
 
19.80 
 
19.46 
 
19.15 
 
19.76 
 
19.93 
 
20.22 
General government total 
     expenditure (% of GDP)/1 
 
23.13 
 
24.21 
 
23.57 
 
24.18 
 
25.47 
 
27.38 
 
28.60 
Total investment (% of GDP)/1 19.33 20.74 21.67 21.51 20.11 21.37 22.55 
Gross national savings (% of GDP)/1 14.93 14.81 12.54 13.07 11.24 10.97 14.39 
Current account balance  
     (% of GDP)/1 
 
-4.56 
 
-5.92 
 
-9.13 
 
-8.44 
 
-8.87 
 
-10.40 
 
-8.16 
Trade (% of GDP/2 50.86 54.23 60.45 55.22 51.28 51.12 44.81 
Exports of goods and services  
     (% of GDP)/2 
 
20.03 
 
20.66 
 
21.63 
 
19.82 
 
18.15 
 
16.92 
 
15.77 
Imports of goods and services  
     (% of GDP)/2 
 
30.83 
 
33.57 
 
38.82 
 
35.41 
 
33.13 
 
34.20 
 
29.04 
Tariff rate (%)/3 , /2 12.55 12.50 12.42 12.21 12.76 12.77 - 
Population/1 37.70 38.50 39.50 40.70 41.80 43.00 44.23 
Unemployment, total/4 , /2  9.40 9.30 9.20 9.20 9.10 9.20 - 
Source: Author based on data by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2016) and the World Bank (2016) 
  
Notes: /1: Source - IMF’s World Economic Outlook (GDP values, in 2015, are estimates)  
/2: Source - World Bank, World Development Indicators 
/3: Most favored nation, simple mean, all products 
/4: International Labor Organization (ILO) modelling estimate  
 
Table 3-1 show that although there are imbalances, broadly, the Kenya's recent 
macroeconomic performance is stable, and is improving. The real GDP growth rate 
reached 5.6% in 2015, up from 3.3% in 2009. This growth trajectory, per the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s projections, is expected to continue in the medium 
term. GDP per capita increased by 41% from United States dollar (US$) 982 to US$ 
1,388 over the 2009-2015 period. The government successfully brought down the annual 
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inflation rate ―measured in consumer prices― to a single digit of 8% in 2015, after a 
spike to 18.9% in 2011. Investment, as a percentage of GDP, has risen by a modest 17% 
between 2009 and 2015. Kenya’s exchange rate regime is fully liberalized and imposes 
high volatility in the domestic foreign exchange market. The Kenya Shilling (KSh) per 
US$ period average exchange rate depreciated by 27% from KSh 77.35 in 2009 to KSh 
98.18 in 2015. The fiscal deficit, as a percentage of GDP, deteriorated to 8.4% in 2015 
compared to 4.3% in 2009, as the government’s spending outpaced its revenue 
mobilization capacity. Unfavorable terms of trade shocks have caused Kenya’s current 
account deficit to widen, as a % of GDP, from 4.6% in 2009 to 8.2% in 2015. The overall 
unemployment rate is 9%, and is higher among the youth. Despite structural bottlenecks 
that sustain relatively high interest rates, the Kenyan economy is otherwise markets 
driven, with prices of factors, goods, and the exchange rate, being broadly determined by 
forces of supply and demand.   
 
3.1.2. Structure of the economy 
 
Kenya’s official policy has long viewed a productive agricultural sector as the foundation 
for industrialization (Government of Kenya, 1965). While in 1980, the shares in GDP 
were 32.6% for agriculture, 20.8% for industry, and 46.6% for services, a decade later the 
contribution to GDP had risen to 51.4% for services, while that for agriculture had fallen 
to 29.5%, and for industry to 19.1%. A country is classified as semi-industrialized if the 
composition of agriculture and services sectors’ output exceed 40% (Dervis, et al., 
1982:262), a threshold that is exceeded in the Kenyan case. The value added
21
 in 
services, agriculture, and industry sectors, as a percentage of GDP, averaging 52%, 29% 
and 19%, respectively, over the 1990-2014 period. 
  
                                                          
21
 “Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate 
inputs.” (World Bank, 2016). 
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Chart 3-1: Kenya’s Agriculture, Industry, and Services Sectors’ Shares in GDP, 1990-2014 
 
 
  Table 3-2: Kenya's GDP, and Sectoral Contributions to GDP, 2001-2014 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
GDP (billion KSh)1 2,138 2,148 2,212 2,314 2,445 2,588 2,766 
Real GDP growth rate (%)1 3.98 0.48 2.95 4.64 5.67 5.85 6.85 
Agriculture growth rate (%)2 11.66 -3.50 2.43 1.75 6.91 1.73 5.09 
Agriculture (% of GDP)2 31.33 29.13 29.03 28.04 27.20 23.16 23.27 
Industry growth rate (%)2 5.50 2.35 6.12 4.07 4.39 5.89 6.13 
     Including manufacturing 
     growth rate (%)2 
 
0.29 
 
0.08 
 
5.97 
 
4.46 
 
4.66 
 
8.21 
 
4.38 
Industry (% of GDP)2 17.22 17.41 17.58 18.23 19.09 21.88 21.82 
    Including manufacturing (% of GDP)2 11.00 11.07 10.92 11.25 11.82 14.32 14.46 
Services, etc. growth rate (%)2 -0.14 2.70 2.53 5.12 4.59 7.67 7.00 
Services, etc. (% of GDP)2 51.45 53.46 53.40 53.73 53.71 54.97 54.92 
        
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
GDP (billion KSh)1 2,772 2,864 3,104 3,294 3,444 3,640 3,834 
Real GDP growth rate (%)1 0.23 3.31 8.40 6.11 4.56 5.69 5.33 
Agriculture growth rate (%)2 -4.98 -2.30 10.06 2.35 2.95 5.25 3.46 
Agriculture (% of GDP)2 24.92 26.14 27.83 29.27 29.09 29.42 30.27 
Industry growth rate (%)2 -0.05 3.70 8.68 7.25 4.18 5.02 6.51 
     Including manufacturing  
     growth rate (%)2 
 
1.14 
 
-1.05 
 
4.50 
 
7.24 
 
-0.56 
 
5.60 
 
3.41 
Industry (% of GDP)2 20.87 20.98 20.79 21.04 20.71 20.07 19.36 
     Including manufacturing (% of GDP)2 13.58 13.39 12.62 13.08 12.26 11.93 11.11 
Services, etc. growth rate (%)2 2.74 6.23 7.30 6.09 4.73 5.41 5.79 
Services, etc. (% of GDP)2 54.21 52.87 51.38 49.68 50.20 50.51 50.37 
Source: Author based on data by the IMF and the World Bank 
 
Notes:    (1) The GDP is at constant 2009 KSh prices (IMF, 2016) 
              (2) These are value-added annual % growth rates (World Bank, 2016) 
 
Chart 3-1 depicts the evolution of the sectoral distribution of GDP in key sectors of 
services, agriculture, and industry, during the 1990-2014 period. The dominant sectors of 
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services and agriculture, recorded annual average growth rate of 4.1% and 2.5%, 
respectively, over this period. On the other hand, industrial sector grew by an annual 
average of 3.3% over the 1990 to 2014 period. Manufacturing sector, however, stagnated 
contributing only 11% to GDP in 2014, down from an average of 13.7% in the 5 years 
preceding 2010.  The 5 years ending 2014, however, reveal a more promising picture for 
the industrial sector. The sector recorded the highest average annual growth of 6.3%, 
surpassing those for the services sector, and the agriculture sector, that averaged 5.9%, 
and 4.8%, respectively (see Table 3-2).  
 
Agricultural sector   
 
Strong growth in the agricultural sector, that averaged 4.8% per annum, over the 5 years 
ending 2014, pushed the sectors’ GDP from KSh 669 billion in 2009 to KSh 844.7 billion 
in 2014.  However, although the agricultural sector supports the livelihood of 80% of the 
population, and 65% of the country’s export earnings, it is beset by institutional 
complexities, and low access to credit (FAPDA
22
, Undated; Odero, et al., 2015). The 
related policy challenges have contributed to the decline of the sector’s productivity, low 
diversification from traditional agriculture, and low commercialization of small scale 
farming. Consequently, the country’s agriculture sector is weakly vertically integrated, 
with poor institutional support for agricultural exports. Regarding trade policy, Kenya, 
together with the other East African Community (EAC) partner states continues to restrict 
imports of several agricultural products (European Commission, 2015a), for example 
sugar, by imposing import quotas, and high tariffs. Such protectionist measures diminish 
the transmission mechanism of world price shocks, thus leaving the domestic supply and 
demand forces to largely influence the agricultural sector’s growth dynamics. 
  
                                                          
22
 FAPDA stands for Food and Agriculture Policy Decision Analysis. It is a programme within the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
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Industrial sector  
 
Table 3-3: Real GDP in Key Sectors, 2014 and 2013 
Recent statistics (see Table 3-
3), paint a promising picture on 
the performance of industrial 
and construction sectors of the 
Kenya economy, whose 
aggregate value-added, as a 
percentage of GDP, stood at 
6.5% up from 5%, and 3.7%, in 
2013, and 2009, respectively. 
Data by the World Bank (2016) show that the level of industrialization in Kenya, as 
measured by industry value-added share of GDP, has over the past 25 years (1990-2014) 
been range-bound between 16% and 22%, with a spike of 21.9% in 2006. Kenya’s 
expanding mining sector is poised for significant long-term growth given the country’s 
major reserves of soda ash, fluorspar, and titanium oxide,
23
 and the recent discoveries of 
recoverable oil reserves
24
. 
 
A thriving manufacturing sector typically precipitate industrialization and, therefore, it is 
worthwhile to look closer at the recent performance of the former. The top part of Table 
3-4 gives the breakdown of the manufacturing sectors’ value of output, intermediate 
consumption, value-added, and employee compensation at current prices over the period 
from 2009 to 2014.  The second part of Table 3-4 presents the quantum index ―an index 
that track the evolution of quantities of goods produced― of selected manufactures over 
                                                          
23
 See: http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/kenya-2016/energy  
24
 Kenya’s recoverable oil reserves are estimated at about 600 million barrels with yet to be proven oil 
reserves that are projected 20.1 billion barrels. The country plans that its first oil shipments in mid-2017 to 
be the first oil exporter in East Africa. See: (i) http://www.energyglobal.com/pipelines/business-
news/07012016/Uganda-and-Kenya-recoverable-oil-reserves-could-impact-economies-depending-on-new-
export-pipeline/;  
(ii) http://www.africareview.com/Business---Finance/Explorer-confirms-more-Kenya-oil-reserves/-
/979184/1979246/-/4opp6e/-/index.html; and (iii) (see article by Bloomberg, “Kenya From Nowhere Plans 
East Africa’s First Oil Exports: Energy” at:  http://www.bloomberg.com/) 
 Share 
in GDP 
(%) 
2014 
(Ksh 
million) 
2013 
(Ksh 
million) 
Mining and quarrying 0.9 35,196 30,813 
(growth rate)  (14.2%) (-8.9%) 
Manufacturing 10.9 416,891 403,128 
(growth rate)  (3.4%) (5.6%) 
Electricity and water supply 2.4 91,908 86,917 
(growth ate)  (5.7%) (6.6%) 
Construction 4.8 185,301 163,841 
(growth rate)  (13.1%) (5.8%) 
Total  19 729,296 684,699 
(growth rate)  (6.5%) (5.0%) 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya (2015:6) 
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the same period. The quantum index cover manufactures that accounted for about 80% of 
the total value-added in 2013.  
 
  Table 3-4: Manufacturing sector's selected indicators, 2009 - 2014 
Output, Intermediate Consumption, Value-Added, and Employee Compensation  
(Current Prices, KSh billion) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Value of output 770 1,259 1,581 1,620 1,738 1,822 
Intermediate consumption 536 902 1,143 1,150 1,230 1,285 
Value-added 235 357 438 470 508 537 
Compensation of employees 75 92 98 106 127 141 
       
Quantum Index of Production for Selected Manufactures  
(Base: 2009 = 100) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Meat products 100.0 98.1 105.1 109.2 109.4 108.8 
Animal and vegetable fats/oils 100.0 103.7 101.1 98.9 111.4 118.8 
Grain mill products 100.0 116.6 126.3 130.3 137.4 148.7 
Other food products 100.0 122.1 116.3 113.8 129.7 133.8 
Beverages 100.0 103.1 113.6 122.9 112.5 105.3 
Textiles 100.0 106.2 110.4 117.7 112.1 115.2 
Wearing apparel 100.0 107.7 112.8 119.0 132.7 139.1 
Printing and production 100.0 100.4 100.5 100.2 102.3 99.3 
Refined petroleum products 100.0 103.2 114.0 91.4 47.0 0.0 
Chemical and chemical products 100.0 110.0 116.0 116.1 112.6 115.7 
Rubber products 100.0 96.1 72.0 82.1 100.2 99.0 
Plastic products 100.0 102.1 110.0 116.5 114.1 123.5 
Other non-metallic minerals 100.0 109.9 119.3 125.3 135.1 156.1 
Fabricated metals 100.0 110.6 123.1 131.7 154.3 175.1 
Motor vehicle and trailers 100.0 104.9 113.1 123.3 119.3 125.9 
Manufacture of furniture 100.0 108.4 150.2 164.2 183.8 208.3 
Total Manufacturing 100.0 109.3 116.3 119.2 127.5 133.3 
Source: Economic Survey, 2014 & 2015 (Government of Kenya, 2014b: 183/184; 2015a:195/196) 
 
From 2009 to 2014, the output in the manufacturing sector expanded by 137% (KSh 
1,052 billion). This mirrors the increase in quantities produced as reflected in the total 
manufacturing quantum index that rose by 33.3 points above the 2009 base value. While 
over the same 2009-2014 period, the value-added, and intermediate consumption in 
manufactures also increased significantly by 129% (KSh 302 billion), and 140% (KSh 
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749 billion), respectively, compensation to employees increased at a slower pace by 88% 
(KSh 66 billion). Manufactures of furniture, fabricated metals, and other non-metallic 
minerals, supported this high output growth trajectory, rising by 108.3 points, 75.1 points, 
and 56.1 points, above the 2009 base value, respectively. Following this is a group of 
manufactures comprising grain milling, wearing apparel, other food products (coffee, tea, 
refined salts, etc.), motor vehicle and trailers, and plastics whose expansion ranged from 
23.5 to 48.7 points. Manufactures of food products normally reflect the performance of 
the agricultural sector. A third group that comprises the manufactures of animal and 
vegetable fats/oils, chemicals, and textiles achieved growth of rates of between 15.2 and 
18.8 points. In 2014, the refining of crude fuel from Kenya Petroleum Refineries Limited 
was stopped. Output of meat products and beverages expanded by 8.8 points and 5.3 
points, respectively, above the 2009 base value, while that of printing and production, 
and rubber products, contracted by about 1 point. 
 
On the policy front, Ronge and Nyangito (2000) define two phases relating to Kenya’s 
industrialization strategy: import-substitution industrialization, and export-oriented 
industrialization (see Table 3-5). Before the 1980s, the country’s policy stances aimed to 
protect “infant-industries” through quantitative import controls, punitive tariffs, an 
overvalued exchange rate, and export subsidies.  Thanks to access to a wider export 
market under the initial EAC customs union with Uganda, and Tanzania that was 
launched in 1967, but collapsed in 1977, Kenya managed to expand its industrial base 
over this period
25
. The collapse of the initial EAC treaty, in the backdrop of excessive 
market distortions that eroded Kenya’s competitiveness in manufactures, however, 
curtailed the county’s further progress towards industrialization.  
 
Ronge and Nyangito (2000)’s second phase coincides with the push by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank for developing countries to implement 
structural adjustment programs of the 1980s. Kenya, on its part, launched its home-grown 
                                                          
25 See “The History Of The East African Community” at: http://eacgermany.org/eac-history/. The Treaty to re-launch 
the EAC was signed on November 30, 1999 and was ratified by the initial member states, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda on July 7, 2000.  Rwanda and Burundi became full members of the re-launched EAC on July 1, 2007, and 
South Sudan, on March 2, 2016. 
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reforms through the Economic Management for Renewed Growth (Sessional Paper No. 1 
of 1986) aiming to liberalize trade and the exchange rates, provide exports incentives, 
and to privatize state enterprises. These goals faced uneven implementation leading the 
IMF to withdraw its financial support in 1997. In the backdrop of major macroeconomic 
imbalances and economic stagnation, the country issued its Industrial Transformation to 
the Year 2020 (Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1996) policy framework that envisaged 
industrialization as a pathway for rapid and sustained economic growth. In the new 
paradigm that was implemented under the Eighth Development Plan (1997–2001), and 
the Ninth Development Plan (2002–2008), the government was mandated to provide 
incentives and strengthen institutional frameworks for private sector led industrialization. 
These objectives were, however, not fully realized because of discontinuation of financial 
support by the IMF, and the World Bank in the decade ending 2003 (Ronge and 
Nyangito, 2000). 
 
Table 3-5: Industrial Sector Development in Kenya: A Historical Perspective 
Policy framework Policy instruments 
Phase I: Import-substitution industrialization (1963-1980) 
 Broadly followed the British colonial policy  Protecting “infant-industries”  
 
Phase II: Export-oriented industrialization (1981-2008) 
 Economic Management for Renewed 
Growth (Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986) 
 Liberalization of trade and exchange rate, 
provision of export incentives, and privatization 
 Industrial Transformation to the Year 2020 
(Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1996) 
 Eighth Development Plan (1997–2001) 
 Stable macroeconomic framework, enhanced 
trade policy regime, infrastructural, human 
resource, and institutional developments 
 Ninth National Development Plan (2002-
2008) 
 Prudent macro-economic policies to sustain 
growth 
  
Phase III: Spatial-inclusive industrialization (2009 to date) 
 Kenya's Vision 2030 (2008-2030) with three 
pillars: Economic, Social, and Political 
 Fostering macroeconomic stability, while 
removing bottlenecks hampering expansion of 
industry sector 
 The 2010 Constitution of Kenya, 6 May 
2010 
 Enhancing spatial distribution of industrialization 
  Source: Author based on Ronge and Nyangito (2000), Kenya's Vision 2030, and 2010 Constitution 
 
I add a third phase from 2009 that I have named, spatial-inclusive industrialization (Table 
3-5).  A new era for industrial take-off in Kenya began with the issuance of Kenya's 
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Vision 2030 (2008-2030), and the enactment of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya (6 May 
2010), that repealed the 1969 Constitution. The 2010 Constitution mandates the equitable 
sharing of resources between national and county governments. Further, it established an 
equalization fund to improve access to services to marginalized communities, that is 
enhancing spatial distribution, and sustainability of industrialization initiatives. Also, 
Kenya's Vision 2030 calls for the country’s transformation into a newly industrialized 
middle-income country by 2030, and mandates the national government to implement 
several enablers to accelerate industrialization including, rapid infrastructure, technology, 
and human resources development (Government of Kenya, 2008). Good progress has 
been made to implement projects envisaged in Kenya’s Vision 2030 under two plans: 
First Medium Term Plan, 2008-2012; and Second Medium Term Plan, 2013–2017. Under 
infrastructural projects, for example, the Kenya-Uganda standard-gauge railway
26
, and 
Africa’s largest wind power project ―situated in a remote, marginalized northern region 
and that is expected to meet 17% of Kenya’s power demand27―, are creating new 
opportunities that will overcome regional inequalities both in economic and spatial terms. 
In the 2016 World Bank’s ease of doing business rating, Kenya was ranked as the highest 
reformer in the region, edging up 21 positions to rank 108 out of 189 economies, a 
demonstration that the country is creating a competitive environment for investments
28
.   
                                                          
26
 The first phase of the railway, from Mombasa to Nairobi is nearing completion, and is expected to be 
commissioned in 2017 well ahead of schedule. This phase cost US$3·6 billion, of which 90% is financed 
by the China EximBank. Agreement with the Chinese has been signed to extend the standard gauge railway 
by another 120 kilometers to serve a newly launched economic development zone at Naivasha in the Rift 
Valley, close to Kenya’s geothermal energy source. See: http://www.railwaygazette.com/ news/ 
infrastructure/single-view/view/standard-gauge-to-serve-naivasha.html 
27
 The Lake Turkana Wind Power project is a US$690 private sector investment that is financed by a 
consortium of investors including the African Development Bank, and the European Investment Bank. See 
news article available at: http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/07/06/3677104/kenya-builds-africas-largest-
wind-farm/ 
28
 See 2016 World Bank Ease of Doing Business rating for Kenya at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
data/exploreeconomies/kenya 
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Service sector   
 
After recovering from the sharp contraction during the post-election crisis from 
December 2007 to February 2008, Kenya's dominant services sector slowed slightly from 
an annual growth rate of 6.2% in 2009, to an annual average growth rate of 5.9% over the 
5-year ending 2014 (Table 3-2). Activities in the services sector that contributed 
significantly to GDP in 2014 were: real estate (KSh 311 billion or 8%), wholesale and 
retail trade (KSh 294.8 billion or 8%), education (KSh 267.8 billion or 7%), transport and 
storage (KSh 252.5 billion or 7%), financial and insurance (KSh 229.9 billion or 6%), 
public administration (KSh 150 billion or 4%), and information and communication (KSh 
137.8 billion or 4%). The service sector activities that achieved the highest average 
annual growth rate over the period 2010 to 2014, are: information and communication 
(13.5%), financial and insurance (8.9%), education (8.5%), wholesale and retail trade 
(8.1%), real estate (4.8%), and transport and storage (4.2%). Accommodation and 
restaurant exhibited contraction in annual growth in both 2013 (-4.6%) and 2014 (-
17.2%) because of recent terrorist attacks that have heightened insecurity.  
 
3.2. International Trade Developments 
 
3.2.1. Trade openness  
 
Despite failed attempts to implement trade reforms before the 1980s (see Ronge and 
Nyangito, 2000; Musila, et al., 2015), Kenya’s economy remained outward-oriented. 
Reforms that the country introduced over the 1986-1989 period, therefore, provided 
further impetus to openness of the economy. These include the gradual reduction of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and bringing the local currency under a managed float 
exchange rate regime (1988-1989) that evolved to a free-floating exchange rate regime by 
1995 (Musila, et al., 2015). Data by the World Bank (2016) support these facts showing 
that from 1963 to 2014 Kenya’s trade openness ratio ―total trade (sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services) as a percentage of GDP― averaged 58.4%, and goods 
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merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP averaged 43.9%.  More recently, during the 
2001-2014 period, the degree of trade openness was lowest in 2009 (50.48%), and 
highest in 2005 (64.47%) as shown in Table 3-6.  
 
Table 3-6: Kenya's Exports, Imports, and Total Trade Ratios (%), 2001-2014 
Year 
 
Exports/ 
GDP 
Imports/ 
GDP 
Degree of 
Openness 
 
Year 
 
Exports/ 
GDP 
Imports/ 
GDP 
Degree of 
Openness 
2001 23.19 31.18 54.37   2008 23.10 34.99 58.09 
2002 24.46 29.41 53.87   2009 19.95 30.53 50.48 
2003 24.22 28.58 52.80   2010 22.46 33.83 56.29 
2004 26.61 32.87 59.47   2011 23.61 38.97 62.58 
2005 28.51 35.96 64.47   2012 21.87 35.55 57.42 
2006 23.02 31.64 54.66   2013 19.62 33.58 53.20 
2007 22.10 31.48 53.58   2014 18.23 33.71 51.94 
Source: Author based on trade data by United Nations (UN) Comtrade (2016) and GDP data by World Bank (2016) 
 
3.2.2. Trade flows 
 
Table 3-6 shows that over the 2001-2014 period, Kenya’s exports of goods and services, 
as a percentage of GDP, spiked to 28.51% in 2005, and declined to their lowest level of 
18.23% in 2014. Over the same period, as a percentage of GDP, imports declined to their 
lowest level of 28.58%, in 2003 and spiked in 2011 to 38.97%. In value terms, Kenya’s 
exports expanded by Ksh 138 billion (43%) to KSh 461 billion between 2009 and 2014, 
while imports increased at a faster pace, by KSh 830 billion (105%) to KSh 1,618 over 
the same period (see Table 3-7 and Table 3-8). Kenya's deteriorating terms of trade 
mirror the depreciating of its currency. The KSh per US$, period average exchange rate, 
declined sharply from KSh 7.42 in 1980 to KSh 77.35 in 2009, and KSh 87.92 in 2014 
(Table 3-1; World Bank, 2016). Although the currency depreciation has adversely 
affected imports, a positive response from the exports side has been slow. Consequently, 
Kenya's current account deficit widened from 4.3% of GDP in 1990 to 10.4% in 2014 
(IMF, 2016).   
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Chart 3-2: Kenya’s Trade Structure, 2010 and 2014 
  
Source: Author based on data by Central Bank of Kenya (2015) 
 
As shown in Chart 3-2, data by the Central Bank of Kenya (2015) reveal that about 50% 
of Kenya’s international trade in 2014 was with Asian region.  This trade grew by a 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 13.8% to reach KSh 1,090 billion in 2014, 
from KSh 650 billion in 2010. European and African regions follow closely with trade 
flows shares of about 20% (KSh 425 billion) and 18% (KSh 388 billion), respectively, in 
2014. This trade expanded at CAGRs of 7.9%, and 8.7%, respectively, over the 2010-
2014 period. Finally, trade with the America region was low at KSh 233 billion in 2014, 
but grew fastest at a CAGR of 51.8% between 2010 and 2014. 
 
Table 3-7, and Table 3-8, presents Kenya’s exports and imports over the period 2009-
2014, respectively. Over this period, three economic categories ―food and beverages, 
other consumer goods, and industrial supplies (non-food)― accounted for roughly 95% 
of Kenya's annual export flows (Table 3-7). While food and beverages, and industrial 
supplies (non-food), remained flat in their contribution to exports, other consumer goods, 
have expanded their contributions, rising from 23.4% in 2011 to 27.9 in 2014. Kenya’s 
imports were clustered in four economic categories, namely, industrial supplies (non-
food), fuel and lubricants, machinery and other capital equipment, and transport 
equipment, taking up about 84% of annual import flows during the 2010-2014 period 
(Table 3-8). Imports of industrial supplies (non-food), machinery and other capital 
Europe 
23% 
America 
6% 
Africa 
22% 
Asia 
48% 
Other 
1% 
Share of Total Trade (%) in 
2010 
Europe 
20% 
America 
11% 
Africa 
18% 
Asia 
50% 
Other 
1% 
Share of Total Trade (%) in 
2014 
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equipment, and fuel and lubricants, have remained roughly constant over the 2009 to 
2014 period, while imports of transport equipment are growing, albeit slowly and 
unevenly. 
 
Table 3-7: Kenya’s Export Values and Shares, 2009-2014 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total Export Value (KSh Billions) 323 385 484 480 456 461 
 
Broad Economic Category 
      
Food and beverages (%) 42.26 44.12 40.36 41.17 42.81 40.84 
Industrial supplies (non-food) (%) 26.99 28.07 30.26 29.61 27.69 27.02 
Fuel and lubricants (%) 1.41 1.93 2.07 0.84 0.35 0.71 
Machinery and other  
     capital equipment (%) 
 
2.10 
 
2.34 
 
2.31 
 
2.86 
 
2.14 
 
1.63 
Transport equipment (%) 1.80 1.71 1.56 1.64 1.78 1.57 
Consumer goods (others) (%) 25.43 21.80 23.42 23.74 24.92 27.89 
Other goods (%) 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.31 0.34 
Total Export Shares (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Government of Kenya (2014b, 2015b) 
 
Table 3-8: Kenya’s Import Values and Shares, 2009-2014 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total Import Value (KSh Billions) 788 947 1,301 1,375 1,413 1,618 
 
Broad Economic Category 
      
Food and beverages (%) 11.48 7.44 8.15 7.94 7.19 6.91 
Industrial supplies (non-food) (%) 29.45 31.60 31.21 29.63 31.87 28.56 
Fuel and lubricants (%) 21.00 22.09 26.90 24.50 23.09 21.43 
Machinery and other  
     capital equipment (%) 
 
17.42 
 
18.71 
 
16.15 
 
18.43 
 
17.75 
 
17.22 
Transport equipment (%) 13.13 12.34 9.98 11.85 11.38 17.22 
Consumer goods (others) (%) 7.32 7.49 7.16 6.98 6.81 7.02 
Other goods (%) 0.20 0.33 0.45 0.67 1.91 1.64 
Total Import Shares (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Government of Kenya (2014b, 2015b) 
 
The analysis of Kenya’s trade with the rest of the world highlights important stylized 
facts. Like other developing countries, primary and labor-intensive goods dominate 
Kenya’s exports flows, while its imports are mainly capital-intensive goods and fossil 
fuels based petroleum products. The latter is bound to change once the country starts 
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producing crude petroleum fuel from its recently discovered oil reserves
29
. The main 
destination for Kenya’s primary commodity exports, mainly horticulture, tea, and coffee, 
is the European Union, while the destination for its manufactured goods is mainly to 
other African countries (EAC and COMESA members) and the United States in respect 
of apparels under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) framework. Kenya 
imports capital-intensive goods and consumer goods mainly from Asian countries (India 
and China), and crude petroleum fuel from the Gulf countries. The economic structure of 
exports and import categories show trends that have not changed over the past decades, 
and are expected to continue in the medium term. 
 
3.2.3. Import tariffs 
 
Kenya’s most favored nation, simple mean, tariff rate for all products averaged 12.5% 
during the 2009-2014 (Table 3-1; World Bank, 2016). Nevertheless, tariff rates on 
individual product classifications vary. In this regard, as a founding member of the EAC 
and the COMESA free trade blocs
30
, that launched their customs unions in March 2004 
and June 2009 respectively, Kenya is obliged to apply a Common External Tariff on 
imports from outside the EAC and the COMESA countries. The COMESA’s Common 
External Tariff is harmonized to that of the EAC (COMESA, 2015d)
31
. The EAC 
Common External Tariff tariffs are set at 0% for raw materials and capital goods, 10% 
for intermediated inputs, and 25% for finished goods. However, there are sensitive 
                                                          
29
 Kenya is building a 960 MW coal-fired power plant in its coastal city of Lamu (Kant, et al., 2014). 
Processing and exports of recently discovered crude petroleum is planned to commence in mid-2017 (see 
article by Bloomberg, “Kenya From Nowhere Plans East Africa’s First Oil Exports: Energy” at:  
http://www.bloomberg.com/). 
30
 The Protocol for the establishment of the EAC Customs Union ―the entry point into the EAC trading 
block― was signed in 2004 (See: http://www.eac.int/customs/index.php?option=com_content&id= 
100&Itemid=49), and came into effect on October 31, 2009. COMESA, established in 1994, evolved from 
the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) that was launched in 1981. Its Treaty was signed in 1993 and ratified a 
year later. Currently, the COMESA region cover twenty countries ―Burundi, Comoros, Congo (DRC), 
Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, 
Sudan, South Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. To boost trade among member 
countries, COMESA launched its customs union in June 2009 (COMESA, 2015a, b).  
31
 The overlaps between the EAC and COMESA might be eliminated in the medium-term if the June 2015 
Sharm El Sheikh (Egypt) declaration by 24 African countries to launch a Tripartite Free Trade Area 
(TFTA) covering the COMESA, the EAC, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is 
actioned (see COMESA, 2015c). 
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sectors that are sheltered from external competition, with tariff rates ranging from 35% to 
100%. The products categorized as sensitive include dairy, cereals, sugar, textiles and 
clothing.  
 
Kenya, in September 2016, signed the European Union/East African Community 
Framework Economic Partnership Agreement (FEPA) that was initiated in 2007. This 
agreement is expected to offer EAC member states with quota free and duty free access 
to the European Union (EU) market. Under this treaty, Kenya is required to progressively 
liberalize 82.5% of its imports from the EU within 15 years, while having duty free 
access to the EU market from the start. Under the existing EU-EAC trade agreement, raw 
materials and capital goods from the EU (about 65.4% of the trade) are imported into 
Kenya at zero tariff, and consequently, the effective extra trade liberalization is about 
17.2% of goods imported from EU, of which about 15.2% are intermediate inputs that are 
currently taxed at a 10% tariff rate (European Commission, 2015a, 2015b).  
 
3.3. Foreign Direct Investments 
 
A country’s outward orientation is also measured by foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows. The net inflows of FDI
32 
to Kenya grew from US$ 116.26 million (0.31% of GDP) 
in 2009 to US$ 1,437 million (2.27% of GDP) in 2015 (World Bank, 2016). The stock of 
FDI increased by 26.1%, from KSh 366.8 billion in 2009 to KSh 462.5 billion in 2011 
(Government of Kenya, 2014b). Over this period, the manufacturing sector received the 
highest proportion of FDI inflows, followed by the financial and insurance sectors. Other 
major sectoral recipients of FDI were electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning 
(Government of Kenya, 2014b).  
 
The EU is a source of major investment to Kenya, taking up about 44% of the total 
liability stocks in 2011, with the United Kingdom leading with 27% of total liabilities in 
2011, while other sources included the Netherlands, France, and Belgium. The Asian 
                                                          
32 FDI net inflows, according to the World Bank (2016), represent acquisition by a foreign investor of a lasting 
management interest of 10 percent or more of voting stock in an enterprise operating in an economy. 
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countries (e.g. Japan, China, and India), and the United States are other major sources of 
FDI (Government of Kenya, 2014b). Kenya, however, does not have a clear policy for 
promoting FDI to specific sectors. In the medium term, the recent finds of mineral wealth 
such as oil and coal could drive the next phase of sectoral allocation of FDI, but this may 
not affect substantially the existing trading patterns.  
 
3.4. Environmental Developments 
 
3.4.1. Environmental performance 
 
Data by the World Bank (2016) show that the proportion of the Kenyan population 
exposed to PM2.5 air pollution
33
 levels that exceed the World Health Organization 
(WHO)’s guideline value, increased from 43.9% in 1990 to 59.8% in 2013. This is as 
PM2.5 air pollution rose by 9% between 2000, and 2011. Over the same period, 
emissions of nitrous oxide (NO2) increased by 24%, and those of methane (CH4) by 
25%. Interestingly, while the emissions from carbon dioxide (CO2) increased by 30%, 
the CO2 emissions from fossil fuel consumption increased by a whopping 340% (see 
Table 3-9).  
 
Table 3-9: Environmental Status in Kenya 
 2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 
CO2 emissions (kt) (Note 1) 10,418 8,562 12,350 12,420 13,568 
CO2 emissions from solid fuel 
     consumption (% of total) 
 
1.69 
 
3.90 
 
2.97 
 
5.05 
 
7.43 
Other GHG emissions, HFC, PFC and SF6 
     (Note 1) (thousand metric tons of  
     CO2 equivalent) 
 
 
5,032 
 
 
2,142 
 
 
1,398 
 
 
1,409 
 
 
1,409 
Combustible renewables and waste  
     (% of total energy) 
 
78.19 
 
77.69 
 
74.13 
 
72.85 
 
73.20 
Methane (CH4) emissions  
     (kt of CO2 equivalent) 
 
22,283 
 
25,615 
 
27,437 
 
27,477 
 
27,752 
Nitrous oxide emissions (thousand  
     metric tons of CO2 equivalent) 
 
9,248 
 
10,595 
 
12,012 
 
11,363 
 
11,477 
PM2.5 air pollution, mean annual exposure      
                                                          
33
 Particulate matter (PM) ―also known as particle pollution―, comprise of tiny pieces of solids or liquids 
that are found in the air, and if less than 2.5 micrometers, are harmful to human health when inhaled.  
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          (micrograms per cubic meter) 10.04 10.70 - 10.72 10.94 
Source: World Bank (2016) 
Note 1: Abbreviations: kt for kilotonnes; HFC for hydrofluorocarbons; PFC for perfluorocarbons; and SF6 
for Sulfur hexafluoride 
 
 
To fulfill its obligations as a non-Annex I party to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Kenya conducted, in 1994 and 2010, 
greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories
34.
 Table 3-10 provide a sectoral decomposition of 
Kenya’s total GHG emissions in 2000 and 2010, as reported to UNFCCC in 2015. This 
illustrates an upward trajectory in the country’s total GHG emissions in CO2 equivalent 
(CO2e), having risen by 27%, from 54.953 CO2e million tons (MtCO2e) in 2000 to 
69.576 MtCO2e in 2010. The relative contributions towards the total GHG emissions are, 
52% for carbon dioxide (CO2), 29% for methane (CH4), and 19% for nitrous oxide 
(N2O) (Government of Kenya, 2015a).   
 
  Table 3-10: Kenya’s Total Emissions by Sector, 2000 and 2010 
  
Million 
Tons 
CO2e 
(2000) 
 
 
Share 
(2000) 
Share 
Excl. 
LULUCF 
(2000) 
Million 
Tons 
CO2e 
(2010) 
 
 
Share 
(2010) 
Share 
Excl. 
LULUCF 
(2010) 
Energy 9.760 17.8% 28.4% 14.735 21.2% 30.4% 
Industrial processes 0.812 1.5% 2.4% 2.210 3.2% 4.6% 
Agriculture 22.539 41.0% 65.7% 29.577 42.5% 61.1% 
Waste 1.205 2.2% 3.5% 1.898 2.7% 3.9% 
Sub-total (excluding 
     LULUCF) 
 
34.316 
 
62.5% 
 
100% 
 
48.420 
 
69.6% 
 
100% 
Land use, land-use change 
     and forestry (LULUCF) 
 
20.637 
 
37.6% 
 
  
 
21.156 
 
30.4% 
 
  
Total 54.953 100%   69.576 100%   
Government of Kenya (2015a) 
 
Emissions from the agriculture sector —e.g., methane (CH4) gas— accounted for 41% 
(22.539 MtCO2e) of the total GHG in 2000, rising to 42.5% (29.577 MtCO2e) in 2010. 
Land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF), was the second highest emitting 
                                                          
34
 Kenya as a non-Annex I party to the Convention is mandated to submit national communications on how it is 
developing an inventory of greenhouse gas (CO2, CH4 and N20), and the steps it is taking to implement the 
Convention to the Conference of the Parties (COP). The country has submitted two reports: on October 22, 2002 and 
December 11, 2015. See: http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_natcom/ submitted_natcom/items/7742.php 
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sector at 37.6% (20.637 MtCO2e) in 2000 and 30.4% (21.156 MtCO2e) in 2010. The 
energy sector was third at 17.8% (9.76 MtCO2e) and 21.2% (14.735 MtCO2e) in 2010, 
followed by industrial processes, and waste sector, that contributed 3.2% and 2.7% of the 
total GHG in 2010, respectively, as shown in Table 3-10 (Government of Kenya, 2015a). 
 
Kenya, however, is a low emitter of GHG. In 2013, the country emitted only 11.7 million 
tons (MT) of CO2 from fuel combustion, compared to leading emitters like China and 
India, that recorded emission levels of 9,023.1 MT of CO2, and 1,868.6 MT of CO2, 
respectively (International Energy Agency (IEA), 2015). Despite this, the risks of 
environmental degradation are rising because of a growing population at 2.7% per 
annum, demographic shift towards urban, that is estimated at an annual rate of 4.15% 
over the 2015-2020 period (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(UN ESA), 2014), and a rapid pace of economic and infrastructure developments. 
Kenya’s own projections show that total emissions are expected to increase from 70 
MtCO2e in 2010 to 138 MtCO2e by 2030 (Government of Kenya, 2015a).  The top three 
activities that will drive this growth in emissions are electricity generation, industrial 
processes, and transportation. The growth of emissions from the energy and 
transportation sectors is projected to add 43 MtCO2eq of GHGs by 2030, compared to 
the situation in 2013 (Kant, et al., 2014). In this regard, during 2013, Kenya’s fuel 
combustion emissions grew by 12.8% from the level achieved in 2012, at a far higher 
pace than the annual emissions growth in China (5.36%), India (4.97%), and South 
Africa (3.1%), according to data by IEA (2015). With respect to energy generation, new 
coal and natural gas resources are expected to be used to meet increasing energy demand, 
thus driving up emissions substantially.  
 
3.4.2. Environmental policy 
 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992 enabled Kenya’s policy makers to link sustainable development to 
environmental quality (Government of Kenya, 2013). This motivated Kenya to develop, 
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in 1994, an action plan on environment, and to release, in 1999, the Sessional Paper No. 6 
that demonstrated the linkages between development and environmental performance. 
Kenya’s first legal framework on environmental issues was the Environmental 
Management and Coordination Act (EMCA) No. 8 of 1999.  The EMCA created the 
National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) under the auspice of the 
Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources, and Regional Development Authorities 
(MENRRDA) to spearhead environmental management in the country. The EMCA also 
established other complementary institutions ―the National Environment Council, the 
Public Complaints Committee, the Standards and Enforcement Review Committee, the 
National Environment Tribunal, the National Environment Action Plan Committees, and 
the County Environment Committees―, to move forward the environmental agenda in 
Kenya (Githaiga, C. W., 2013).  Furthermore, the promulgation of a new Constitution in 
2010 created a new dispensation for greener development through several provisions, for 
example, on citizenry rights to a clean and healthy environment as enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights (Government of Kenya, 2013). 
 
Kenya issued its National Environment Policy in 2013 that provides a framework for an 
integrated approach to the country’s natural resources management (Government of 
Kenya, 2013). The policy complements other actions that the country has taken to 
address environmental concerns. By ratifying the UNFCCC in 1994 as a non-Annex I 
party, Kenya committed itself to take necessary measures to mitigate the adverse impacts 
of climate change. As a result, the country has refocused its efforts for monitoring and 
reporting on GHGs more consistently since 2010.  Kenya ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 
25 February 2005 (UNFCCC, 1997) and has actively participated in all events of 
UNFCCC including the 2015 COP21 (Conference of Parties, 21st) Climate Conference in 
Paris. To address the risks posed by climate change, Kenya, in addition to its National 
Environment Policy, 2013, has also issued a National Climate Change Response Strategy 
(NCCRS), 2010, and a National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP), 2013 
(Government of Kenya, 2010, 2013).  
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In conjunction with command and control instruments (emissions and technology 
standards), market based instruments (MBIs), both direct (emission fees, and marketable 
permits) and indirect (taxes, and subsidies), have played a role in pollution abatement in 
developing countries. In the case of Kenya, however, the use of MBIs is limited to taxes 
on use of petroleum products by consumers, and subsidies that are used to incentivize 
reforestation and the adoption of cleaner technologies (Di Falco, et al., 2012). The lack of 
clear policy intentions on the use of pollution abatement policies and weak administrative 
capacity of the regulators, are binding constraints on use of MBIs as effective tools for 
pollution abatement in Kenya.  
 
There is a major paradox in that although the country’s NCCAP envisages a low-carbon 
economy by 2030, on the contrary, Kenya’s Vision 2030 is driving industrialization 
through higher utilization of fossil fuels for electricity generation (Kant, et al., 2014). 
Kenya is, however, gifted by having a civil society that demand higher environmental 
quality, building on the work of Wangari Maathai (1940-2011), the 2004 Nobel Peace 
Prize Laureate, who called on her fellow Kenyans, and Africans in general, “to take 
charge of their environment” (Green Belt Movement, 2015). But heightened civil society 
activism, alone, is not enough to guarantee better environmental outcomes.   
 
The focus, therefore, needs to shift towards creating adequate capacity in NEMA to 
control and enforce environmental standards. NEMA is directing its attention towards 
ensuring that proper environmental impact assessments (EIA) are conducted for projects, 
and environmental audits and monitoring are enhanced. Nevertheless, as is the case in 
many developing countries, the implementation of environmental standards in Kenya will 
continue to be a challenge in the medium-term because of inadequacy of institutional 
capacity and resources, to ensure proper monitoring and enforcement of the strict 
standards, that would guarantee environmental sustainability in the backdrop of 
accelerating industrialization. 
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3.5. Summary 
 
The Kenyan economy is dominated by agricultural activities that traditionally are 
associated with high chemical intensity, and emissions of methane (CH4) gas. 
Additionally, increased trade liberalization, to drive the country’s industrialization 
aspirations, will increasingly transform the economy to agro-industrial manufacturing. 
Kenya is an attractive destination for foreign direct investments in the EAC region given 
its relatively well-educated workforce that provide comparative advantages in 
manufacturing and services. The country’s industrial operations are generally, more 
capital-intensive, in the region. A free trade pack with the EU and the EAC member 
countries that Kenya has been aggressively pursuing, and that was signed in September 
2016 will deepen trade with the EU. It is likely that Kenya’s manufacturing sector will 
expand considerably in the short-term. This is in the backdrop that 17% of Kenya’s 
exports are in energy-intensive sectors whose activities are associated with significant 
industrial emissions. Consequently, the proportion of industrial emissions will rise as 
Kenya pursues the benefits of globalization, in the contexts of further trade opening, and 
the planned oil production and exports starting in 2017.  
 
This is in the backdrop of a growing population that is rising at an annual rate of 2.7%, 
and increased urbanization. Regarding the former, a growing population implies higher 
consumption of fossil fuels among other dirty goods.  About the latter, estimates by UN 
ESA (2014) show that Kenya’s average annual rate of change of the urban population 
stood at 4.35% during the 2005-2010 period, and is growing at an annual rate of 4.15% 
over the 2015-2020 period. Such a demographic shift to urban, coupled with high and 
rising pollution from urban transportation systems and industrial activities that are urban 
based, will have detrimental consequences to public health, and the overall environment 
condition in the short-run. 
 
These casual observations appear to indicate that Kenya will shortly be faced with a 
major problem of addressing the environmental consequences of trade specialization. As 
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the country intensifies its globalization agenda by taking advantages of its traditional 
comparative advantages in its natural resources, a relatively well-educated workforce, 
and a reasonable capital base for capital-intensive manufacturing, so will industrial 
emissions rise. At the same time, the population is growing moderately and is shifting 
from rural to urban centers, and this will intensify consumption related pollution.  
 
If Kenya implements tough pollution abatement practices, the marginal costs of 
production are likely to rise significantly as pollution abatement levels rise. This in turn 
could adversely undermine the country’s current export competitiveness. Conversely, an 
environmental tax on energy inputs will increase the price of goods, and if the tax is very 
high, this might not be politically acceptable. This suggests that a trade-off could exist 
between trade liberalization and environmental quality. Lower environmental quality 
appears to imply a trade-off in terms of higher GDP growth rates in Kenya, while 
economic growth itself, is partly driven by higher international trade flows. These 
important conclusions support the need for Kenya’s policy makers to take concrete steps 
to mitigate the adverse effects on the environment from further free trade initiatives, 
while pursing outward-oriented trade policies. 
  
CHAPTER IV: METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
 
Understanding the linkages between trade-driven growth and environmental quality is 
important for evidence based policy responses in both developed and developing 
countries. In respect of rapidly industrializing developing countries such as Kenya, it is of 
uttermost urgency that policy makers have evidence based prescriptions on optimal 
policies that would strike the right balance between expanding trade liberalization, on the 
one hand, and reducing industrial pollution, on the other. Policy setting in Kenya, 
however, is curtailed by the scarcity of research in the domain of trade and the 
environment because of data constraints. A 2015 released dataset, in the form of the 
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Kenya, 2009, is now available for use by 
researchers. To close gaps in the literature, this Chapter presents the static Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) Model for Kenya in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling 
System) software ―the KenCGE Model― that is used to analyze the links between 
further trade liberalization and the environmental quality in the country. 
 
The KenCGE Model introduces new knowledge by applying the Löfgren (1993) model to 
a different country and economic structure, and by extending the focal area of policy 
analysis to the environment arena. The Löfgren (1993) model is enhanced to allow policy 
simulations with highly disaggregated activity and commodity accounts, where an 
activity can produce multiple commodities, and multiple activities can generate a 
commodity (see Löfgren et al., 2002). Following Elshennawy (2011), there is a 
separation between production (unskilled labor, capital, and land that are sector specific), 
and non-production (skilled labor that is sectorally mobile) factors.   
 
This Chapter starts with Section 4.1 that presents introductory remarks related to the CGE 
model for Kenya. This is followed by section 4.2 that provides a complete mathematical 
statement for the KenCGE Model, including the model’s equations. The latter cover 
prices, production, factors and institutions, and system constraints. The parameter 
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requirements for the KenCGE Model’s calibration are noted in Section 4.3, that also 
presents the SAM for Kenya, 2009.  Finally, Section 4.4 concludes. 
 
4.1. A CGE Model for Kenya – An Introduction 
 
The KenCGE Model is adapted from the CGE models in GAMS by Löfgren (1993), and 
is theoretically rationalized on the CGE models for open developing economies that were 
advanced by the World Bank (Dervis, et al., 1982). As such, the model is founded on 
neoclassical assumptions of perfectly competitive products and factor markets (see 
Robinson, 1989; Taylor, 1990; and Robinson et al., 1999). In this regard, the Kenyan 
economy is market driven and therefore, the neoclassical assumptions of the model are 
appropriate. The KenCGE Model’s prices in all sectors, by assumption, are determined 
under competitive supply conditions in all markets, given an optimized use of inputs.  
Kenya is a small player in the world’s goods markets, and consequently, the United 
States dollar (US$) equivalent of the world prices, for both Kenyan imports and exports, 
are given under the “small-country” assumption.  
 
On the production side, key assumptions include constant returns to scale, and a fixed 
supply of primary factors of capital and labor. Goods that are imported, and those that are 
produced and consumed domestically (i.e. differentiation by place of origin), are modeled 
through a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function.  Finally, producers 
differentiate between production for the domestic market and for exports, through a 
constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function (see Powell and Gruen, 1968).   
 
Consumer optimization behavior determines the allocation of disposable incomes 
between consumption and savings. Several constraints need to be satisfied, not by 
individual agents (Robinson, 1989:907-908), but at a macro level, for example, the 
equality between supply and demand for goods and factors. Unlike other domestic 
institutions, a budget constraint does not bind the government. To maintain balance 
between government revenues and expenditures, the government deficit/saving is 
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endogenously derived.  Under the current account closure rule, the difference between 
foreign earning and expenditures is foreign savings, where the foreign exchange rate is 
exogenous. The foreign savings balances the savings-investment account.  
 
The KenCGE Model is static. It assumes that full adjustment occurs between equilibria, 
through a convergence process that require the use of macro closure rules. As capital 
stock remains fixed in the equilibrating process, the KenCGE Model may be referred to 
as an “equilibrium short-run” model (see Norton and Hazell, 1986:300). The model 
assumes that economic agents ―firms and households― optimize their actions in the 
markets for goods, factors, and foreign exchange, and that endogenous prices clear these 
markets. Being myopic, these agents base their optimization decisions on static 
expectations of prices and quantities. The detailed equations of the proposed KenCGE 
Model are presented in the following section. 
 
4.2. Mathematical Statement for the KenCGE Model 
 
This section presents the equations of the KenCGE Model block-by-block following the 
Löfgren (1993) model for Egypt in GAMS. The blocks cover prices, production, factors 
and institutions, and system constraints. The equations are informed by Löfgren et al., 
(2002) in the areas of commodity production, allocation, and output aggregation, and by 
Elshennawy (2011) regarding the derivation of primary factors’ demands and incomes. 
Section 8.1. (Appendix 1) presents the definitions of the sets, the parameters, and the 
variables. Regarding the notational conventions, the Greek alphabet is reserved for 
parameters.   
 
4.2.1. Price block equations 
 
The price block has six equations (see Table 4-1). Equations (4.1.1), and (4.1.2), 
represents the domestic currency prices of Kenya’s imports (ps
m), and exports (ps
e), 
respectively. These tradable-goods prices are, respectively, equated to the world prices of 
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imports (ps
wm), and exports (ps
we) under the open “small-country” assumption, and 
adjusted for tariffs (τs
m), and export taxes (σs
e). There were no export taxes in the 2009 
base year, however. The exchange rate, r, is used to convert the world prices in US$ 
equivalent to Kenya Shillings (KSh).  
 
Table 4-1: Price Block 
 
Import price: 
 
  
ps
m = ps
wm[1 + τs
m]r           s ∈ ST (4.1.1) 
 
Export price: 
 
  
ps
e = ps
we [1 − σs
e]r      s ∈ ST (4.1.2) 
 
Domestic supply price: 
 
  
ps
q
= [ps
d ds
qs
]  + [ps
m ms
qc
]
|
s ∈ ST,   c ∈ C
  
s ∈ S 
c ∈ C 
(4.1.3) 
 
Domestic output price: 
 
  
ps
x = [ps
d ds
xs
] + [ps
e es
xs
]
|
s ∈ ST
 
s ∈ S (4.1.4) 
 
 
Activity price: 
 
  
PA𝑠 = ∑ PXACs c  •  θs c 
c∈C
                 s ∈ S (4.1.5) 
 
 
Value-added price: 
 
  
ps
va = [1 −  τs
i ]ps
x − ∑ 𝜄𝑠′𝑠
s′∈ S′ 
p
s′
q
 
s ∈ S (4.1.6) 
 
 
 
The next two equations are the prices of domestic supply and output. Equation (4.1.3) is 
the price of domestic supply (ps
q
), that is expressed as a weighted average of the domestic 
goods price (ps
d), and the import price (ps
m), where the weights are the domestic share in 
domestic good supply (
ds
qs
), and import share in domestic good supply (
ms
qc
), respectively. 
On the other hand, equation (4.1.4) expresses the domestic output price (ps
x) as a 
weighted average of the domestic good price (ps
d), and export price (ps
e), where the 
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weights are the domestic share of domestic output (
ds
xs
), and export share of domestic 
output (
es
xs
), respectively. Domestic supply from imports, and domestic output, are 
modeled as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Further, domestic output 
consumed locally and exported follow a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
function. These two aggregations functions are linearly homogenous, and an application 
of Euler’s Theorem, facilitate their derivation (see Löfgren, 1993:18/19).  
 
The activity price (PA𝑠) is specified in equation (4.1.5) as a summation of the product of 
producer prices (PXACs c), and yields (θs c). This equation allows for the possibility that 
an activity may produce several commodities. Finally, equation (4.1.6) defines the value-
added price (ps
va) as the market price of domestic output (ps
x) after indirect taxes (τs
i ), less 
the sum of the unit cost of intermediate inputs, where, 𝜄𝑠′𝑠 is the quantity of input per unit 
of output. 
 
4.2.2. Production block equations  
 
Table 4-2 is a list of the fourteen equations that form the production block. A Cobb-
Douglas production function, given by equation (4.2.1), is assumed to represent the 
relationship between output and factor use at the sector level. Two parameters, a shift 
parameter in the production function (αs
xp
), and a share parameter for factors in sectors 
(𝛽𝑓𝑠), and one variable, the demand for factors in sectors (cfs
f ) enter this function. 
Following Elshennawy (2011:16/17) the KenCGE Model disaggregates labor (L) into 
production (unskilled), and nonproduction (skilled) labor, where sectorally, the former is 
immobile, and the latter mobile (equation 4.2.2). There are four factors of production: 
one sectorally mobile skilled labor (LNSP), and three sector-specific factors, namely, 
unskilled labor (LSP), capital (K), and land (LAND)
35
.   
                                                          
35
 Factors that are sector-specific can only be employed in their original sectors, while those that are 
sectorally mobile, can be allocated to any sector. The KenSAM, 2009 defines quantities for three labor 
factors: skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled. This study groups skilled and semi-skilled labor into skilled 
labor. 
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Table 4-2: Production Block 
   
Domestic output:   
xs =  αs
xp
∏
|(f,s) ∈ MFS
f ∈ F
cfs
f βfs  
 
s ∈ S 
 
(4.2.1) 
   
Labor disaggregation:   
𝐿𝐿𝑆 𝑠
𝑓 =  𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑃 𝑠
𝐿 𝐿𝑆𝑃 𝑠𝛼
 𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃 𝑠
𝐿 𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃 𝑠𝛼
       s ∈ S (4.2.2) 
 
 
Factor demand – sector specific factors: 
  
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑃 𝑠
𝑓 =  
𝑝s
𝑣𝑎x𝑠𝛽𝐿𝑆𝛼𝐿𝑆𝑃 𝑠
𝑤𝐿𝑆𝑃 𝑠
𝑠  
       
f ∈ FS, s ∈ S 
(f, s) ∈ MFS 
 
(4.2.3) 
 
𝐾𝑘 𝑠
𝑓 =  
𝑝s
𝑣𝑎x𝑠𝛽𝑘𝑠
𝑤𝑘 𝑠
𝑠        
  
(4.2.3ʹ) 
   
𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝑓 =  
𝑝s
𝑣𝑎x𝑠𝛽𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝑤𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝑠           (𝐴𝑔𝑟 = agriculture)     
  
(4.2.3ʹʹ) 
 
Factor demand – sectorally mobile factors: 
  
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃 𝑠
𝑓 =  
𝑝s
𝑣𝑎x𝑠𝛽𝐿𝑆 𝑠 𝛼𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃 𝑠
𝑤𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃 𝑠
       
f ∈ FM, s ∈ S 
 
(4.2.4) 
 
Intermediate demand: 
 
 
 
vs = ∑ ιss′
s′∈ S′ 
xs′  
s ∈ S (4.2.5) 
 
Commodity production and allocation: 
  
QXACs c = θs c • QAs s ∈ S 
s ∈ CX 
(4.2.6) 
 
Output aggregation function:   
xs = αc
s c • (∑ δs c
s c
s ∈ S
  • QXACs c
−ρc
s c
)
− 
1
ρ
 
c ∈ CX (4.2.7) 
 
 
First-order condition for output aggregation function: 
  
PXACs c = ps
𝑥 • xs ( ∑ δs c
s c
s ∈ S′
  • QXACs c
−ρc
s c
)
−1 
• δs c
s c • QXACs c
−ρc
s c−1
 
s ∈ S  
c ∈ CX 
(4.2.8) 
 
 
   
Domestic supply aggregation:   
qs = αs
q
[δsms
−ρs
q
+ (1 − δs)ds
−ρs
q
]
 
−1
ρs
q
 
s ∈ ST (4.2.9) 
   
 71 
 
      (Table 4-2: Production Block) (continued) 
   
Import demand:    
ms =   ds [
ps
d
psm
δs
1 − δs
]
 
1
1+ρs
q
 
 
s ∈ ST 
 
(4.2.10) 
 
 
Domestic output transformation: 
  
xs = αs
xt [γses
ρs
x
+ (4 − γs)ds
ρs
x
]
 
1
ρs
x
 
 
s ∈ ST 
 
(4.2.11) 
 
Export supply: 
  
es =   ds [
ps
e
psd
1 − γs
γs
]
 
1
ρs
x−1
 
 
s ∈ ST 
 
(4.2.12) 
 
Domestic production for nontradables: 
  
xs =  ds s ∈ SN (4.2.13) 
 
Domestic supply for nontradables: 
  
qs =  ds s ∈ SN (4.2.14) 
 
 
Factor demands are derived by maximizing profits subject to the Cobb-Douglas function 
(equation (4.2.1)). This is specified in equations (4.2.3), and (4.2.4), for sector specific 
factors (unskilled labor, capital, and land), and sectorally mobile factor (skilled labor), 
respectively. The price of factors in sectors (𝑤𝑓
𝑠), enter as a denominator on right hand 
side of equations (4.2.3) and (4.2.4). In equation (4.2.3) land is a specific factor in 
agriculture sector.  Equation (4.2.5) shows that intermediate input demand (vs) is 
determined through fixed input coefficients under a Leontief production technology. In 
KenSAM, 2009, activities can produce one or more commodities. This possibility is 
accounted for through equations (4.2.6), (4.2.7) and (4.2.8). Equation (4.2.7) models the 
aggregate domestic marketable output (xs) as a CES function. The parameters that enter 
this function are a shift parameter (α𝑠
𝑠𝑐), a share parameter (δsc
sc), and an exponent (ρc
s c). 
The quantities of marketed output of commodities (QXAC𝑠 𝑐), also enter the CES 
function. These are derived in equation (4.2.6) as a product of the yields of output per 
unit of activity (θs c), and the corresponding quantity of activity (QAs).  Finally, equation 
(4.2.8) lays out the first order condition for an optimization problem that determines the 
choice between commodities produced by multiple activities.  
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The composite good in supply domestically (qs) is determined by an Armington constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) function, where a domestically produced good (ds), and 
an imported good (ms), are assumed to be imperfect substitutes (equation (4.2.9)).  For 
this composite supply function, αs
q
, and δs, are shift, and share parameters, respectively. 
Producers determine their import demands (ms), by minimizing costs of a combination of 
domestic and imported inputs ―subject to the above Armington CES function (equation 
(4.2.10)). On the other hand, a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function 
combines domestic output for domestic market (ds), and domestic output for exports (es), 
under the assumption of imperfect transformability (equation (4.2.11))
36
.  Equation 
(4.2.12) shows that producers determine export supply (es) by maximizing sales revenue 
―subject the above CET function―, by allocating output between domestic and export 
markets
37
. Essentially, this equation expresses export supply as a function of domestic 
output (ds), and the ratio of prices of exports (ps
e) to domestic sales (ps
d). In equations 
(4.2.13) and (4.2.14), domestic output (xs), and domestic supply (qs), respectively, are 
both equated to domestic use of domestic output (ds). This is because these equations 
relate to nontradable goods.  
 
4.2.3. Factor and institution block equations  
 
The factor and institution block has nine equations as listed in Table 4-3. Incomes earned 
by labor, capital, and land (y𝑓
𝑓
), appropriately disaggregated into sector specific and 
sectorally mobile, are defined in equations (4.3.1) through (4.3.2) as a summation of the 
product of quantities demanded and prices. For sectorally mobile (nonproduction) labor 
                                                          
36
 Imperfect substitutability and imperfect transformability are the reverse of each other (see Armington, 
1969).  To get the CET function for imperfect transformability, pre-multiply, by -1, all the exponents of the 
CET function for imperfect substitutability. Because of the restrictions that are imposed on the parameter 
(ρ), the isoquant for the output transformation function are concave to the origin (see Löfgren, H., 
1993:26/27). 
37
 The constant elasticity of transformation between two goods is modeled by the exponent [1/(ρs
x − 1)] 
(Condon et al., 1987) ― see equation (4.2.12). In the limiting cases, as (𝜌𝑠
𝑥) approaches 1, from above, the 
elasticity approaches ∞, and because of perfect transformability, the cheaper good is used. Alternatively, as 
(𝜌𝑠
𝑥) approaches ∞ we have the case of perfect complementarity, and the ratio between the two goods is 
fixed irrespective of price changes. There is also an intermediate case where a combination of the two 
goods is used (see Löfgren, H., 1993:28). 
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factors, such income is augmented with remittances from abroad, (∅lw) expressed in 
domestic currency using the exchange rate, r. Factor incomes are transferred to 
institutions in fixed proportions (ψif
f ) as expressed in equation (4.3.3). Equation (4.3.4) 
defines incomes of households (yi
i), as comprising the sum of transfers from factors (tif
f ), 
other institutions (tii′
i ), the government (∅i
ig
), and the rest of the world (∅i
iw). In the 
KenCGE Model, households include enterprises and, therefore, the term transfers from 
other institutions drops out of the equation.  The price index, π̅ (linked to government 
transfers), and the US$ equivalence of remittances from abroad (later converted in 
domestic currency using the exchange rate), are exogenous items in equation (4.3.4). 
Intra-institutional transfers (tii′
i ) ―by domestic nongovernmental institutions to all other 
institutions (domestic or foreign)― occur in fixed proportions (ψii′
i ) as given by equation 
(4.3.5). Household consumption expenditure (eh
h) is specified in equation (4.3.6).  The 
totality of household income (yh
i ) is allocated to direct taxes (𝜏h
d), and based on 
household income shares (ψ), to other institutions and savings. To comply with 
household budget constraint, consumption is the residual. 
 
By assumption, households maximize a Stone–Geary utility function38 to derive their 
consumption demands (CDsh
h ) as expressed in equation (4.3.7).  Equation (4.3.8) defines 
government revenues (yg) as comprising various taxes (including import tariffs) and 
transfers ―including capital― from abroad. On the other hand, equation (4.3.9) defines 
government spending (eg), as a sum of transfers to households (∅i
g
) that are linked to an 
exogenous price index, (?̅?), and its own consumption expenditure, where demand for 
goods (γ̅s
q
) is exogenous. Savings are accounted for in the savings-investment balance, as 
by assumption, the government is not faced with a budget constraint.  
                                                          
38
  The Stone–Geary utility function is named after Geary (1950), who, informed by Klein and Rubin 
(1947)’s work, derived a constant-utility index of the cost of living, and Stone (1954) who applied a linear 
expenditure system on patterns of demand in Britain. Lluch, C. (1973) following a consumer utility 
maximization procedure, derives an aggregate consumption function that is linked to a linear expenditure 
system. Li, J. C. (2005: Appendix A, 271/2) presents a derivation of private consumption demand 
following the Stone–Geary utility linear expenditure system. 
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 Table 4-3: Factor and Institution Block 
 
Factor income - sector specific factors: 
  
y𝑘
𝑓 = ∑ 𝑤ks
𝑠 𝑘ks
𝑓  
𝑠 ∈ 𝑆
                 f ∈ FS (4.3.1) 
 
 
y𝐿𝑆𝑃
𝑓 = ∑ 𝑤LSP
𝑠 𝐿LSP,   s
𝑓  
𝑠 ∈ 𝑆
                  (4.3.1ʹ) 
 
 
y𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷
𝑓 = ∑ 𝑤LAND
𝐴𝑔𝑟 𝐿LAND,   Agr 
𝑓  
𝑠 ∈ 𝐴𝑔𝑟
                  (4.3.1ʹʹ) 
 
 
Factor income - sectorally mobile factors: 
  
yLSNP
𝑓 = w𝐿𝑁𝑆𝑃 [∑  
s ∈ S
𝐿LSNP,   s
𝑓 ] + r∅lw                
f ∈ FM 
 
(4.3.2) 
 
Factor transfers: 
  
tif
f = ψif
f yf
f   ;                 ∑ ψif
f = 1 
i ∈ I
      i ∈ I, f ∈ F 
(i, f) ∈ MIF 
 
(4.3.3) 
 
Institutional income: 
  
yi
i = ∑
|
(i,f) ∈  MIFf ∈ F
 tif
f + ∑ tii′
i + π̅
i′ ∈  ID
∅i
ig
+ r∅i
iw            
 
i ∈ ID 
 
(4.3.4) 
 
Intra-institutional transfers: 
  
tii′
i = ψii′
i yi′
i   i ∈ I, i
′ ∈ ID 
(i, i′) ∈ MIID 
 
(4.3.5) 
   
Household consumption expenditures:   
eh
h = [1 − ∑ ψih
i − 𝜏h
d − ψh
s
i ∈  I
] yh
i  
h ∈ H (4.3.6) 
 
Household consumption demand: 
  
CDsh
h =  
ψsh
e eh
h
ps
q   
 
h ∈ H, s ∈ S 
 
(4.3.7) 
 
Government revenue:   
yg  = ∑ τi
d
i∈ID
 yi
i  +  r∅gov
iw + ∑ τs
i
s∈S
 ps
xxs + ∑ τs
mr
s∈ST
 πs
wmms 
 (4.3.8) 
 
Government expenditure: 
  
eg  =  π̅ ∑ ∅i
g
i ∈ ID
+ ∑ ps
q
s ∈ S
γ̅s
q
 
 (4.3.9) 
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4.2.4. System constraint block equations  
 
Table 4-4:  System Constraint Block 
   
Factor markets - sector-specific factors: 
 
  
𝐾ks
𝑘 =  λks
s  f ∈ FS, s ∈ S 
(f, s) ∈ MFS 
(4.4.1) 
 
𝐿LSP
𝐿 =  λLSP
s   (4.4.1ʹ) 
 
𝐿LAND
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 =  λLAND
Agr
  (4.4.1ʹʹ) 
 
   
Factor markets – sectorally mobile factors: 
 
  
∑ 𝐿LSNP
𝐿
𝑠∈𝑆
= λ𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃  
f ∈ FM (4.4.2) 
 
Domestic goods markets: 
 
  
qs  =  vs + ∑ csh
h
h∈H
+ γ̅s + ιs̅  
 
s ∈ S 
 
(4.4.3) 
Current account: 
 
  
∅i
lw  + ∑ ∅i
iw
i ∈ I
+ ∑ ps
we
s ∈ ST
 es + s
w    
  =
1
r
[ ∑
|
(row,   i) ∈  MIID
trow,   i
i +
i ∈ ID
trow,   lab
f ] + ∑ πs
wm
s ∈ ST
ms 
 (4.4.4) 
 
Savings-investment balance: 
 
  
∑ ψi
s
i∈ID
yi
i +  (yg − eg)  + rsw  =   ∑ ps
q
ιs̅
s∈S
 
 (4.4.5) 
 
Price-normalization: 
 
  
  ∑ ps
q
ωs =  π̅
s∈S
 
  
(4.4.6) 
 
 
Table 4-4 lists the six equations of the system constraint block. The closure in the factor 
markets is predicated on two assumptions; one that the economy is at its full employment 
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level, and the other, that factor prices are flexible
39
. The latter assumption fosters the 
equilibration of supply and demand in factor markets. Equation (4.4.1) and (4.4.2) define 
the demands for sector-specific factors, and sectorally mobile factors, respectively, as 
equal to a fixed supply of such factors, assuming flexible factor prices and full 
employment. The goods market equilibrium requires that domestic supply ―from 
Armington transformation of imported goods and domestic output― be equalized to the 
economy-wide demand (equation (4.4.3)). In this equation, government and investment 
demands are exogenous, and prices are the equilibrating variables.  
 
Equation (4.4.4) is expressed in foreign currency. It defines the equilibrium between 
Kenya’s foreign earnings and spending. The difference between current earning and 
expenditure is foreign savings, where the latter is the equilibrating variable.  After 
incorporating fixed shares of savings by households (includes enterprises) and the 
government account, foreign savings, expressed in domestic currency (KSh) equilibrate 
total savings and investments, as shown in equation (4.4.5). By Walras’ law (Walras, 
1874), this equation will be dropped, and savings and investment assumed to be in 
equilibrium.  Finally, equation (4.4.6) is the price index. 
 
4.3. Model Calibration 
 
4.3.1. A SAM for Kenya, 2009 
 
Like other CGE models, the KenCGE Model builds on the economy wide circular flow 
of income that depicts how economic actors earn and spend their incomes. Households 
own factors of production, and receive income and transfers from enterprises and the 
government. Enterprises and the foreign sector sell goods and services, and in return 
receive incomes. In the KenCGE Model, however, enterprises are included in 
households.  
                                                          
39
 The system constraint block equations apply economy-wide, and not at an individual actor level. 
Closure balances in the factors and goods markets are referred to as real balances, while those in respect of 
savings-investment and current accounts are nominal balances.  
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Table 4-5: Kenya's 2009 Basic SAM Structure 
   
 
Activities  
 
 
Commodities 
 
 
Factors 
 
 
Households 
 
 
Enterprises 
 
 
Government 
 
Savings-
investment 
Rest of world 
(RoW) 
 
 
TOTAL  
Activities    Marketed 
production by 
industries 
           Gross 
output  
Commodities Intermediate 
inputs by 
industries  
   Private 
consumption 
  Government 
consumption 
Investment Exports Aggregate 
demand 
Factors Value-added                Factor 
income 
Households     Factor 
income to 
households 
Inter-
household 
transfers 
Distributed 
income to 
households  
Transfers to 
households 
  Remittances 
from RoW 
Household 
income 
Enterprises     Factor 
income to 
enterprises 
    Transfer to 
enterprises 
  Transfer to 
enterprises 
from RoW 
Enterprise 
income 
Government Taxes less 
subsidies on 
products 
Import tariffs 
and custom 
duties 
Factor 
income to 
government, 
factor taxes 
Taxes on 
household 
income 
Taxes on 
income and 
wealth  
    Transfers to 
Government 
from RoW 
Government 
revenue 
Savings-
investment 
      Household 
saving 
Enterprise 
savings 
Government 
savings 
  Foreign 
savings 
(capital 
transfers) 
Savings 
Rest of 
world (RoW) 
  Imports Factor 
payments to 
RoW 
  Transfers to 
RoW 
Government 
transfers to 
RoW 
    Foreign 
exchange 
outflow 
TOTAL Activity  Supply 
expenditure 
Factor 
expenditure 
Household 
expenditure 
Enterprise 
expenditure 
Government 
expenditure 
Investment 
expenditure 
Foreign 
exchange 
inflow 
  
Source: Author, based on Government of Kenya (2015b)  
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The government provides public goods and in return receives tax revenues. It also 
subsidizes productive activities, and make transfers to households. The Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Kenya, 2009 (KenSAM, 2009) that was prepared and 
officially released by the Kenyan statistical agency ―the Kenya National Bureau of 
Statistics (KNBS)― in 2015 (Government of Kenya, 2015a, 2015b)40 replicate these 
complex direct and indirect linkages between diverse sectors and economic agents in the 
Kenya economy, and is the database that calibrates the KenCGE Model’s parameters.  
The KenSAM, 2009 provide the baseline data representing the Kenyan economy in 2009 
that is assumed to be in equilibrium. Table 4-5, explains verbally, the contents of the 
SAM for Kenya, 2009.   
 
4.3.2. Dimensions of the SAM   
 
A social accounting matrix (SAM), represents an overview of the accounts of an 
economy’s circular flows in production, factors, domestic institutions, and the outside 
world (Löfgren, 1993). It is an empirical data set, that forms a crucial framework for 
economy-wide policy analysis work as it explicitly portrays the linkages of payments and 
receipts by economic agents and institutions in the system (see pioneering work by Stone, 
1970; Pyatt and Round, 1979, 1985). The micro SAM for Kenya, 2009 is square, as its 
headings in the rows and the column are similar, with equal row and column totals.  Each 
cell in the SAM represents an expenditure for the column account and an income for the 
row account.  
 
Table 4-6, illustrates that Kenya’s industrial sector is well diversified and produces a 
wide range of capital and consumer goods. There are several non-energy intensive 
manufacturing industries —food manufactures (e.g., meats, fish, fruits and vegetables, 
coffee, tea, and beverages), and non-food manufactures (e.g., textiles, printing, 
machinery, and transport equipment).    
                                                          
40
 Acknowledgment: The author would like to thank Mr. Collins M. Omondi, Director, Macroeconomics 
Statistics, the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), for providing the disaggregated Kenya’s 2009 
balanced micro Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for use in this study (Government of Kenya, 2015c). 
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Table 4-6: Dimensions of the SAM for Kenya, 2009 
Activities/commodities (34) 
      Agriculture (1)
/a
 
      Primary energy (2)
/b
 
      Energy-intensive (11)
/c
 
      Non-energy intensive (17)
/d
 
      Construction (1) 
      Transport (1)
/e
 
      Other services (1)
/f
 
Factors (3) 
      Labor (unskilled and skilled) 
      Capital 
      Land 
Institutions (3) 
         Households (including enterprises)  
         Government  
         Rest of the world 
Source: Author 
 
Notes: 
a. The agriculture sector is an aggregation of 5 sectors are: (1) crop, (2) animal, (3) support services, 
(4) forestry & logging, and (5) fishing & aquaculture. 
b.  The 2 sectors are: (1) petroleum, and (2) electricity. 
c.  The 11 sectors are: (1) mining & quarrying, (2) non-metal minerals, (3) chemicals, (4) rubber & 
plastics, (5) water supply and sewerage, (6) leather, (7) paper, (8) pharmaceuticals, (9) wood, (10) 
basic chemicals, and (11) metals. 
d.  The 17 sectors are: (1) meat, (2) fish, (3) fruit & vegetable, (4) vegetable/animal oils & fats, (5) 
dairy, (6) grain, (7) bakery, (8) sugar, (9) coffee, (10) tea, (11) other food, (12) beverages, (13) 
tobacco, (14) textiles/clothing, (15) printing & reproduction, (16) machinery & equipment 
(including transport equipment), and (17) other manufactures. 
e.  The transport sector aggregates 6 sectors which are: (1) railways, (2) passenger road, (3) freight 
road (4) pipeline, (water), and (6) air. 
f.  Other services aggregates 35 sectors, of which the top 15 in value are: (1) wholesale & retail trade, 
(2) motor trade, (3) real estate, (4) public administration, (5) other monetary intermediation, (6) 
telecommunications, (7) accommodation & food, (8) secondary education, (9) human health, (10) 
primary education, (11) professional, scientific & technical, (12) insurance & pension, (13) IT & 
other information, (14) other administration & support, (15) higher education, ………….., (35). 
 
The economy has two primary energy sectors (electricity generation, and petroleum fuel), 
one of which ―electricity generation― use energy more intensely41. Other energy-
intensive industries include those that produce non-metal minerals, chemicals, rubber and 
                                                          
41
 The EU’s regulations on pollution prevention defines an energy-intensive industry (or company) as one 
whose energy costs comprise 3% or more of the total production costs (see: UK’s House of Commons. 
Hansard.  Energy Intensive Industries (see: https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-03-10/ 
debates/16031031000002/ EnergyIntensiveIndustries). This definition has been used to estimate energy 
intensity. 
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plastics, leather, pharmaceuticals, wood, and metals. Finally, construction, transportation, 
and other services also consume relatively more energy.  
 
The official detailed micro SAM for Kenya, 2009 has a total of 81 activities and 
commodities with some activities producing several commodities, and there are 
commodities that are generated by multiple activities. For the purposes of this study, 
these are aggregated into 34 activities/commodities (see Table 4-6): 1 agriculture, 3 
services, and 30 industries. The industrial sector’s disaggregation into 30 
activities/commodities (two of which relate to primary energy) is appropriate for the 
intended purpose of this study, which is to empirically examine trade-induced sectoral 
specialization in dirty industries in the Kenyan economy.  
 
The modeled economy has three primary factors of production; labor, capital, and land. 
The labor factor is disaggregated into unskilled, and skilled (includes, semi-skilled). 
There are three institutions (one households ―including enterprises―, government, and 
the rest of the world). The aggregated Kenya SAM 2009 that is verbally explained in 
Table 4-5 is a good description of the sources of the data that is used to calibrate the 
KenCGE Model’s base year scenario.  Finally, the Kenya SAM, 2009 is sufficient for this 
study, and does not require to be supplemented with data from external sources. 
 
4.3.3. Structure of the economy  
 
Table 4-7 presents the sectoral characteristics of Kenya’s economy in 2009 ―the base 
year for the proposed study. The industry sector accounts for thirty-four of the eighty-one 
activities in 2009, in both energy-intensive, and non-energy intensive sectors. A country 
is classified as semi-industrialized if the composition of agriculture and services sectors’ 
output exceeds 40% (Dervis, et al., 1982:262). As shown in column (2) of Table 4-7, this 
threshold is exceeded as Kenya’s services sector, and agriculture sector, contributed 
40.8%, and 17% of the 2009 output, respectively.  
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 Table 4-7: Structure of the Kenyan Economy in 2009 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
  O O' GDP GDP' VA D X M T EI OI/O VA/O X/O M/D 
               Agriculture 826 17.0 548 18.7 25.2 15.0 13.0 8.4 8.2 1.6 17.6 80.8 9.0 0.1 
Primary energy 
              Petroleum 79 1.6 -40 -1.3 0.8 4.6 2.1 12.6 28.9 0.5 73.8 25.7 15.0 0.4 
Electricity 74 1.5 19 0.6 1.4 1.4 0.2 0.1 2.4 32.2 16.2 51.6 1.3 0.0 
Energy-intensive 
              Mining & quarrying 31 0.6 -48 -1.6 0.6 1.5 0.9 6.7 0.1 19.1 28.2 52.6 15.6 0.7 
Non-metal minerals 40 0.8 0 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.8 1.5 0.7 10.1 62.7 27.1 25.7 0.2 
Chemicals 66 1.4 -27 -0.9 0.8 2.6 4.3 8.8 2.0 11.7 126.6 61.7 93.6 1.0 
Rubber & plastics 56 1.2 4 0.1 0.5 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.3 5.8 71.8 22.4 13.6 0.2 
Water supply & sewerage 37 0.8 24 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 28.0 65.9 0.0 0.0 
Leather  16 0.3 15 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.7 5.4 59.7 34.9 28.0 0.2 
Paper and wood 53 1.1 -13 -0.5 0.5 1.4 0.8 2.4 0.7 7.9 142.3 49.8 16.7 0.4 
Other (energy-intensive) 105 2.2 -30 -1.0 1.3 3.3 4.4 10.0 1.8 10.2 197.8 91.9 
112.
3 1.5 
Non-energy intensive 719 14.8 568 19.3 8.6 19.7 26.8 38.1 39.4 1.3 66.9 31.8 21.3 0.3 
Construction 311 6.4 264 9.0 4.1 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 61.1 34.6 0.0 0.0 
Transport   467 9.6 350 11.9 7.8 8.0 20.2 1.4 2.9 22.8 33.1 44.1 24.8 0.0 
Services 1,984 40.8 1,303 44.4 46.9 34.3 23.6 7.9 11.0 3.8 33.6 62.5 6.8 0.0 
TOTAL 4,866 100 2,938 100 100 100 100 100 100           
Source: Author based on the Kenya's 2009 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) provided by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 
 
Notes:    
Abbreviations:  O: for gross output; GDP: for gross domestic product (market prices); VA: for value-added; D: for final demand; X: for 
exports; M: for imports; T: for import duties/tariffs; EI: for energy intensity; OI: for other intermediate inputs.  
Column (1):  Gross output (O), billions of 2009 KSh 
Column (3):  GDP, billions of 2009 KSh market prices  
Columns 2 & 4-9:  Percentage points (%) contributions to: gross output (O), gross domestic product (GDP), value-added (VA), final demand 
(D), exports (X), imports (M), and import duties/tariffs (T), respectively 
Column 10: Energy intensity
42
 (EI) is the ratio of primary energy to total activity expenditure times 100.   
Columns 11-14: Ratios: other intermediate inputs to gross output, value-added to gross output, exports to output, and imports to final demand, 
respectively. 
                                                          
42
Ibid. 
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Within the industrial sector, the non-durable food sector ―classified as non-energy 
intensive― dominate, followed by the following top five activities (basic metals, 
petroleum, electricity, rubber and plastics, and chemicals).  Columns (4), (5), and (6) of 
Table 4-7 emphasize the important roles that services, agriculture, nondurable food, 
transport, and construction play in supporting GDP growth, value-added and total 
demand, respectively. Columns (7) and (8) show the sectoral trade orientation. All sectors 
have tradable goods and services, except for water supply and sewerage, and construction 
sectors. Interestingly, column (13) shows that energy-intensive and highly polluting 
goods (see column 10 for estimates of energy intensities), dominate the top positions in 
the ranking of the ratio of exports to output. Within the industrial sector, the energy-
intensive industries include chemicals, pharmaceuticals, other non-food manufacturers, 
leather, non-metal minerals, metals, rubber and plastics, and paper products. The mining 
and quarrying sector, and the transport sector are also energy-intensive.  The ratio of 
imports to aggregate demand appears to be more balanced (see column 14). Sectors with 
the highest ratio of imports to aggregate demand are chemicals, pharmaceuticals, mining, 
non-food manufacturers, petroleum, and metals products. 
 
4.3.4. Exogenously determined parameters 
 
There are certain parameters and exogenously determined variables (by assumption) that 
are estimated from external data sources. These are: the elasticity of substitution between 
domestic use and imports, the elasticity of transformation between domestic use and 
exports, and the elasticity of substitution in domestic commodity aggregation function. 
This thesis draws on academic literature for the needed values of these elasticities. 
Dervis, et al., (1982) provide trade substitution and price elasticities, while Löfgren 
(1994) surveys developing countries’ elasticities for CGE models. Maskus, el al. (1997) 
have applied relevant substitution elasticities in their CGE model of Egypt to evaluate 
trade policy reforms in the context of the country’s trade partnership with the European 
Union. Chapter 5 presents the assumed elasticity values that are used to calibrate the 
KenCGE Model. 
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4.4. Summary 
 
This Chapter has presented the complete mathematical definitions of the KenCGE 
Model’s equations, sets, parameters, and variables. The model is static and is developed 
to facilitate the quantitative exploration of the main channels through which deeper trade 
liberalization affects environment quality in Kenya. It uses the most recent dataset ―the 
KenSAM 2009―, and is adapted from the CGE model by Löfgren (1993), with 
modifications from Löfgren, et al., (2002). Moreover, theoretically, it follows the 
tradition of CGE models for open developing economies that were proposed by the 
World Bank (Dervis, et al., 1982). Based on the current state of academic literature, there 
does not appear to be a study on Kenya, that has used the methodology that is like the one 
underpinned by the KenCGE Model, and is described in this Chapter. 
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CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Chapter five presents the outcomes of the assessment of Kenya’s trade liberalization and 
environment policies. This investigation focuses on the assumed trade-off between trade 
liberalization and pollution abatement policies. It seeks to uncover whether such trade-
offs could provide incentives for Kenya to specialize in dirty industries, to exploit its 
comparative advantages in trade.  This Chapter starts by highlighting additional features 
of the model that was presented in Chapter IV, and importantly, presenting the 
experiments that underpin this study. Next is Section 5.2 that investigates the question 
whether further trade liberalization policy, alone, affects the pattern of trade 
specialization in Kenya and what, if any, are the implications for the country’s 
environment. Thereafter, Section 5.3 analyzes the impacts of implementing an 
environmental tax policy, alone, on Kenya’s international trade competitiveness. This is 
followed by Section 5.4 that assesses the implications of implementing joint policies of 
further trade liberalization, and pollution abatement, on the country’s trade 
competitiveness, and the pattern of industrial specialization. Finally, Section 5.5 
concludes. 
 
5.1. The Experiments 
 
The computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for Kenya in GAMS ―the KenCGE 
Model― that was presented in Chapter IV was employed to execute the experiments that 
inform the outcomes of this thesis. The KenCGE Model was calibrated to the base-run 
solution based on the data drawn from the 2009 Kenya’s Social Accounting Matrix 
(KenSAM, 2009), as discussed in Chapter IV.  However, the parameters related to the 
constant elasticities of substitution, and transformation functions, that are also required to 
calibrate the KenCGE Model were estimated, drawing on the works of Dervis, et al., 
(1982), Löfgren (1994), and Maskus, el al. (1997). From these academic sources, the 
following were judged as reasonable estimates for these parameters: the elasticity of 
substitution between domestic use and imports = 2; the elasticity of transformation 
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between domestic use and exports = 5; and the elasticity of substitution in domestic 
commodity aggregation function = 4. 
 
Table 5-1: Policy Simulation – KenCGE Model 
Using KenCGE Model, four 
policy experiments (exp) were 
executed, as outlined in Table 5-
1. The first experiment (exp1) is 
the 2009 base-run that is the reference competitiveness, pattern of specialization, and 
emissions path if Kenya does not change its trade liberalization and environment policies.  
As discussed in Chapter III, Kenya’s has a robust policy on trade liberalization, and 
intends to further deepen its initiatives in this area. The KenSAM 2009 has a tariff rate of 
12.4%. In contrast, Kenya’s environmental management instruments are weak and vastly 
nonexistent. There is a tax that is paid by final consumers of petroleum products but the 
tax is not assigned as an environmental instrument. Kenya’s prices of petroleum products 
are relatively lower compared to those of its neighbors, and are below the world average 
prices. The base-run experiment (exp1) results are not reported in this thesis; they, 
however, provided a counterfactual base for comparing the effect of policy shocks on 
macroeconomic variables, and sectoral changes in output, trade flows, and prices of 
factors and commodities.  
 
The second experiment (exp2) comprises the implementation of a unilateral trade 
liberalization policy that entail a 100% elimination of import duties. This effectively 
equalizes the domestic and international prices of imports, and reduces the cost of 
imported commodities by 12.4%, compared to the 2009 base year. A substantial increase 
in imports of pollution-intensive consumer goods might reduce pollution by changing the 
production mix in Kenya’s industrial sector, from dirtier to cleaner goods. However, 
there is a priori expectation that tariff reforms might also boost sectors with imported 
inputs, and this could lead to an expansion of activity output. On the downside, such an 
expansion in output might have adverse implications on the environment, through higher 
Simulation Description 
Exp 1 2009 base-run  
exp2 100% reduction in import tariffs 
exp3 10% increase in energy (petroleum) inputs taxes 
exp4 exp2 + exp3 
 86 
 
use of petroleum fuel inputs. In the third experiment (exp3), a restrictive 10% tax policy 
is imposed on the price of petroleum fuel inputs.  A priori considerations suggest that a 
carbon tax on petroleum fuel will incentivize industries to reduce demand for pollution-
intensive energy inputs. There is an expectation that this could also lower output of 
energy-intensive industries, and in the longer run, provide industries with the incentive to 
shift to cleaner energy sources. Finally, a joint reform (exp4) that brings together the two 
separate policies (exp2 + exp3), is implemented, but the net outcome of such a 
coordinated policy is difficult to predict, a priori.  This is because sectoral responses to 
the tariff elimination, on the one hand, and those from the extra environmental tax on 
energy inputs, on the other, are unpredictable as they, separately, have divergent effects 
on the pattern of trade specialization and environmental outcomes. 
 
5.2. Trade Liberalization Policy 
 
This section reviews the results of the second experiment (exp2) that involves a policy of 
100% elimination of import tariffs, alone, compared to the 2009 base-run.   
 
Table 5-2: Aggregate Short-Run Impact of Tariff  
                  and Energy Tax Reforms  
Macroeconomic effects: 
As shown in Table 5-2, 
trade reforms (exp2) that 
leads to full convergence 
of the domestic and world 
prices of imports, induces 
a small contraction in the 
real GDP of 0.64%, in the 
short-run, compared to the 
base-run. Also, the removal of tariffs caused reductions in nominal GDP by 1.37%, and 
the value of imports by 2.92%, and an expansion in the value of exports by 2.37%.  The 
fall in the value of imports boosted industrial activities and consumer demand, and 
  
% Change from base-run 
(exp1) 
Variable exp2 exp3 exp4 
    Nominal GDP -1.37 -0.40 -1.73 
Real GDP -0.64 0.01 -0.63 
Imports (value, domestic currency)  -2.92 -0.42 -3.31 
Exports (value, domestic currency) 2.37 1.23 3.46 
Consumption demand in current prices 2.57 -0.95 1.71 
Consumption demand in real terms 3.33 -0.53 2.85 
Government revenues -19.61 2.12 -17.63 
Foreign savings 47.62 -7.80 40.32 
Nonproduction labor real wage rate 3.68 -0.51 3.22 
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enhanced household welfare, as evidenced by the increase in real consumer demand by 
3.33%.  There was a substantial increase in foreign savings by 47.62%, compared to the 
base-run. However, the government was the main loser of the trade reform policy as its 
revenues fell by 19.61%, compared to the base-run, because of dwindling in revenues 
from taxes on commodities and international trade. 
 
Sectoral effects: A tariff reforms policy has favorable effects on activity output, imports, 
and exports, as shown in Table 5-3, and by detailed data in Table 8-5 in Section 8.2 
(Appendix 2). Broadly, evidence suggests that trade liberalization could incentivize 
Kenya to specialize in dirtier industries. The elimination of import tariffs stimulated 
growth in activity output across sectors. As a result, most industries recorded relatively 
higher increases in activity output, compared to the base-run, that ranged from 1%-
10.7%. These include those that produce pharmaceuticals, bakery, rubber and plastics, 
and chemical products. Of these, the production of pharmaceuticals, rubber and plastics, 
and chemical goods require high use of energy inputs, specifically, of between 3% to 
8.6% of production costs in the base year.  
 
Conversely, trade liberalization reforms caused contraction in outputs, for example, in 
industries manufacturing paper, other foods, sugar, and wood products, and in mining and 
quarrying sector. These recorded output contractions of between 0.6%-2.8%. Thanks to 
the contraction, trade liberalization policy, could advance pollution abatement and 
mitigation goals, in energy-intensive industries producing paper, wood, and metals 
products, and in mining and quarrying activities. Other industries’ output responses after 
trade liberalization fall in between these cases, but the storyline, regarding the 
environmental implications of the related changes in output is not that promising. 
Overall, a significant observation is that 10 out of 15 sectors in the 2009 baseline that are 
energy-intensive experienced positive output responses after trade was fully liberalized. 
Conversely, sectors that pollute less, for example, food manufactures, and agriculture, 
either recorded lackluster expansion in output or at worse contracted after the trade 
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liberalization policy was effected. Consequently, from an output perspective, one would 
expect increasing pollution from scale effects, with further trade liberalization. 
 
Table 5-3: Sectoral Short-Run Impact of Tariff and Energy Tax Reforms  
  % Change from base-run (exp1) 
 
Activity output  
 
Quantity of imports 
 
Quantity of exports 
Sector exp2 exp3 exp4 
 
exp2 exp3 exp4 
 
exp2 exp3 exp4 
            Agriculture -0.08 0.01 -0.07 
 
28.49 -1.16 27.17 
 
0.75 2.21 2.71 
Mining and quarrying -1.06 -0.11 -1.17 
 
3.05 0.02 3.07 
 
32.09 -0.30 31.73 
Meat processing 0.20 -0.04 0.17 
 
35.23 -1.77 33.09 
 
-10.11 4.37 -6.60 
Fish processing 0.05 0.14 0.17 
 
30.51 -1.18 29.15 
 
-0.97 1.13 0.03 
Fruit and vegetable 
     products 
 
0.30 
 
0.54 
 
0.78 
 
 
22.70 
 
-0.49 
 
22.18 
 
 
3.41 
 
1.14 
 
4.41 
Vegetable and  
     animal oils/fats 
 
0.55 
 
0.16 
 
0.71 
 
 
14.82 
 
-0.63 
 
14.17 
 
 
16.19 
 
0.80 
 
16.95 
Dairy products 0.89 -0.12 0.79 
 
30.61 -1.36 29.03 
 
0.44 2.55 2.74 
Grain mill products 0.09 -0.05 0.06 
 
28.89 -1.52 27.18 
 
0.86 3.62 4.05 
Bakery products 3.65 -0.37 3.33 
 
29.93 -1.41 28.27 
 
11.55 2.24 13.90 
Sugar manufacture -1.11 0.02 -1.08 
 
26.99 -1.26 25.59 
 
-0.81 2.51 1.40 
Coffee processing -0.07 0.06 -0.01 
 
32.64 -1.02 31.44 
 
-0.83 0.37 -0.50 
Tea processing 0.21 0.12 0.31 
 
32.99 -1.21 31.56 
 
-0.58 0.51 -0.13 
Other food products -2.75 0.28 -2.48 
 
23.50 -1.03 22.39 
 
3.46 2.37 5.62 
Beverages products 0.59 -0.06 0.55 
 
32.33 -1.51 30.55 
 
-3.13 3.00 -0.51 
Tobacco products 0.64 0.36 0.96 
 
22.94 -0.88 21.97 
 
1.82 0.63 2.37 
Textiles and clothing -0.12 0.06 -0.06 
 
23.14 -0.80 22.28 
 
5.42 1.07 6.37 
Leather products 0.20 0.06 0.25 
 
26.12 -1.06 24.95 
 
2.95 1.24 4.07 
Wood products -0.61 0.00 -0.61 
 
19.05 -0.26 18.80 
 
16.72 0.56 17.26 
Paper products -1.92 0.10 -1.84 
 
8.64 -0.03 8.62 
 
27.91 0.30 28.21 
Printing and 
     reproduction 
 
-0.07 
 
0.02 
 
-0.05 
 
 
26.41 
 
-0.37 
 
26.01 
 
 
4.87 
 
0.91 
 
5.69 
Petroleum products 0.10 0.01 0.11 
 
6.81 -0.42 6.42 
 
31.37 0.67 32.02 
Basic chemicals 1.31 0.10 1.41 
 
3.48 -0.04 3.46 
 
10.26 0.14 10.40 
Chemical products 1.23 -0.43 0.86 
 
14.74 -0.36 14.35 
 
18.40 -0.25 18.21 
Pharmaceuticals 10.69 0.55 11.34 
 
8.21 -0.34 7.86 
 
21.14 0.88 22.18 
Rubber and plastics 1.55 0.02 1.60 
 
14.43 -0.53 13.89 
 
24.19 0.88 25.17 
Other non-metal 
     minerals 
 
0.12 
 
-0.03 
 
0.10 
 
 
13.41 
 
-0.07 
 
13.33 
 
 
15.43 
 
0.02 
 
15.45 
Metal products -0.18 0.05 -0.13 
 
8.22 -0.07 8.15 
 
23.85 0.22 24.07 
Machinery and 
     equipment  
 
0.15 
 
0.03 
 
0.18 
 
 
2.68 
 
-0.10 
 
2.57 
 
 
13.77 
 
0.11 
 
13.87 
Other manufactures -0.16 0.03 -0.13 
 
16.68 -0.54 16.13 
 
17.84 1.01 18.81 
Power generation/ 
     distribution 
 
0.60 
 
-0.48 
 
0.17 
 
 
28.28 
 
1.49 
 
29.89 
 
 
3.77 
 
-5.04 
 
-0.73 
Water supply and 
     sewerage 
 
0.20 
 
-0.05 
 
0.16 
 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
Construction 0.03 0.00 0.03 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Transport 0.38 -0.33 0.10 
 
2.62 -0.84 1.84 
 
-2.18 0.27 -1.88 
Other services -0.06 0.06 -0.02  3.30 -1.23 2.15   -6.49 2.66 -4.21 
 
Although tariff reforms induced strong sectoral imports and exports responses as shown 
in Table 5-3, the responses were strikingly dissimilar. All sectors expanded their imports 
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after trade reforms. However, imports in non-energy intensive sectors, expanded fastest, 
compared to the base-run scenario.  Virtually all sectors related to food processing, and 
agriculture, that are relatively more protected through import tariffs recorded substantial 
increases in imports ranging between 23.5%-35.23% over the 2009 base-run. The only 
exception in the category of sectors that responded strongly in their demand for imports, 
and that use energy intensely, are: electricity generation and distribution (increase of 
28.28%); leather production (increase of 26.12%); and wood products (an increase of 
19.05%). With these exceptions, other energy-intensive sectors had lower imports 
responses after trade liberalization reforms, of between 2.62% to 14.74%. 
 
Unlike on the imports side, where non-energy intensive sectors dominated in expanding 
their activity after trade reforms, Kenya's export growth was concentrated in pollution-
intensive sectors (11 out of the 24). In this regard, after trade reforms, exports grew by 
between 21.14% to 32.09% in mining and quarrying whose activities are energy-
intensive, and in energy-intensive industries involved in the production of paper, rubber 
and plastics, metals, and pharmaceuticals products. While most industries expanded their 
exports activity, there were eight industries that experienced contractions, two of which 
―transportation (contracted by 2.18%), and other services (contracted by 6.49%)― are 
energy-intensive. The non-energy intensive sectors that recorded export activity 
contractions of between 0.58% and 10.11% are in food manufacturing industries that 
process meat, beverage, fish, coffee, sugar, and tea products.  
 
Interestingly, while exports expanded across all sectors of the economy after trade 
reforms, compared to the base-run, the quantity sold domestically of domestic output 
contracted across sectors.  Importantly, most of the industries that diverted their output to 
exports, were energy-intensive. These include other non-metal minerals, paper, metals, 
pharmaceuticals, and basic chemicals. These energy-intensive industries, sharply reduced 
the supply of their goods to the domestic market, in favor of exports. The fact that 
Kenya’s trade reforms intensify the production, for exports rather than domestic 
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consumption, of energy-intensive and, therefore, potentially pollution-intensive goods, 
has a major implication on the level of emissions in the country.  
 
The above analysis reveal that trade opening might enable Kenya to specialize in 
producing dirtier goods where it has a comparative advantage, because of lower 
opportunity costs. The experiments show that import response after trade reforms is 
lackluster in sectors that are energy and pollution-intensive. Conversely, spectacular 
growth in imports emerge in sectors that are associated with lower energy intensities, and 
are more labor intensive, such as food manufactures and agricultural activities. Recall 
from Chapter III that Kenya imposes punitive tariffs, ranging between 35% and 100% on 
some imports in sectors that are classified as sensitive —for example, cereals, sugar, and 
textiles and clothing. Simulation in exp2 show that with further trade opening, imports in 
these and other sectors that have lower-carbon emissions in the Kenyan economy could 
grow at a faster pace than in sectors with high-carbon emissions. Conversely, on the 
exports side, this situation is reversed; substantially high growth was achieved in energy-
intensive sectors, that pollute more, than in sectors that are associated with lower-carbon 
emissions.  
 
Impact on households: At the macro and sectoral levels, freer trade is welfare enhancing. 
In real terms, consumer demand increased by 3.33%, and nonproduction labor wage rate 
by 3.68%, compared to the base-run (see Table 5-2). At the sectoral level, the real wage 
rate for production labor increased substantially in virtually all sectors compared to the 
base-run (see Section 8.2, Appendix 2, Table 8-6). Mining and quarrying sector and three 
industries —other foods, wood products, and paper products, however, recorded 
contractions in the real wages of between 0.48% and 8.96%.  The top three industries that 
recorded the highest growth in production labor wages, were those producing 
pharmaceutical, meat, and bakery products, where the real wage rate rose by 25.8%, 
21.54%, and 20.82%, respectively, compared to the base-run.  However, increased output 
in dirty industries would intensify pollution, and in the longer-term lead to detrimental 
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effects on public health and labor productivity. Such developments have negative impact 
on social welfare. 
 
Impact on environment: The analysis of the existing trade patterns as documented in 
Chapter III reveal that Kenya’s exports are dominated by primary commodities and labor-
intensive manufactured goods, while capital-intensive goods dominate on the imports 
side. Is this pattern of trade specialization likely to change if a trade reform policy, alone, 
is implemented?  And if so, what are the implications for Kenya’s environmental quality? 
The analysis so far seems to suggest that, yes, the pattern would change if trade reforms 
involve removal of all trade tariffs. Without any further analysis or environmental policy 
actions, it appears that Kenya is likely to specialize in the production of dirtier goods, as 
it intensifies its exports in relatively dirtier goods, after trade liberalization. Further, it is 
evident that imports in the Kenyan case are not a substitute instrument for abating 
pollution when trade is fully liberalized as exp2 show that imports in cleaner sectors rise 
relatively faster than those in dirtier sectors. In summary, further trade liberalization 
policy, alone, would increase the country’s pattern of specialization towards dirty 
industries if Kenya does not take concrete actions to implement complementary pollution 
abatement actions to mitigate pollution that is likely to emerge with further trade opening. 
 
5.3. Pollution Abatement Policy 
 
The third experiment (exp3) involved a policy change that imposes a 10% environmental 
tax on petroleum (energy) inputs to curtail harmful emissions, compared to the 2009 
baseline. The experiment for this standalone policy change on energy taxes was 
conducted under the assumption of no further trade liberalization.   
 
Macroeconomic effects: The short-run effects of this restrictive environmental tax 
policy, on aggregate variables are presented in Table 5-2.  Under the pollution abatement 
policy (exp3), alone, there was a small increase in real GDP by 0.01% from the 2009 
base scenario, a far better result than the contraction of 0.64% that was experienced under 
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a trade reform policy, alone (exp2). The nominal GDP, however, contracted by 0.4% 
after the environmental tax policy was effected, but at a slower pace than the contraction 
experienced under the trade reforms policy, alone of 1.37% compared to the base-run. 
Furthermore, compared to the 2009 base-run, foreign savings contracted sharply by 7.8% 
unlike in exp2 where such savings increased by 47.62%. Finally, government revenues, 
compared to the base-run, increased by 2.12%, unlike in exp2 where such revenues 
declined by 19.61%.   
 
Under an environmental tax policy alone, there are several effects that feed back to 
depress real GDP growth. First, the assumption that capital is sector specific impedes 
sectoral reallocation of capital and amplifies impacts on the macroeconomic variables 
because of a restrained equilibrating process. Furthermore, in the base 2009 economy, 
Kenya is an oil importer, and, therefore, the higher energy prices have a higher adverse 
effect on energy-intensive production and consumption.  These adverse effects are 
reflected in contraction in nominal GDP (reduced by 0.4%), and nominal consumption 
(reduced by 0.95%), as shown in Table 5-2. The value of exports expanded, however, by 
1.23%, but this increase, compared to the base-run, was about half of the increase in 
exports of 2.37% under trade reforms, alone (exp2). The government was the main 
beneficiary of the environmental tax policy as its revenues increased by 2.12% in exp3 as 
compared to the reduction of 19.61% under the trade reforms policy only (exp2) because 
of the mobilization of both environmental and international trade taxes. Conversely, 
households were the main losers of the standalone environmental tax policy. This is 
reflected in the decline in real consumer demand, and real nonproduction labor wage rate 
by, respectively, 0.53% and 0.51% under exp3 compared to an increase of 3.33% and 
3.68%, under the trade reform policy, alone (exp2).  
 
Sectoral impacts: Results in Table 5-3, and Table 8-5 in Section 8.2 (Appendix 2) show 
that an environmental tax on energy inputs has, broadly, adverse effects on output, and 
trade flows. Compared to the trade reform policy, alone, the standalone environmental 
tax policy reform caused the activity output across sectors to expand at a slower pace, of 
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less than 1%, as data in Table 5-3 demonstrate. For example, the pharmaceutical industry, 
that had achieved a substantial activity output expansion of 10.69% under the trade 
reform policy alone, responded weakly under the environmental tax policy alone with an 
activity output growth of only 0.55%, compared to the base-run. As expected, far fewer 
energy-intensive industries expanded their output under the environmental tax policy. In 
the top five position, only the pharmaceutical industry, that is pollution-intensive, 
maintained its stronger output expansion response to the environmental tax policy reform, 
alone. This contrasts with the trade reform policy, alone, where more energy-intensive 
industries responded strongly in expanding their production capacities.  The electricity 
(power) generation and distribution, transportation, and chemicals sectors that rely 
heavily on fuel were most adversely affected by the environmental tax policy.   
 
Another interesting comparison between the output performance under trade reforms 
alone, and an environmental tax alone, is the variation in outcomes. Data in Table 5-3 
show that under the trade reform policy, alone, the range of industrial output response 
was wider (contraction: -0.48%; expansion: 10.69%), compared to the range under the 
environmental tax policy, alone, (contraction: -1.69%; expansion: 0.55%). This suggests 
that in the Kenya case, an environmental tax policy is a better, and more targeted 
instrument for pollution abatement than the trade policy reforms policy. Indeed, a closer 
scrutiny of the output data reveal that the response of activity output to the energy tax, 
alone, is more evenly spread across industries (both energy-intensive and non-energy 
intensive) compared to the case of the trade reform policy, alone. 
 
Regarding trade flows, performance vary across sectors of the economy, but generally, 
imports and exports activity decline (see Table 5-3). On the imports side, only two 
sectors marginally increased their imports under the energy tax policy; electricity (power) 
generation and distribution (by 1.49%) and mining and quarrying (by 0.02%), both of 
which are energy-intensive. On the exports side, higher production costs caused the 
following energy-intensive industries to curtail activities; electricity (power) generation 
and distribution (by 5.04%), and chemicals (by 0.25%). Also, exports from the mining 
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and quarrying sector, that is also energy-intensive, contracted by 0.3%.  Other industries 
in the tradable sector increased exports by between 0.02% and 4.37%, with all the 
energy-intensive ones increasing their exports at rates below average, except for other 
services sector that expanded its exports by 2.66%.  
 
These results suggest that without mitigating actions, an environmental tax policy in the 
form of an energy tax, alone, could harm Kenya’s international trade competitiveness. 
The outcomes of exp3 show that a 10% increase in the price petroleum fuel, which is 
viewed as harmful to the environment, imposes substantial costs on the Kenyan economy 
in terms of reduction in trade flows of both imports and exports, activity output, and the 
prices of labor. It is unlikely, without compensatory measures, that the Kenyan public 
would readily accept to bear the cost of increased energy prices, even if they have 
heightened environmental awareness. 
 
Impacts on households:  At the aggregate level, compared to the base-run, the energy tax 
policy caused household welfare to fall, as real consumer demand contracted by 0.53%. 
This is a worse off outcome for consumers as under the trade liberalization policy, their 
real consumption had increased by 3.33% compared to the base-run. Another source of 
declining welfare for household arose from the contraction of the real wage rate for 
nonproduction labor, by 0.51% compared to the base-run, and an increase of 3.68% under 
the trade reform policy, alone. At the sectoral level, an energy tax is not welfare 
enhancing, as well.  The real wage rate for production labor contracted across the sector 
after the energy tax was imposed, compared to a clear pattern of increases across sectors 
under the trade liberalization reforms (see Section 8.2, Appendix 2, Table 8-6).  
 
These results illustrate that an environmental tax has adverse effects on sectoral output. 
As production costs rise because of rising energy prices, enterprises scale back their 
activities, leading to declining overall output and use of primary labor factors. This 
causes an overall fall in the wage rate, and consequently, household incomes. In this 
analysis, however, it is not possible make deeper analysis of the effects of the policy 
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shocks on households’ welfare, because households are not disaggregated into quintile 
income groups. On the positive side, however, lower output and the likelihood of a 
cleaner environment might in the longer term have beneficial effects on public health and 
the productivity of labor, and consequently, lead to enhanced social welfare. 
 
Impact on environment: Although there are unfavorable effects of the environmental tax 
policy, alone, on Kenya’s international trade competitiveness, such a policy has positive 
effects on environmental quality. Evidence of decline in aggregate domestic output, in 
energy-intensive industries, after the implementation of an environmental tax policy, 
suggest that the pollution intensity of output will decline through scale effects. As such, 
compared to the 2009 baseline, the higher energy taxes would cause a decrease in 
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), and ambient particulate matter (PM10). A reduction 
in PM10 will in turn have favorable effects on public health. However, estimates of the 
reductions of these emissions, after an environment tax policy is introduced, is an 
empirical question that is outside the scope of this study. 
 
5.4. Policy Coordination 
 
Table 5-2 shows the effects of a policy that combines a 10% environmental tax on fuel 
products, and 100% import tariffs cut (exp4). 
 
Macroeconomic effects: The impact of the coordinated policy on the macroeconomic 
variables is more moderated compared to outcomes under separate policies. Abolition of 
tariffs reduce the prices of imported inputs and final goods, and foster higher trade. This 
dampens the economy-wide negative effects of the higher energy prices that arise 
because of the environmental tax. As Table 5-2 illustrate, the real GDP responded to the 
joint policy by contracting marginally by 0.63%, compared to the base-run. Government 
revenues contracted sharply by 17.63% because the loss in revenues from the tariff cuts 
(a decrease of 19.61% per exp2) was only partially offset by the extra resources that were 
mobilized from the environmental tax (an increase of 2.12% per exp3).  Both the 
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domestic value of exports (increase of 3.46%), and the domestic value of imports 
(decrease of 3.31%) under the joint policy depict a far better terms of trade position 
compared to the stand-alone policies. Finally, the real consumer demand increased by 
2.85% under the joint policies compared to a deterioration under an environment policy 
alone.  
 
Sectoral effects: Compared to the environmental tax policy alone, there is considerable 
improvement in the sectoral effects of the coordinated policy (see Table 5-3, above, and 
detailed data in Table 8-5 in Section 8.2 of Appendix 2). Regarding activity output, the 
responses of the coordinated policy are evenly distributed across sectors, unlike in the 
case of stand-alone policies where responses are clustered in unique patterns. Table 5-3 
show that industries that achieved above average output outturns that ranged between 
1.44% to 11.34% under the coordinated policy are those that produce pharmaceuticals, 
bakery, rubber and plastics, and basic chemicals products. The pharmaceutical industry 
recovered strongly by achieving an activity output growth of 11.34% under the 
coordinated policy, compared to the slow-down of 0.55% under the environmental tax 
policy, alone. The top five sectors whose output contracted the most under the 
coordinated policy are mining and quarrying, and those that cover industries producing 
wood, paper, sugar, and other food products. These contracted by between 0.61% and 
1.56%, compared to the base-run. It is noticeable that under the coordinated policy, there 
is no systematic pattern of specialization of activity output, as energy-intensive industries 
feature in both expanding (for example, pharmaceutical and chemicals), and contracting 
(for example, wood production), and in mining and quarrying activities. 
 
Under the coordinated policy, tariff cuts benefit output more, while the effects of higher 
energy prices are still evident, with energy-intensive sectors being negatively impacted 
more than non-energy intensive sectors.  As shown in Table 5-3, despite all sectors 
expanding their imports under the coordinated policy, the energy-intensive ones faired far 
worse than non-energy intensive ones; only two energy-intensive sectors —electricity 
(power) generation and distribution, and the production of leather products— had import 
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expansion above 20% under the coordinated policy, compared to the base-run.  On the 
exports side, the pattern of distribution of responses to the coordinated policy show a 
relatively more symmetrical distribution of energy-intensive industries, although more 
industries expanded their activities than those that recorded contractions. The mining and 
quarrying sector, and industries producing paper, rubber and plastics, metal products, and 
pharmaceuticals expanded their exports by above average rates. The energy-intensive 
industries that achieved contraction in export growth are electricity generation, 
transportation, and other services. These outcomes demonstrate the balanced nature of the 
coordinated policy unlike under the stand-alone policies where outcomes depict patterns 
of specialization in activity outputs and trade flows. 
 
Impact on households: The coordinated policy still has negative effects on households 
when compared with the stand-alone trade policy, but broadly, is welfare improving. As 
shown in Table 5-2, the real consumer demand increased by 2.85% compared to the base-
run, a far better performance compared to the stand-alone environmental tax policy where 
such demand contracted by 0.53%. This, however, is a weaker performance compared to 
the higher real consumer demand of 3.33% that was reached under the trade reform 
policy, alone, compared to the base-run. At the macro level, the real wage rate for 
nonproduction labor increased by 3.22% compared to the base-run. This is slightly less 
than the level achieved under the trade reforms policy alone (an increase of 3.68%), but a 
far better result than the outcome under the environmental policy (a contraction of 
0.51%). At a sectoral level, the real wage rate for production labor under the coordinated 
policy increased across all sectors except in four (other foods, wood products, mining and 
quarrying, and paper) (see Section 8.2, Appendix 2, Table 8-6). These outcomes are far 
better for households than the contraction experienced under the environment policy 
alone. 
 
Environmental effects: The implications of implementing joint policies of further trade 
liberalization, and pollution abatement, on the environment are similar to those achieved 
under an environmental policy, alone. However, the environmental impacts are expected 
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to be more moderated under the coordinated policy, as compared to the policy of 
environmental tax, alone. 
 
5.5. Summary 
 
The removal of trade tariffs has a favorable effect on sectoral output and trade flows, but 
increases the risks that Kenya might specialize in dirty industries. On the other hand, 
sectors that are energy-intensive are more negatively impacted by an environmental tax 
on energy inputs. Although the adverse effects of an environmental tax policy do not 
dissipate under the joint policy, the impact on macroeconomic and sectoral variables are 
dampened. Sectorally, the effects of a coordinated trade-environment policy will depend 
on energy intensities and trade orientation, but broadly, the benefits of a coordinated 
policy are evident.  
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis moves forward the discourse on the consequences of outward oriented trade 
policy on the environment. It advances the debate on the assumed trade-off between trade 
liberalization and environmental quality using the case of Kenya, a new entrant to middle 
income country status, and a country that is aggressively pursuing industrialization as an 
instrument for enabling its citizens to reap the dividends of globalization. Understanding 
the linkages between trade-driven growth and environmental quality is important for 
evidence based policy responses, particularly for developing countries, such as Kenya, 
with low institutional, and implementation capacities, for environmental management. In 
respect of Kenya, a progressively industrializing developing country, it is of uttermost 
urgency that policy makers have evidence based prescriptions on optimal policies that 
would strike the right balance between expanding trade liberalization, while controlling 
trade-driven industrial pollution. Such evidence based policy prescriptions are, however, 
curtailed by the scarcity of theoretically founded research on Kenya, as is for many 
developing economies.  
 
A Computable General Equilibrium Model for Kenya (the KenCGE Model) was 
developed, as part of this thesis, to close the gaps in the literature. Technically, founded 
on the Löfgren (1993)’s static open economy general equilibrium model for Egypt, the 
model is theoretically grounded on the tradition of the World Bank’s neoclassical CGE 
models (see Dervis, et al., 1982). The model is developed taking Kenya’s economy as 
open, under a small country assumption where world prices for the country’s imports and 
exports are given. Domestic factor and product markets are taken as perfectly 
competitive. The model is calibrated using the Social Accounting Matrix for Kenya, 2009 
(KenSAM, 2009), and is simulated to run on the GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling 
System) software (see Brooke et al., 1988). The KenCGE Model incorporates a detailed 
definition of the industrial sector ―thirty, out of thirty-four sectors―, structural 
characteristics (markets for goods, labor, capital, and land), and institutions (one 
household ―incorporating enterprises―, the government, and the rest of the world). The 
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KenCGE Model was used to analyze the effects of three policy choices: a 100% cut in 
import tariffs, alone; a 10% environmental tax on petroleum inputs, alone; and a 
combined trade reforms and environmental tax policies.  
 
6.1. Key Outcomes 
 
Trade reforms ―100% elimination of import tariffs― as an instrument for abating 
pollution lead to several short-run responses. At the macro level, real GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) decline by 0.64%, as domestic and international prices converged 
under the small country assumption.  At the sector level, trade reforms, alone, induce 
output specialization towards dirtier industries, and consequently, has the potential to 
increase pollution through scale effects. Above average output increases (range of 
between 1%-11.7%), over the base-run, were noticed in industries that are energy-
intensive such as pharmaceuticals, rubber and plastics, and chemical products. Further, 
out of the 15 industries that are categorized as energy-intensive, only 5 had activity 
output reductions after trade was fully liberalized. This suggest that trade reforms in 
Kenya increases the risk of specialization in dirtier industries, as 67% of energy-intensive 
industries had positive output responses. 
 
Trade tariff reforms, alone, induced strong imports and exports responses across 
tradeable sectors, compared to the base-run. While imports increased in all sectors, non-
energy intensive sectors, for example food processing and agriculture, expanded their 
imports at a faster pace.  On the exports side, the responses induced by trade reforms 
were mixed. Surprisingly, stronger positive responses in exports were noticeable in 
energy-intensive sectors. These include mining and quarrying, and the production of 
rubber and plastics, paper, metals, and pharmaceuticals products. Unlike in the case of 
imports, only a handful non-energy intensive sectors ―these are vegetable and animal 
oils and fats, machinery and equipment, bakery products, and other manufactures― 
achieved noticeable increases in exports after trade reforms, compared to the base-run. 
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There was evidence of diversion of output of energy-intensive industries (for example, 
basic chemicals, and pharmaceuticals) to exports, from the domestic market, after trade 
opening reforms. This is a highly significant finding as trade reforms incentivized dirty 
industries to intensify exports of dirtier goods, while curtailing supply to the domestic 
market. This, in turn, has the potential of increasing the level of pollution in the Kenyan 
economy, after full trade liberalization is realized. In sum, under exp2, compared to the 
base-run (exp1), trade reforms, alone, induced in most sectors increases of activity 
output, imports, and exports. Although exports expanded in 24 out of 32 tradable sectors, 
imports increased in all tradable sectors. The diversion of trade to the export caused the 
quantity of goods supplied domestically, from the domestic output, to contract in most 
industries. With domestic and international prices, having converged after Kenya’s trade 
was fully liberalized, product prices across all sectors fell. The falling domestic prices 
caused an in increase net exports as domestic goods became more competitive in 
international markets. This suggests that trade reforms, alone, increases the risk that the 
Kenyan economy might specialize in dirty industries. This would intensify emissions, if 
no complementary mitigating policy actions are taken to protect the environment. 
 
Finally, a trade liberalization policy, alone, enhances economic welfare. At the macro 
level, real consumer demand, and the real nonproduction labor wage rate, increased by 
3.33%, and 3.68%, respectively. Sectorally, the real wage rate for production labor 
increased in virtually all sectors. The higher real wages translate into rising real incomes 
and, consequently, higher economic welfare of household. Conversely, increased output 
that is induced by trade liberalization might lead to intensification of pollution, and this 
has adverse consequences on social welfare. 
 
A policy of pollution abatement that entails levying a 10% energy input tax, alone, 
resulted in a small increase in real GDP by 0.01%.  At the sector level, the environmental 
tax had mixed results. Most of the energy-intensive sectors posted relatively weaker 
output increases, while a few contracted (for example, mining and quarrying, 
transportation, chemicals, and electricity generation). Imports in energy-intensive sectors 
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declined, with two exceptions where small increases were noted (electricity generation, 
and mining and quarrying). Finally, exports responded weakly, with notable, below 
average increase responses from energy-intensive industries. These results suggest that 
without mitigating actions, an energy tax policy alone, might cause significant damage to 
Kenya’s international trade competitiveness.  
 
An energy tax, alone, does not enhance economic welfare.  At an aggregate level, real 
consumer demand declined by 0.53%, and this adversely impacted consumer welfare. 
Real wages for labor factors contracted in tandem with economic output downturn. These 
outcomes unfavorably impacted households’ welfare, compared to the base-run. On a 
positive note the decline in aggregate domestic output, after the energy policy reform, is 
expected to result in decline in pollution of energy-intensive industries, and this might, in 
the longer-term, contribute to a cleaner environment and improved social welfare. 
 
The final experiment is a coordinated policy reform that comprises a 100% cut in tariffs, 
and a 10% tax on petroleum fuel inputs.  This resulted in contraction of real GDP by 
0.63%. Generally, changes in aggregate variables under joint policy reform, were more 
moderated compared to the stand-alone reforms on trade and the environment. Further, 
the sectoral activity output outcomes of the joint policy change improved, though they 
varied depending on sector specific energy intensities.  Exports also increased in most 
sectors. However, because of diversion of trade from the domestic to foreign markets, the 
quantity of domestic output sold domestically declined across sectors, compared to the 
base-run. As is in the case of the trade policy alone, the joint policy appears to cause an 
increase in net exports because of increasing competitiveness of the domestic goods in 
world markets. However, the environmental component of the joint policy might mitigate 
the risk of specialization in dirty industries that Kenya is faced with under a trade 
liberalization policy reform, alone. 
 
In conclusion, industrial responses to the coordinated policy lead to a more evenly 
distributed activity outputs across sectors. This suggests that the significant patterns of 
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specialization in production that arose under the trade policy, alone, have been mitigated 
through policy coordination. Tariff cuts were beneficial to output, while the effects of 
higher energy prices are still evident with energy-intensive industries being relatively 
more negatively impacted than non-energy intensive ones. Despite economy wide 
expansion of imports under the coordinated policy, all energy-intensive sectors faired far 
worse than non-energy intensive ones. The welfare of households increased under the 
coordinated policy, as reflected in the improvement in real consumer demand unlike in 
the case of an environmental tax policy, alone, where real consumption demand 
contracted. This, however, was a weaker performance as under the trade reform policy 
alone, the real consumer demand was higher. Finally, given that environmental policy 
reforms are included in the joint policy, growth in output is bound to occur in a 
sustainable cleaner environment, and this, in the longer-term will enhance social welfare. 
These findings are in stark contrast with those of Gumilang, et al. (2011) who concluded 
that the impact of deepening Indonesia’s trade liberalization on the environment was 
insignificant. The findings, however, demonstrate the advantages of coordinating trade 
and environmental policies. 
 
6.2. Policy Implications 
 
Kenya is currently, a low emitter of greenhouse gases. As such the concerns relating to 
the inevitable growth-environment trade-off (Beghin, et al., 2002b) that Kenya is 
currently faced with are manageable, as the country’s industrial emissions have not 
reached a critical level. The analysis in this thesis suggest that there is need for “caution” 
(Beghin, et al., 2002b:4), if Kenya were to manage the transition to industrialized status 
through a sustainable trade opening growth path that is also environmental friendly. To 
address the challenges posed by the risks of specialization in dirty industries, the analysis 
presented in this study, as in Beghin, et al., (2002b), suggest that Kenya will need to 
coordinate its trade opening policy with an appropriate pollution abatement policy. Kenya 
should, therefore, incorporate in its environmental policy tools, specific economic 
instruments that address directly environmental concerns.  
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To overcome emerging environmental challenges that might arise from further trade 
liberalization, an energy tax or a carbon tax on petroleum fuel inputs and new sources of 
hydrocarbon fuels such as coal, should be considered as a key policy instrument for 
abating pollution. The carbon tax, should target energy-intensive industries, but could be 
calibrated at different rates across sectors based on the objectives the environmental 
policy seeks to achieve, and in consideration of the country’s growth, and household 
welfare objectives. As the Kenyan public is likely to oppose such a new tax, incentives 
could be incorporated to channel part of the additional revenues that are mobilized from 
the carbon tax, to subsidies for low income households and public transportation. The 
Kenya’s National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) should use the balance 
of the revenues from the carbon tax to reinforce its capacity to monitor, and control 
industrial pollution. 
 
6.3. Other Matters for Consideration 
 
The KenCGE Model is particularly strong in supporting policy makers in Kenya in their 
quest to implement optimal economic policies in the areas of trade and industrial 
pollution. The model’s household sector, however, is highly aggregated and, therefore, it 
can only provide broad insights on the impact of trade and environmental quality on 
household welfare. Disaggregation of households into various income quantiles is an 
enhancement that is essential for the model to provide insights of the impact of policy 
changes on various income groups. Another area that disaggregation could be helpful 
relates to labor factors. Collectively, such disaggregation would enhance the economic 
and welfare related policy prescriptions that arise from the analysis of the linkages 
between trade liberalization and environmental policies. 
 
The focus of the model was on identifying the impact on patterns of industrial 
specialization of a trade opening policy, on the one hand, and a pollution abatement 
policy, on the other. The next logical step is for the model to be enhanced to account for 
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further environmental impacts by connecting emissions to both the use of primary inputs 
―petroleum and electricity―, and the final consumption demand (see Beghin, et al., 
2002b). In this case, Beghin, et al (1996) approach is informative. Further, as in Beghin, 
et al (1996), the model’s structure could be made dynamic in the areas of accumulation of 
productive factors (capital and labor), and technological growth. This is important 
because emissions abatement technology play an important part in both enhancing 
production processes, and in the design of a robust environmental policy.  
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VIII. APPENDICES 
 
8.1. Appendix 1: KenCGE Model – Definition of Sets, Parameters, and Variables 
 
Table 8-1: KenCGE Model - Alphabetical List of Sets 
 
Sets --- One – Dimensional 
c ∈ C =  commodities 
c ∈ CX(⊂ C) =  commodities with domestic production  
f ∈ F =  factors 
f ∈ FM (⊂ F) =  sectorally mobile factors 
f ∈ FS (⊂ F)  =  sector-specific factors 
h ∈ H (⊂ I)  =  households 
i ∈ I =  institutions  
i ∈ ID (⊂ I) =  domestic non-government institutions 
i′ ∈ ID′  =  ID 
s ∈ S =  sectors/good  
s′ ∈ S′  =  S 
s ∈ SN (⊂ S) =  non-tradable sectors/goods 
s ∈ ST (⊂ S) =  tradable sectors/goods 
 
Sets --- Two – Dimensional 
(f, s) ∈ MFS =  mapping between factors (capital, labor, land) and sectors 
(i, f) ∈ MIF =  mapping between institutions and factors (capital, labor, and land) 
(i ∈ i′) ∈ MIID =  mapping between institutions and domestic non-government institutions 
 
 
Table 8-2: KenCGE Model - Alphabetical List of Parameters 
αs
xp
 =  shift parameter in the production function 
α𝑠
𝑥𝑡 =  shift parameter in the output transformation function 
αs
q
 =  shift parameter in the composite supply function 
α𝑠
𝑠𝑐 =  shift parameter for domestic commodity aggregation function  
αLSNP =  share of nonproduction labor in sector s 
αLSP =  share of production labor in sector s 
𝛽𝑓𝑠 =  share parameter for factor f in sector s 
𝛾𝑠 =  share parameter in the output transformation function 
?̅?𝑠 =  government demand 
δsc
sc =  share parameter for domestic commodity aggregation function 
𝛿𝑠 =  share parameter in the composite supply function 
𝜄𝑠′𝑠 =  quantity of input 𝑠
′per unit of output s 
ι?̅? =  investment demand 
λfs
s  =  fixed supply of sector-specific factor f in sector s 
λf
m =  fixed supply of sectorally mobile factor f 
λks
s  =  fixed supply of capital 
λLNP =  fixed supply of nonproduction labor 
λLSP
s  =  fixed supply of production labor 
λland Agr
𝐴𝑔𝑟
 =  fixed supply of land in the agriculture sector 
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               (Table 8-2: KenCGE Model - Alphabetical List of Parameters) (continued) 
ps
wm =  world import price (US$) 
Π =  price index (KSh) 
θsc =  yield of output c per unit of activity a 
ρs
x =  substitution parameter in the output transformation function 
ρs
q
 =  substitution parameter in the composite supply function 
ρ𝑐
𝑎𝑐  =  domestic commodity aggregation function exponent 
σs
e =  export tax rate 
τi
𝑑 =  rate of direct tax for institution i 
τs
𝑖  =  indirect tax rate 
τs
𝑚 =  tariff rate 
∅𝑙𝑤  =  transfers to labor from Rest of the World (RoW) (US$) 
∅i
𝑖𝑔
 =  transfer to institution i from government (KSh) 
∅i
𝑖𝑤 =  transfer to institution i from RoW (US$) 
ψsh
𝑒  =  expenditure share for good s for household h 
ψif
f  =  share to institution i from the income of factor f 
ψii′
𝑖  =  share to institution i from the income of institution 𝑖′  
       (excluding direct taxes to the government) 
ψi
s =  income share for institution i to savings 
ω𝑠 =  weight in price index for good s 
 
 
 Table 8-3: KenCGE Model - Alphabetical List of Variables 
CDsh
ℎ  =  consumption demand for good s from household h 
cfs
f  =  demand for factor f in sector s 
𝐾𝑘𝑠
𝑓
 =  demand for capital in sectors 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃
𝑓
 =  wage for non-production labor in sectors 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑃
𝑓
 =  demand for production labor 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝑓
 =  demand for land in the agriculture sector 
d𝑠 =  domestic output sold domestically 
e𝑠 =  exports 
𝑒𝑔 =  government expenditures (KSh) 
eh
ℎ =  consumption expenditures for household h (KSh) 
m𝑠 =  imports 
𝑝s
𝑑 =  domestic price of domestic output (KSh) 
𝑝s
𝑒 =  domestic export price  (KSh) 
𝑝s
𝑚 =  domestic import price  (KSh) 
𝑝s
𝑞
 =  domestic supply price  (KSh) 
𝑝s
𝑣𝑎 =  value-added price  (KSh) 
𝑝s
𝑤𝑒  =  world export price (US$) 
𝑝s
𝑥 =  market price of domestic output (KSh) 
PA𝑠   =  activity price (unit gross revenue) (KSh) 
PXAC𝑠 𝑐 =  producer price  of commodity c for activity a (KSh) 
q𝑠 =  domestic supply (from domestic output and imports) 
QA𝑠 =  quantity (level) of activity 
QXAC𝑠 𝑐 =  quantity of marketed output of commodity c from activity a 
𝑟 =  foreign exchange rate (KSh/US$) 
𝑠𝑤 =  foreign savings (US$) 
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               Table 8-3: KenCGE Model - Alphabetical List of Variables 
𝑡𝑖𝑓
𝑓
 =  income transfer to institution i from factor f (KSh) 
𝑡𝑖𝑖′
𝑖  =  income transfer to institution i from institution 𝑖
′ (KSh) 
v𝑠 =  intermediate demand for good s 
𝑤f
𝑚 =  price of sectorally mobile factor f (KSh) 
𝑤fs
𝑠  =  price of sector-specific factor f in sector s (KSh) 
𝑤𝑘𝑠
𝑠  =  price of capital in sectors 
𝑤𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝐴𝑔𝑟
 =  price of land in agriculture sector 
𝑤𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃
𝑠  =  wage for nonproduction labor 
𝑤𝐿𝑆𝑃
𝑠  =  wage for production labor 
x𝑠 =  domestic output 
yk
𝑓
 =  income of capital (KSh) 
𝑦𝐿𝑆𝑁𝑃
𝑓
 =  income nonproduction labor (KSh) 
𝑦𝐿𝑆𝑃
𝑓
 =  income of production labor (KSh) 
yland
𝑓
 =  income of land (KSh) 
𝑦𝑔 =  government income (KSh) 
𝑦i
𝑖  =  income of institution i (KSh) 
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8.2. Appendix 2: Results of the KenCGE Model 
 
  Table 8-4: List of Abbreviations Used In KenCGE Model Results Tables 
 
 
EXPERIMENTS  
Abbreviation Meaning 
exp1 2009 base-run (not reported in the results, below)  
exp2 100% reduction in imports tariffs 
exp3 10% increase in energy (petroleum) inputs taxes 
exp4 exp2 + exp3 
 
 
ACTIVITIES / COMMODITIES 
Abbreviation Meaning   Abbreviation Meaning 
AGRICULTURE 
  
SERVICES 
 
AGRICU Agriculture 
 
SCONST Construction 
  STRNSP Transportation 
INDUSTRY 
 
 
SOSERV Other services 
IMINIG Mining and quarrying 
 
  
IMEATP Meat processing 
 
  
IFISHP Fish processing 
 
  
IFRVEG Fruit and vegetable products 
 
  
IOILFT Vegetable and animal oils/fats 
 
  
IDAIRY Dairy products 
 
  
IGMILL Grain mill products 
 
  
IBAKRY Bakery products 
 
  
ISUGAR Sugar manufactures 
 
  
ICOFFE Coffee processing 
 
  
ITEAP: Tea processing 
 
  
IOTFDS Other food products 
 
  
IBEVEG Beverages products 
 
  
ITOBAC Tobacco products   
ITEXTL Textiles and clothing    
ILEATH Leather products    
IWOODP Wood products    
IPAPER Paper products    
IPRINT Printing and reproduction    
IPETRO Refined petroleum products    
IBCHEM Basic chemicals    
ICHEMP Chemical products    
IPHARM Pharmaceuticals    
IRPLST Rubber and plastics    
INOMTL Other non-metal mineral products    
IMETAL Metal products    
IMEQPT Machinery and equipment    
IOMANU Other manufactures    
IPOWER Power generation/distribution    
IWATER Water supply and sewerage    
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Table 8-5: KenCGE Model Results –Quantities– % Change From Base-Run 
 
 
Activity output  
 
Aggregate quantity  
 
Quantity of imports 
  exp2 exp3 exp4 
 
exp2 exp3 exp4 
 
exp2 exp3 exp4 
Sectors 
           AGRICU -0.08 0.01 -0.07 
 
-0.08 0.01 -0.07 
 
28.49 -1.16 27.17 
IMINIG -1.06 -0.11 -1.17 
 
-1.06 -0.11 -1.17 
 
3.05 0.02 3.07 
IMEATP 0.20 -0.04 0.17 
 
0.16 -0.03 0.14 
 
35.23 -1.77 33.09 
IFISHP 0.05 0.14 0.17 
 
-0.04 0.05 0.00 
 
30.51 -1.18 29.15 
IFRVEG 0.30 0.54 0.78 
 
0.30 0.54 0.78 
 
22.70 -0.49 22.18 
IOILFT 0.55 0.16 0.71 
 
0.72 0.01 0.75 
 
14.82 -0.63 14.17 
IDAIRY 0.89 -0.12 0.79 
 
0.89 -0.12 0.79 
 
30.61 -1.36 29.03 
IGMILL 0.09 -0.05 0.06 
 
0.09 -0.05 0.06 
 
28.89 -1.52 27.18 
IBAKRY 3.65 -0.37 3.33 
 
3.65 -0.37 3.33 
 
29.93 -1.41 28.27 
ISUGAR -1.11 0.02 -1.08 
 
-1.38 0.07 -1.31 
 
26.99 -1.26 25.59 
ICOFFE -0.07 0.06 -0.01 
 
-0.07 0.06 -0.01 
 
32.64 -1.02 31.44 
ITEAP 0.21 0.12 0.31 
 
0.21 0.12 0.31 
 
32.99 -1.21 31.56 
IOTFDS -2.75 0.28 -2.48 
 
-1.69 0.16 -1.54 
 
23.50 -1.03 22.39 
IBEVEG 0.59 -0.06 0.55 
 
0.59 -0.06 0.55 
 
32.33 -1.51 30.55 
ITOBAC 0.64 0.36 0.96 
 
0.64 0.36 0.96 
 
22.94 -0.88 21.97 
ITEXTL -0.12 0.06 -0.06 
 
-0.12 0.06 -0.06 
 
23.14 -0.80 22.28 
ILEATH 0.20 0.06 0.25 
 
0.20 0.06 0.25 
 
26.12 -1.06 24.95 
IWOODP -0.61 0.00 -0.61 
 
-0.61 0.00 -0.61 
 
19.05 -0.26 18.80 
IPAPER -1.92 0.10 -1.84 
 
-1.63 0.09 -1.56 
 
8.64 -0.03 8.62 
IPRINT -0.07 0.02 -0.05 
 
-0.07 0.02 -0.05 
 
26.41 -0.37 26.01 
IPETRO 0.10 0.01 0.11 
 
0.10 0.01 0.11 
 
6.81 -0.42 6.42 
IBCHEM 1.31 0.10 1.41 
 
1.35 0.09 1.44 
 
3.48 -0.04 3.46 
ICHEMP 1.23 -0.43 0.86 
 
1.09 -0.31 0.83 
 
14.74 -0.36 14.35 
IPHARM 10.69 0.55 11.34 
 
10.69 0.55 11.34 
 
8.21 -0.34 7.86 
IRPLST 1.55 0.02 1.60 
 
1.55 0.02 1.60 
 
14.43 -0.53 13.89 
INOMTL 0.12 -0.03 0.10 
 
0.07 -0.03 0.05 
 
13.41 -0.07 13.33 
IMETAL -0.18 0.05 -0.13 
 
-0.18 0.05 -0.13 
 
8.22 -0.07 8.15 
IMEQPT 0.15 0.03 0.18 
 
0.15 0.03 0.18 
 
2.68 -0.10 2.57 
IOMANU -0.16 0.03 -0.13 
 
-0.15 0.03 -0.12 
 
16.68 -0.54 16.13 
IPOWER 0.60 -0.48 0.17 
 
0.60 -0.48 0.17 
 
28.28 1.49 29.89 
IWATER 0.20 -0.05 0.16 
 
0.20 -0.05 0.16 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
SCONST 0.03 0.00 0.03 
 
0.03 0.00 0.03 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
STRNSP 0.38 -0.33 0.10 
 
0.38 -0.33 0.10 
 
2.62 -0.84 1.84 
SOSERV -0.06 0.06 -0.02  -0.06 0.06 -0.02   3.30 -1.23 2.15 
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Table 8-5: KenCGE Model Results –Quantities– % Change From Base-Run (continued) 
 
  
  
Quantity sold 
domestically of 
 
Quantity of goods 
supplied domestically 
 
Quantity of exports 
 
domestic output 
 
("composite supply") 
Sectors  exp2 exp3 exp4 
 
exp2 exp3 exp4 
 
exp2 exp3 exp4 
            AGRICU 0.75 2.21 2.71 
 
-0.17 -0.21 -0.36 
 
2.64 -0.31 2.34 
IMINIG 32.09 -0.30 31.73 
 
-7.86 -0.07 -7.92 
 
0.07 0.00 0.07 
IMEATP -10.11 4.37 -6.60 
 
0.22 -0.06 0.18 
 
0.35 -0.06 0.30 
IFISHP -0.97 1.13 0.03 
 
0.45 -0.52 -0.01 
 
3.56 -0.60 3.01 
IFRVEG 3.41 1.14 4.41 
 
-2.68 -0.03 -2.71 
 
1.22 -0.10 1.12 
IOILFT 16.19 0.80 16.95 
 
-4.05 -0.22 -4.26 
 
6.82 -0.46 6.37 
IDAIRY 0.44 2.55 2.74 
 
0.91 -0.26 0.69 
 
2.38 -0.32 2.09 
IGMILL 0.86 3.62 4.05 
 
0.08 -0.08 0.02 
 
4.43 -0.31 4.13 
IBAKRY 11.55 2.24 13.90 
 
3.60 -0.38 3.27 
 
3.83 -0.39 3.49 
ISUGAR -0.81 2.51 1.40 
 
-1.44 -0.19 -1.60 
 
5.01 -0.45 4.58 
ICOFFE -0.83 0.37 -0.50 
 
1.66 -0.62 1.10 
 
1.79 -0.63 1.23 
ITEAP -0.58 0.51 -0.13 
 
1.93 -0.72 1.27 
 
2.38 -0.73 1.72 
IOTFDS 3.46 2.37 5.62 
 
-2.22 -0.07 -2.27 
 
3.23 -0.28 2.96 
IBEVEG -3.13 3.00 -0.51 
 
0.82 -0.25 0.61 
 
2.29 -0.31 2.01 
ITOBAC 1.82 0.63 2.37 
 
-2.98 -0.45 -3.38 
 
7.87 -0.64 7.24 
ITEXTL 5.42 1.07 6.37 
 
-1.90 -0.27 -2.14 
 
4.04 -0.40 3.66 
ILEATH 2.95 1.24 4.07 
 
-0.88 -0.41 -1.23 
 
5.44 -0.57 4.90 
IWOODP 16.72 0.56 17.26 
 
-1.40 -0.02 -1.43 
 
0.09 -0.04 0.05 
IPAPER 27.91 0.30 28.21 
 
-5.19 0.06 -5.15 
 
0.20 0.02 0.22 
IPRINT 4.87 0.91 5.69 
 
-0.19 0.00 -0.19 
 
0.18 -0.01 0.17 
IPETRO 31.37 0.67 32.02 
 
-5.63 -0.11 -5.74 
 
2.44 -0.31 2.15 
IBCHEM 10.26 0.14 10.40 
 
-12.24 0.01 -12.22 
 
1.21 -0.03 1.19 
ICHEMP 18.40 -0.25 18.21 
 
-3.57 -0.33 -3.86 
 
4.01 -0.34 3.68 
IPHARM 21.14 0.88 22.18 
 
-6.92 0.01 -6.91 
 
6.64 -0.31 6.32 
IRPLST 24.19 0.88 25.17 
 
-2.44 -0.13 -2.55 
 
2.11 -0.24 1.89 
INOMTL 15.43 0.02 15.45 
 
-5.07 -0.05 -5.11 
 
0.70 -0.05 0.65 
IMETAL 23.85 0.22 24.07 
 
-6.33 0.01 -6.32 
 
0.59 -0.03 0.56 
IMEQPT 13.77 0.11 13.87 
 
-11.94 -0.04 -11.98 
 
1.74 -0.10 1.64 
IOMANU 17.84 1.01 18.81 
 
-2.55 -0.10 -2.65 
 
2.56 -0.22 2.35 
IPOWER 3.77 -5.04 -0.73 
 
0.56 -0.42 0.18 
 
0.79 -0.40 0.42 
IWATER 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.20 -0.05 0.16 
 
0.20 -0.05 0.16 
SCONST 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.03 0.00 0.03 
 
0.03 0.00 0.03 
STRNSP -2.18 0.27 -1.88 
 
1.22 -0.52 0.76 
 
1.27 -0.54 0.80 
SOSERV -6.49 2.66 -4.21  0.40 -0.14 0.29   0.51 -0.18 0.36 
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Table 8-6: KenCGE Model Results –Prices– % Change From Base-Run  
 
    Real wage rate   Nominal wage rate  
  
for production labor 
 
for production labor 
Sectors  
 
exp2 exp3 exp4 
 
exp2 exp3 exp4 
         AGRICU 
 
1.39 -0.18 1.25 
 
0.65 -0.59 0.13 
IMINIG 
 
-6.28 -1.54 -7.69 
 
-6.97 -1.95 -8.71 
IMEATP 
 
21.54 -3.34 18.43 
 
20.65 -3.74 17.12 
IFISHP 
 
4.11 0.66 4.70 
 
3.35 0.24 3.54 
IFRVEG 
 
4.98 1.73 6.56 
 
4.21 1.30 5.38 
IOILFT 
 
6.61 0.30 6.94 
 
5.82 -0.12 5.76 
IDAIRY 
 
11.27 -1.48 9.89 
 
10.46 -1.89 8.67 
IGMILL 
 
5.28 -1.26 4.19 
 
4.51 -1.67 3.04 
IBAKRY 
 
20.82 -2.06 18.73 
 
19.94 -2.46 17.41 
ISUGAR 
 
1.69 -0.47 1.28 
 
0.94 -0.89 0.16 
ICOFFE 
 
2.27 0.81 2.99 
 
1.52 0.39 1.85 
ITEAP 
 
7.87 1.88 9.53 
 
7.07 1.46 8.32 
IOTFDS 
 
-0.48 -0.10 -0.53 
 
-1.21 -0.52 -1.64 
IBEVEG 
 
9.93 -1.12 8.91 
 
9.12 -1.54 7.71 
ITOBAC 
 
6.22 0.85 7.03 
 
5.45 0.43 5.84 
ITEXTL 
 
2.20 0.23 2.42 
 
1.45 -0.19 1.29 
ILEATH 
 
5.29 -0.07 5.29 
 
4.52 -0.49 4.12 
IWOODP 
 
-2.37 -0.51 -2.80 
 
-3.09 -0.92 -3.88 
IPAPER 
 
-8.96 0.15 -8.84 
 
-9.63 -0.27 -9.85 
IPRINT 
 
1.28 0.23 1.50 
 
0.53 -0.19 0.38 
IPETRO 
 
9.01 -0.08 9.09 
 
8.21 -0.49 7.88 
IBCHEM 
 
12.30 0.12 12.48 
 
11.48 -0.30 11.24 
ICHEMP 
 
6.59 -1.48 5.23 
 
5.81 -1.89 4.07 
IPHARM 
 
25.80 0.53 26.66 
 
24.88 0.12 25.26 
IRPLST 
 
9.89 -0.44 9.64 
 
9.09 -0.85 8.42 
INOMTL 
 
8.42 -1.52 7.08 
 
7.62 -1.93 5.90 
IMETAL 
 
1.21 0.21 1.43 
 
0.47 -0.21 0.31 
IMEQPT 
 
8.67 0.45 9.12 
 
7.87 0.03 7.91 
IOMANU 
 
0.42 0.06 0.53 
 
-0.31 -0.36 -0.58 
IPOWER 
 
6.44 -2.59 3.98 
 
5.66 -3.00 2.83 
IWATER 
 
6.01 -1.08 5.04 
 
5.23 -1.49 3.88 
SCONST 
 
3.88 -0.53 3.40 
 
3.12 -0.94 2.25 
STRNSP 
 
7.47 -3.56 4.24 
 
6.68 -3.96 3.09 
SOSERV  3.50 -0.35 3.17  2.74 -0.77 2.03 
 
